793.00/75
The British Chargé (Chilton) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 10.]
Sir: I have the honour to invite reference to the recent communications which I have addressed to you on the subject of events in China ending with my note No. 684 of the 7th instant.32 Owing to the rapid developments of the situation and to the dangers with [Page 612] which it is fraught, His Majesty’s Government consider it to be of the utmost importance that their future policy towards China, as also that of the other interested Powers, should be clearly defined at the earliest possible moment. I am accordingly instructed to lay before you the following summary of the situation as it now appears to His Majesty’s Government which, for purposes of convenience, is grouped under geographical headings according to the areas affected by the present disturbances.
(1) North China.
Chang, after making overtures (which have not been encouraged) for support to enable him to crush Communist elements which are fomenting the present anti-foreign agitation, seems to be drawing in his horns with a corresponding increase of Feng’s military power in and around Peking. Chang is apparently embarrassed by Russian activities in that part of Northern China, which he is himself primarily concerned to maintain as the basis of his operations. Thus the situation, as viewed by His Majesty’s Government, is increasingly propitious for the emergence of Feng, who has a considerable and well trained force at his disposal, and is being supplied with munitions of war from Russia, as a national patriotic leader, pledged, with Russian encouragement, to destroy the position of the foreign powers in China, He has already openly declared himself in favour of war upon His Majesty’s Government. The present state of Chinese feeling, which is being systematically and deliberately exploited by Soviet agents, therefore makes it necessary seriously to consider the possibility that Feng may at any moment translate his words into deeds with results which must be a matter of grave concern to other treaty Powers as it is to His Majesty’s Government.
(2) Yang Tze Valley.
Here there have been a series of disorders which, as the latest information at the disposal of His Majesty’s Government indicates, may at any moment be repeated and endanger the safety of treaty ports on this waterway. The resulting adverse effects upon the whole position of foreign interests in China hardly require to be emphasized.
(3) Canton.
The aggressive attitude of the Communist Government now installed at Canton is proved by recent events and it is impossible not to feel considerable uneasiness regarding the position of the foreign community at Shanghai [Shameen?] who are on the defensive; the danger presented by Canton is not purely local. The Canton authorities possess in the Whampoa Officers’ Training School, an institution which His Majesty’s Government are reliably informed is a distinctly military asset. It is partly staffed with Russian instructors and must be regarded as the possible nucleus of a military force which, under conditions now prevailing, may seriously affect the whole Chinese situation. Indeed, recent events appear, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Naval authorities, to indicate the possibility of a Russo-Chinese attempt to blockade the passage of the Canton [Page 613] river. In these circumstances, it is subject for consideration whether immediate steps ought not to be taken if possible to avert and, failing prevention, to provide against a combination of dangers which, if they materialize, must inevitably lead to forcible action on a considerable scale for the protection of foreign interests, life and property.
In deciding what policy they should adopt to cope with the exigencies of the situation, His Majesty’s Government are above all anxious that their attitude should in all respects possible correspond with that of the United States Government. I am accordingly instructed to enquire whether the United States Government are in general agreement with the foregoing summary and, in the affirmative event, I should be grateful to learn at the earliest opportunity, what steps your Government consider should be taken to meet the situation, together with a statement of their reasons for any action proposed.
I have [etc.]