867.602/81: Telegram
The Special Mission at Lausanne to the Secretary of State
[Received June 7—5:46 a.m.]
406. Referring to no. 161 of June 1 from the Department.21 Last night Ismet called upon me, and discussed the general situation at Lausanne. He informed me that he is under pressure from the Allies to admit into the treaty a provision confirming concessions made before the war, upon which work had actually commenced, but which had not been legally validated. He said that the Chester concession is the specific object of this move, and added that in the interests of peace he might be compelled to yield. When he asked for my opinion I said that my Government was fully persuaded that the Turkish Government, which had consistently stood for its legal rights and its national sovereignty, would not now abandon a principle of such importance. Ismet asked what our attitude would be if Turkey yielded. I replied that an unfortunate impression [Page 1017] might be created in the United States by the Turkish surrender. When Ismet suggested that we meet again tonight to discuss the subject, I replied that I did not perceive any advantage in so doing, and I added that if the implication of his suggestion was that I should try to influence the Allies, I ought to explain to him that this was not a question which called for negotiation between the United States and the European powers.
I have had conversations with Rumbold, Pellé, and Montagna since I talked with Ismet. During these interviews Ismet’s statements were confirmed. Among the concessionary companies negotiating at Angora only those having unimportant matters to discuss are reaching a settlement. In particular the claims for losses during the war are rejected by the Turks. It is now regarded as necessary, therefore, to insert into the treaty some general provisions, which Pellé outlined this afternoon as follows: (1) Pre-war concessions to be recognized; (2) contracts to be modified to conform to present business conditions; (3) claims for losses during the war to receive consideration; (4) arbitration of disputes to be arranged for. So far as the United States is concerned these proposals appear quite unobjectionable. Pellé admitted, however, when directly questioned, that under the first point the British draft provided for confirmation of concessions made before the war, upon which work had commenced, but which had not been subjected to all the legal formalities. He gave as an instance the French concessions for the Samsoun-Sivas railway and the port of Samsoun, which, he said, have unquestionably a legal validity, but for which the legal formalities had not been completed, owing to the natural impatience of the Turks to receive the French loan. Pellé told me that he would not insist that these concessionary rights be recognized in the treaty if the French concessionaires could at least agree with the Angora Government upon some basis of compensation. But he seemed far less optimistic over a private agreement between the Turks and the concessionaires than he was when I talked to him last week. I explained to him: (1) that our sole interest was in the principle involved, (2) that we regarded with entire sympathy the French effort to induce Turkey to recognize the validity of commitments made before the war, (3) that the legal aspects of particular French claims did not engage our attention, and (4) that we were bound to have some misgivings over making the treaty an instrument for validating concessions which have a doubtful legality or none at all. Before making these observations I told Pellé that I had no specific instructions and was speaking unofficially.
I made similar statements in conversations with Rumbold and Montagna, both of whom maintained a decisive attitude. In my [Page 1018] interview with Rumbold I referred to the memorandum which the Department addressed to the British Embassy and to the observations therein upon the economic clauses of the draft treaty and especially upon article 94. Rumbold replied that the British Government does not agree with our views, and that the Department had been so informed. It is obvious that the Turkish delegates, who have recently applied to Angora for instructions, may be obliged to yield to the Allies in the matter of pre-war concessions of doubtful validity. The Department may wish, therefore, to amplify the instructions contained in its 161 of June 1, and to prescribe the action I am to take, in case there is presented to the conference the draft of a treaty clause in the above sense.
Copies of documents marked “private”, in support of abovementioned French claims, were sent to me today by Pellé on his own initiative.
I have had another conversation with Montagna since the foregoing was written. He told me that during a long interview with Ismet he had urged the Turkish delegate to concede compensation to the French company; should Ismet do so the treaty clause to which we object would be dropped. Montagna seemed more hopeful than during our conversation last night, as he thinks Ismet will discover some solution of that sort. In view of our declaration that we will resolutely support the principle involved, Montagna agrees with me that there is every reason to avoid bringing the matter up in committee.