893.00/6109

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador ( Howard )

Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note No. 309 of March 27, 1925, in which it is stated that the British Government fears that civil war may again break out in the near future in North China to the serious detriment of the country in general and to its arteries of communication in particular. In view of these circumstances, you state that the British Ambassador in [Page 608] Tokyo has been instructed to ascertain from the Japanese Government whether it desires to make any proposals with a view to international consultation or the use of diplomatic pressure upon the rival Chinese groups so as to prevent the hostilities now threatened. You add that it appears to the British Government that this is an opportune moment for Japan to submit constructive proposals calling for joint pacific action and that you have been directed to solicit the cooperation of the American Government in approaching Japan upon this important matter.

The seriousness of the present situation in China, with its menace of a further outbreak of civil war, has not failed to cause this Government also the greatest concern; and it has therefore given the most careful consideration to the proposals of the British Government as stated in your note. As a result of a thorough review of the matter, I venture to submit the following observations as briefly summarizing the views of this Government:

(1)
The use of diplomatic pressure upon the rival Chinese groups so as to prevent hostilities would in effect constitute a form of interference in the domestic affairs of China. In the recent hostilities, it has been the carefully observed policy of the principal Powers concerned, including Japan, to abstain from such intervention, a policy which this Government believes has had much to do with the comparative immunity of foreign persons and property within the areas affected. It does not appear that the hostilities now threatened are likely to be of a character essentially different from such conflicts as have hitherto occurred, and this Government is scarcely inclined to believe, in view of the declared policy of the Japanese Government of non-interference in such matters, that a suggestion to that Government that it initiate a démarche of the character described, would prove acceptable. In this connection, the speech of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs at the recent opening of the Diet appears most pertinent,—particularly the statement that the Japanese Government had no intention whatever of interfering in the domestic affairs of China and that it had consistently conformed to that policy.
(2)
Irrespective, however, of the attitude of the Japanese Government toward a proposal to apply diplomatic pressure with a view to the prevention of hostilities, this Government is of the view that pressure limited to joint pacific action would not prove effectual and would in all probability be disregarded by whichever faction sought to profit by taking the offensive.
(3)
Aside from the question of the doubtful efficacy of the course proposed, this Government cannot escape the conviction that such an effort to influence by external pressure the course of Chinese domestic politics would almost certainly aggravate, and perhaps render critical, [Page 609] the present wide-spread anti-foreign sentiment among certain classes of the Chinese people. As the British Government is aware, the last few months have seen a recrudescence of such sentiment, which has manifested itself acutely at various places throughout China and has appeared in different forms, opposing foreign capital, foreign education, and foreign Christian missions. While this Government has no desire to exaggerate the dangers of this situation, it is reluctant to assume the risk of exacerbating such sentiment by adopting a course which seems likely at the same time to prove ineffectual for the purposes in mind, and to afford a basis for a possible charge of favoring one faction as against another.

This Government, therefore, while viewing with the greatest sympathy the objects which the British Government has in mind, and not wishing to close the door to a consideration of any practical suggestion which may be evolved, regrets that it cannot see its way to adopt the course of action proposed in your note of March 27.

Accept [etc.]

Frank B. Kellogg