Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1925, Volume I

893.00/6110: Telegram

The Minister in China ( Schurman ) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

Peking , March 29, 1925—8 p.m.
[Received 6 p.m.]

127. Department’s telegram No. 56 of March 27, 5 p.m.

1. Frequently and recently I have warned the Department that further fighting will inevitably take place in China.

2. For the last three years the grounds for the action now proposed in the first paragraph of the British note have existed not less flagrantly in substantially the same form with only slight change of names. The Chinese have suffered terribly during all this time and foreign trade has been greatly handicapped. Transportation by railway was almost completely paralyzed from September 1924 to February 1925. The Peking-Mukden, Tientsin-Pukow, and Shanghai-Nanking lines, in which controlling financial interest is British, were among the railways included.

3. The statement in the British note that Japan is the great power most directly concerned, is not true, the British standing foremost in the commercial interests for which all nations alike cultivate China. The leading position of Japan is true only in respect to the imperialistic position which has been acquired forcibly in Manchuria by the Japanese. The Soviet Union is a formidable rival in this respect as well as in geographical proximity. I believe that this British proposal reestablishes in effect the Japanese contentions as to her dominant position in relation to China which was crystallized in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement²³ which the Washington Conference happily canceled,²⁴ or at least that it offers an opportunity to reestablish these contentions.

4. Probably railway construction in China and the development of commerce are not the chief motives of the British Government. Since the World War, Great Britain is more than ever dependent upon foreign trade for its economic life. Owing to military and political disorders the Chinese market has come far short of the expectations of the British financial and trading community in Shanghai and the treaty ports. Japan is as much interested in advancing her Chinese trade which has suffered both from general causes and from boycotting. To appeal to both the trading and imperialistic instincts of the Japanese is a clever play on the part of the British Government. There is reason to expect cooperation by France because of French policy toward China. Because of our “hands off” policy, American cooperation is the least to be expected.

5. The British have another motive. Great Britain has been unpopular with the Japanese and has been the object of constant criticism from them ever since the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was abrogated. The policy of the British regarding the base at Singapore has greatly intensified this feeling. The sending of the present British note to the Japanese Government is a means of improving the British position in Japan without disadvantage, unless, indeed, the United States should offer criticism because the British are not adhering to the American policy of masterly inactivity in China. Another consideration is whether the French and Japanese might not use this move to improve their own relations with the Soviet Union.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7. Ostensibly the purpose of the British proposal is to prevent hostilities which now threaten. The means to be used is international consultation or the bringing of diplomatic pressure upon the rival Chinese factions. Japan is to be the primary agency, the Japanese Government being requested to offer constructive proposals for united, peaceable action.

8. As the initiating agent, Japan will consider her own interests and almost certainly will support Chang as she did in last fall’s fighting. If Chang and Tuan need a modification of the arms embargo for the benefit of the national government or a new loan to enable them to carry on, the Japanese would probably give them support.

9. The means proposed for carrying out this suggestion, whether international consultation, peaceful action, or pressure, would not be effective with any party except Chang Tso-lin. He would become the protégé of the foreign governments. All his rivals, especially the Kuomintang, Feng Yu-hsiang, the Communists, radicals, and students (a most powerful factor in the existing political situation) would appeal to racial and national feeling against the foreign imperialists, who, by using the military, would dominate China. I fully agree with you that antiforeign feeling would be aroused in China by the suggested program.

10. The program suggested would not obtain the end sought. It would not prevent hostilities if they are to occur. Foreign powers cannot independently settle China’s political and military problems. China herself alone can solve these problems. The powers can only facilitate a settlement. They should avoid even the appearance of intervening on the side of any faction or group in the conflict which impends, but should give all appropriate recognition and encouragement to any governmental authority which may emerge independently with reasonable likelihood of authority and stability. The first three paragraphs of the Department’s telegram No. 293 of November 25, 1924, 6 p.m.²⁵ apply without qualification to the present situation and I entirely concur with the views there stated.

11. The existing military and political chaos is a standing menace to China and to the peace of the world as well as a great obstacle to commerce. Upon the collapse of a dynasty such chaos has been a common phenomenon in the history of China and sometimes has lasted for decades. Intelligent Chinese realize, however, that the annihilation of time and space and the contact with foreign countries make it necessary that they establish a new and workable government within a shorter interval than in bygone centuries. It is my deliberate opinion that sympathetic, thoughtful, and helpful cooperation with the Chinese is the wisest policy for the United States to pursue in the present crisis; the same policy which we have always followed in the past.

This telegram is repeated to Tokyo.

Schurman

23. Foreign Relations, 1917, pp. 264–265.
24. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement was not canceled by the Washington Conference. For cancelation of the agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. ii, pp. 591 ff., and ibid., 1923, vol. ii, pp. 455 ff.
25. Not printed; this telegram quoted instruction No. 434, Nov. 24, 1924, to the Ambassador in Great Britain, ibid., 1924, vol. i, p. 423.