893.00/5952: Telegram

The Minister in China ( Schurman ) to the Secretary of State

28. 1. At noon January 17th British Minister came to confer with me in regard to a telegram dated January 16, 8 p.m., he had just received from British Acting Consul General Pratt, Shanghai, of which pertinent portion was as follows:

“The China Association representing leading British interests in Shanghai have made representations to me that measures should be devised to prevent a recurrence of fighting in immediate vicinity Shanghai. Various proposals have been made involving the sending to Shanghai of an international military force. The grave difficulties attending despatch of such a force are obvious, nevertheless I am of opinion that the time has now come when this step should be taken. Result of next conflict may well be that large bodies of soldiers may wish to enter Settlement but may refuse to surrender their arms. [Page 593] Specific measures taken is a military question but my own opinion is that it would probably suffice to occupy two strategical points, namely, North Railway Station and Lunghua Junction, thus denying use of loop line to Chinese troops.”

2. I pointed out to my colleague that this telegram (1) did not state that the present international naval forces and local volunteers were insufficient to protect life and property in the settlement, and (2) did not claim that the military objective indicated and military measures suggested had the approval of any military or naval authority. I also said that the course proposed by Pratt and his China Association was an act of forcible intervention on Chinese territory. I declared emphatically that my Government was opposed to such a policy and that I would not even consider it unless the naval authorities reported that it was imperative necessity for the protection of American and other foreign lives in Shanghai. The British Minister shared these views and so telegraphs Pratt January 17.

3. In case the Chief Executive succeeds his policy of detaching Sun Chuan-fang from the alliance with Chi Hsieh-yuan under which aggressions [aggressive] hostilities against Lu Yung-hsiang were begun in the neighborhood of Shanghai, it is probable that Chi will be defeated and in that event his soldiers might get out of hand, might refuse to give up their arms and might loot Shanghai. Bui: the alternative is equally conceivable, namely, that these soldiers would make no trouble or if they did they would be restrained by the victorious forces of Lu or Sun.

4. Foreign intervention in the way proposed would be a benefit to the present Peking Government and the Anfu Party and disadvantageous to Chi whom it would shut off from the arsenal. It is not improbable that it would be favored by the Japanese. Among the British and some other foreign merchants in Shanghai there has been always strong element in favor of military intervention in China and they may be utilizing the present situation to get foreign governments committed to that program.

5. The following telegram, dated January 17, 3 p.m. from Cunningham received this morning:

“The senior consul is addressing a protest to Marshals Chi and Sun against the recent hostilities on the border of the French concession which were a grave menace to foreign lives and property, and a demand that no Chinese troops remain within rifle shot of foreign-inhabited area in the future and that any such troops within such radius at present be removed at once. This is the result of meeting this morning of consuls general for Italy, United States, Japan, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and France.

That an international military force should be sent immediately to Shanghai to ensure compliance with this demand, which is essential [Page 594] for security of foreign settlements, was the unanimous opinion of the meeting.”

Foregoing will probably be considered by diplomatic body at a meeting which had already been brought up [called for?] January 19th.

6. I have telegraphed Consul General Cunningham as follows:

“January 17, 10 p.m.

1.
Your January 17, 3 p.m. brings forward a very serious and important proposal and raises a number of points upon which I require information before reaching any conclusion: First, what do you mean by ‘international military force’? Do you mean a force composed army units or an increased naval landing force? Second, is your last paragraph a recommendation of yours or is it advance information of a recommendation which the senior consul intends to address to the [consular body?]? Third, if by ‘international military force’ you [mean] army forces, why do you consider that naval landing forces supported by their ships are not adequate to cope with any situation as has been the case in the past, notably that of some days ago and of last September–October? Fourth, were the protest and demand mentioned in your first paragraph made after consultation with the senior foreign naval officers present or were they made on the judgment alone of the consular officers concerned? Also the same information relative to your statement in last paragraph that compliance with the consular demand is essential for security foreign settlement. Fifth, what Chinese forces are now within the radius you define? Sixth, in your meeting who took the lead and why, if such information available? What was the attitude of the different consuls general?
2.
I assume you realize the extreme seriousness of your proposal if it entails landing of international army units and their occupation Chinese territory while the powers concerned are at peace with China.

Consult with Admiral McVay and telegraph me fully at once in reply to my questions including any other information you may consider necessary or helpful in enabling me to reach a decision concerning any recommendation I may [make?] to the Secretary of State.”

7. We now have Sacramento and two destroyers at Shanghai. Barker, Bone and Whipple with 2 officers and 100 marines left Cavite January 17th and are due at Shanghai January 20th. Admiral McVay now at Shanghai stated at 1 o’clock today:

“Six destroyers sufficient for present needs. Subject to agreement Tsingtau authorities 10,000 interned soldiers will be sent there today and tomorrow on board foreign vessels. Conditions Nanking, Cliinkiang, Shanghai quiet but with general feeling of unrest.”

British have two large cruisers and also river gunboats at Shanghai.

[Page 595]

8. There are large concentrations of Chinese troops in and near Peking, Tientsin, Hankow and Nanking as well as at Shanghai.

9. I intend sending an assistant military attaché to Shanghai by the first available steamer. Train service very irregular.

Schurman