Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1925, Volume I

893.5045/170: Telegram

The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

Peking, August 8, 1925—9 a.m.
[Received 6:13 p.m.]

319. Your number 192, August 6, 6 p.m.

1. Minister for Foreign Affairs August 6th recounted to me an informal conversation with British Chargé d’Affaires in which the former had expressed objection to the proposed judicial inquiry into the Shanghai affair on the ground that it would merely delay a settlement of the case.

2. He asked my views and I told him that while I had received no final instructions from my Government on this point I was personally of the opinion that such an inquiry would be of value and might in fact obviate delays in the negotiations prescribed otherwise likely to occur through failure to agree on the actual facts involved. He very persistently argued that the reports made by the Chinese commission and by the commission of the diplomatic body would furnish an adequate basis for negotiations, even though they represented ex parte investigations by the two parties in interest. He clearly implied that the Chinese would find it easier to deal with the matter through mutual concessions rather than on the basis of an impartial and precise ascertainment of facts.

3. From this and previous indications of Chinese feeling, I judge that the acceptability of this proposal to the Chinese has been prejudiced by publicity from London regarding the British Government’s intention to bring about a judicial inquiry, these reports having first reached the Chinese in a form that made no reference to Chinese participation.

4. At a meeting of interested ministers August 7th senior minister informed us that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him the Chinese Government had noted press reports concerning the proposed inquiry and stated that he hoped no such proposal would be made as the Chinese Government would categorically refuse to entertain it and would not only be unwilling to participate but would take no cognizance of any of the findings of the inquiry. Senior minister said he inferred, though it was not stated, that it was the intention of the Chinese Government to decline all cooperation in such matters as the summoning of witnesses under Chinese jurisdiction.

5. This attitude on the part of the Chinese disappoints the hope that they would regard as a conciliatory gesture an offer to have them participate in the inquiry: and I am afraid that if the powers were not committed to such a course of action in consequence of publicity given the assurances, I should now be disposed to recommend that we abandon a course which under present circumstances seems likely to aggravate rather than diminish the feeling among the Chinese. It is doubtless too late now to do that; and our problem is to relieve the tense situation as best we can despite the further difficulty that has arisen.

6. Japanese Minister has now stated that his Government assented on two conditions to the British proposal for the inquiry: First, that it should not stand in the way of early acceptance of the offered resignation of McEuen, the Shanghai police chief whom the Chinese generally regard as responsible for the shooting; and, second, that negotiations for the settlement of Shanghai matters be undertaken as promptly as possible. It is the view of the Japanese Government that pending the result of judicial inquiry into the facts of shooting we might at once take up with the Chinese negotiations concerning indirectly related questions of rendition of Mixed Court and of Chinese representations on Municipal Council.

7. The British Government has telegraphed to its Legation here a draft of a document by which it is proposed the diplomatic body should constitute the commission of inquiry. This draft contemplates not merely that the commission shall be a fact-finding body, but provides further that they shall “make such recommendations as they may think proper as to action which is called for in the circumstances as established by them and as to any steps which should in their opinion be taken by authorities ultimately responsible for administration at International Settlement at Shanghai with a view to preventing similar occurrences in future.” This seems to me to go far beyond the purposes of a judicial inquiry and to confuse the functions of the inquiry with political considerations. Assuming that the Chinese will not participate, the so-called judicial conference would in fact be scarcely more than new foreign agency to reconsider the conclusions already reached by the diplomatic body and now held in abeyance.

8. While the subject of a judicial inquiry is thus beclouded, no progress is being made towards a settlement of Shanghai affairs, the agitations continue, and the more responsible elements among Chinese find themselves increasingly embarrassed in dealing with agitators by reason of what appears to them the evasiveness and lack of candor of the foreign powers in dealing with the present crisis. The situation is drifting dangerously, and it seems to me important that we should try to bring about some solution of the present muddle. It appears that the British hold the key to the situation, and since their Chargé d’Affaires seems to have exhausted his influence with his own Foreign Office in the course of his contest with the ultraconservative British consulate at Shanghai, I venture to recommend that you urge upon the government at London the necessity for action which will in some degree meet a situation in China which is critical for all foreign interests and particularly harmful to the British.

9. Concretely, I think we should urge upon the British Government the following plan: (a) Resignation of McEuen to be accepted immediately; (b) negotiations to be begun without delay by informing the Foreign Office of our assent in principle to the rendition of Mixed Court and to Chinese representation on Municipal Council; (c) judicial inquiry, if British Government still insists upon it, to be limited to finding of facts. Points (a) and (b) substantially correspond with Japanese conditions referred to in paragraph 6.

10. The British Government seems to have adopted the views of Shanghai interests that McEuen should be retained as chief of police unless and until he may be judicially determined to have been culpable in the shooting affair. This view ignores the fact that in the light of the present crisis in China essential question is not as to his culpability but as to the expediency of retaining him in his post despite the fact that traditional Chinese concepts of official responsibilities point him out as one whose retention or departure from office constitutes a test whether or not the foreigners are sincere in their professions of regret and of desire to settle the Shanghai affair. The Council might well let McEuen go with a pension because so long as he is retained it will be difficult or impossible to negotiate in mutual confidence or good will with the Chinese. His ostensibly voluntary resignation was already in the hands of the Municipal Council when the British Government proposed that action be suspended pending judicial inquiry. If that Government realized what from this viewpoint is apparent as the obvious necessity of his withdrawal from the situation, there should be no difficulty in its bringing about that result.

11. As for commencing negotiations on the subjects indirectly related to the incident of May 30, while withholding discussion of that incident pending the result of the judicial inquiry, I feel that this somewhat illogical order of procedure would be justified by the necessity of putting an end to the delays in commencing negotiations.

12. The judicial inquiry should be very strictly confined to the determination of the facts in connection with the shooting, and in view of the antagonism aroused among the Chinese it would be prudent to minimize the emphasis placed upon it.

13. If this proposal meets with your approval I suggest that you authorize me to discuss the matter with the Japanese Minister with a view to his asking his Government to make representations in a similar sense to the British Foreign Office.

MacMurray