793.00/146
The British Chargé (Chilton) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 20.]
Sir: In my note No. 738 of the 11th instant on the subject of China I had the honour to state that His Majesty’s Government would regard it as most unfortunate if the replies of all the Powers to the Chinese note were not identical, and I added that my Government regarded this as an essential sign of solidity in the interests of which they were prepared to defer to the American draft.
His Majesty’s Government now have reason to believe that the Japanese Government may be inclined to question the inclusion of Chinese tariff autonomy in the agenda of the conference to be held in the near future, and that the Japanese attitude may result in a divergence of view between the Powers and consequent further delay in replying to the Chinese note. This being so, His Majesty’s Representative at Peking has been reminded that recent developments in China would seem to indicate the use of a movement aiming at the abolition of extraterritoriality and looking to complete fiscal autonomy. This movement, in the opinion of my Government, cannot be ignored and can only be met by a gradual and dignified surrender of treaty rights by the Powers.
As you are aware, His Majesty’s Government were originally in favour of indicating their policy, as outlined very briefly above, in their reply to the Chinese note. When, however, the British draft note was amended by the Japanese Government my Government did not adopt a rigid attitude but recommended the Japanese alterations to the United States and other Governments concerned, although His Majesty’s Government are still inclined to feel that it would be more advantageous to adopt the course originally suggested. Should the United States and Japan agree to omit all mention of the decision of the Powers to consider helpfully the reasonable and just aspirations of China on the question of tariffs, or succeed in agreeing to a formula of compromise, His Majesty’s Government would offer no objection.
Mr. Palairet has had it made clear to him, however, that if no agreement can be arrived at between the Governments of the United States and of Japan, His Majesty’s Government would have no option but to decide upon a draft of their own similar, if not identic, with either the Japanese or American. I need hardly add that my Government would regret exceedingly having to take such action, as it would inevitably draw attention to the differences existing among the Powers. This, in the opinion of my Government, would be more [Page 821] likely to encourage the pretensions of China than a carefully drafted identic undertaking to cooperate in furthering the aspirations of that country.
I have [etc.]