893.00/6507: Telegram
The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 14—2:40 p.m.]
329. 1. The consul general at Canton, believing that an attack on the French and British Concessions at Shameen by the Canton military forces is possible, asks whether it would be advisable for the United States naval forces to unite with the French and British forces in the defense of the island if so requested by the authorities of either Government, or whether it would be preferable to limit their activities to aid in removing noncombatants from danger zone and to safeguarding the property and the lives of Americans.
2. While I do not believe in the likelihood of an attack of this sort, it seems to me that it is none the less so obviously possible that the duty lies upon us of deciding beforehand and authoritatively on the policy to be followed in such an event, in order that the consul general and the senior naval officer of the American cruiser should not have to make a decision without warning and in grave danger of extensive loss of life and of property, on their own responsibility. This sort of a decision as to the policy to be pursued seems the more advisable at present because of the large number of other places in all parts of China where a situation of like nature might well occur at any moment as a consequence of local unrest.
[Page 759]3. A distinction should be noted between the situation under consideration and that at Shanghai where we take part in and share the responsibility for the administration and protection of the foreign International Settlement. Insofar, however, as concerns Shameen the French and British authorities have insisted on their own sole responsibility.
4. It seems evident that our participation should not be warranted merely for the protection of a French or a British concession. If we could in fact isolate this question from other considerations, no doubt it might be possible that it would be preferable for us to avoid involving ourselves in any sort of dispute to support anything like a territorial claim for any other nation.
5. It appears, however, practically impossible to separate this problem from larger considerations which would be brought into action in any case of this sort if the American forces were either to remain inactive or to retire in the course of an attack possibly directed ostensibly and at first against the British or any other nationality, but, when thoroughly analyzed found to spring from motives in which we and other nations would be implicated to only a lesser degree. Such action would be particularly lacking in courtesy in cases where the lives and property of Americans were in danger of attack. In a case of that sort it would in fact be practically impossible to give adequate protection to American nationals without taking our part in a united plan for defense.
6. Further than the obvious precaution of withholding our naval forces from foreign concessions in which the interests of Americans are not implicated, I acknowledge that no way presents itself by which we can differentiate our own interests from those of other nations, so as to avoid our possible implication as participants in defending any foreign concession where American nationals may have become established. We have considered the possibility of a withdrawal of Americans at any time when an attack threatened, but aside from the regrettable effect that this would have on the feeling of the foreigners and on the possibility of cooperation with other foreign nations whose interests in China are in substance of the same nature as our own, I cannot help thinking that such a withdrawal at a moment of crisis would in itself have a tendency toward encouraging and bringing about separating hostile action on the part of the Chinese, which would finally involve us, beyond doubt, no less than it would the nation first attacked. Though, for the time being, the agitation against the position of foreigners in China is concentrated principally against Japanese and British, it should be remembered that such a distinction is, in great measure, a matter of tactics on the part of the leaders in the agitation; and we should also not forget that to those inspiring the attack its purpose would be perhaps not [Page 760] directly but none the less actually in opposition to American interests and will be a benefit to China. It is especially the case in Canton, which is in great measure under Soviet influence at present, that the motivating force is antagonistic to the “imperialistic and capitalistic” powers and opposed to the entire political and economic system of which the United States forms as large a part as does Great Britain.
7. Hence I am unable to avoid the conclusion that in Canton and other treaty ports where a crisis of like nature might occur, it would be preferable for the United States naval forces to remain in order to protect American citizens and their interests and, with that in view, it would be advisable for them to be authorized to unite in such defense measures as the commander in his discretion may deem necessary to accomplish that end after mediation appears no longer possible.
8. The commander of the South China Patrol has presented this same question of policy to the commander in chief and I am sending him a copy of this telegram.
9. I should appreciate an early reply as to the Government’s policy in this matter.