793.00/73: Telegram
The Chargé in China ( Mayer ) to the Secretary of State
[Received 2:45 p.m.]
263. 1. Mr. Yoshizawa, the Japanese Minister, called upon me and stated that his Government had instructed him to discuss informally with the British Chargé and myself the question of more complete cooperation between the representatives of Great Britain, Japan, and the United States in order to expedite settlement of the Shanghai affair. He said that his Government thought that it would be of great benefit if the three of us could be the force to lead the Heads of Legation to an early settlement of this matter. Yoshizawa added that he had delayed complying with his instructions so that he could consider his own opinion that from a practical standpoint it might be better to include our French and Italian colleagues in any such cooperation. He said that the French Minister had shown himself always willing to cooperate, that the Italian Minister as senior minister was in a practical sense the leader of the Heads of Legation, and that there had been and continued to be excellent cooperation and understanding between the representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States.
2. Yoshizawa had called upon Mr. Palairet, the British Chargé, before calling upon me and had discussed the matter with him. Mr. Palairet had suggested that it might be advisable to include all the Washington Conference powers in any such proposed cooperation as the Japanese Government had suggested.
3. The Japanese Minister asked me to tell him informally what I thought on the subject. I replied that I could only speak for myself since on a matter of this kind I would have to ask my Government for instructions before I could give any answer that he could make to his Government. I added that as the new American Minister was soon to arrive I had some hesitancy even to discuss this matter, implying future action by our Legation. I did, however, informally discuss the subject with Yoshizawa, my special purpose being to sound him out. I told him that from a practical standpoint we believed that the fewer persons who cooperated in a situation the better it was. [Page 772] I said, however, that I fully appreciated Yoshizawa’s idea of the practical utility of having the French and Italian Ministers join in such cooperation as the Japanese Government seemed to contemplate. I expressed the opinion that for the purpose in view the eight Washington Conference powers seemed a rather unwieldy combination. I raised the objection of the national susceptibilities of treaty powers which were not represented in the Washington Conference, experience with regard to which we had had in connection with the joint note of December 9, 1924 from the Washington Conference powers to the Chinese Government.74 I questioned whether it would be beneficial to create a block of Washington Conference powers just in order to expedite results in the present situation as such a block would be either too large or not large enough.
4. Yoshizawa and I agreed fully regarding the attitudes of the French and Italian Governments. The former had completely changed since the settlement of the gold franc issue and now seemed anxious to aid China in every proper way. For this reason the French Minister doubtless would generally be in accord with what I consider to be the American, British, and Japanese policy with respect to China, i. e., a sympathetic attitude toward China’s aspirations, assistance in that direction by proper revision of treaties as fast as the Chinese show ability to fulfill their responsibilities, and the achievement by China of a stable government without foreign interference. Yoshizawa and I agreed that the Italian attitude toward China differed rather sharply from that stated above. We both feel that the Italian Government seems disposed to make the satisfactory settlement by China of the Italian gold franc case and the payment to Italy of certain former Austrian bonds a condition to a sympathetic attitude toward China generally and specifically to wholehearted support to the early convening of the Tariff Conference. Yoshizawa also pointed out that although two months ago France had promised to ratify the Washington Conference treaties she had not yet done so.
5. The Japanese Minister then came to the point which I think was the reason for his appeal to me. He said that he believed his Government contemplated a larger cooperation between the American, British, and Japanese Governments with respect to China than merely cooperation in the affair at Shanghai. He repeated in several different ways this extended idea of cooperation, which gave me every reason to believe that Japan is making a bid on a definite basis for cooperation in China of these three powers. I told Yoshizawa that I could not express an opinion on this very important conception and [Page 773] its many implications but said that I would be glad to comply with his request to report the same for consideration by my Government. At this point I questioned Yoshizawa as to Japan’s attitude toward China. After discussion I summarized its attitude as I saw it as follows:
With respect to Manchuria, Japan had taken a position which it believed was vital to Japan’s existence as a nation; but as for the rest of China, Japan wishes it to work out its own destiny free from foreign interference so that an authoritative, stable government may be established, and Japan believes that as concerns treaty readjustment and the like the national aspirations of China should receive sympathetic consideration. Yoshizawa was evidently pleased to confirm this summary as being exactly the attitude of the Japanese Government.
6. I call the Department’s attention to the statement by Waterlow in the third sentence of the telegram from Perkins at the London Embassy, 195, July 1, 1 p.m.75 I received this telegram after my conversation with the Japanese Minister.
7. For a long time I have believed, as previously reported, that considering the situation with respect to Japan and the Soviet Union in Manchuria, the menace in Mongolia from the Soviet Union, and the connections which Feng Yu-hsiang76 undoubtedly has with the Soviets and in general with the radical elements in China, the Japanese must sooner or later decide whether to join an Asiatic block with China and the Soviet Union or to remain, so to speak, a Western power. The proposal reported herein may well be evidence of a decision by Japan to remain in the concert of Western powers if she can be assured of a well-defined understanding with America and Great Britain for cooperation in China. Japan must also realize the advantage of such cooperation in view of the agitation against the Japanese which is now rather widespread in China. The Japanese may have concluded that the American Government is about to assume a more decided leadership or a certain independence of action in China showing more willingness than the other interested powers to respond sympathetically to China’s aspirations for readjustments in her foreign relations. Japan may therefore wish to align herself with America both to keep us from winning undue prestige from such an independent position and to benefit by being in some way associated with America in the pursuance of a policy of this kind which would be popular with the Chinese.
8. Aside from the angles mentioned above with respect to such an understanding between the American, British, and Japanese Governments [Page 774] as is contemplated, I will only suggest a fact which may be worthy of serious consideration, which is that by aligning ourselves in such an association we would be taking an important step toward the adjustment of our relations with Japan as regards the recent immigration-law difficulties and, of even more importance, that it would be a move toward detaching Japan, at least for a time, from a pan-Asiatic alliance with the Soviet Union.
9. I am mailing a copy of this telegram to Tokyo.
- See telegrams No. 472, Dec. 4, 1924, and No. 478, Dec. 9, from the Chargé in China, and telegram No. 302, Dec. 5, to the Chargé in China, Foreign Relations, 1924, vol. i, pp. 431, 439, and 434.↩
- Post, p. 835.↩
- Commander in chief of the People’s Army and director general of the Northwest Frontier Defence.↩