767.68119/5: Telegram

The High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

238. It is presumed that the Department appreciates the importance of immediately formulating the precise nature and extent of our sympathy in the approaching Near East settlement in view of the conference now taking place at Mudania and the likelihood that in the near future a peace conference will be convened. There must also be a decision regarding time and method for negotiating with the Turks as well as possibly with the Allies. As the United States is one of the capitulatory powers with extensive vested interests in Turkey, we cannot afford to remain inactive while the Allies give their consent to important changes in the capitulatory regime. The Department may wish therefore to bring the vital interests of the United States in this phase of the settlement to the [Page 881] attention of the Allied Governments and to suggest that while a conference at Paris may settle in principle the reform of capitulations, there should be an express reservation of the details of such reform for consideration at a conference of all the powers concerned. Even if the United States were actively represented at the coming peace conference it would be hard for us to offset the tendency of the Allies, the French especially, to concede to the Turks as much as possible so as to secure a peaceful adjustment of the present crisis. We have such a different point of view from the Allies that in my opinion it would not serve our purpose to take part in the peace conference and by involving ourselves in the consideration of matters of no direct concern to us we might prejudice our real interests. It must be realized that for our Government officially to identify itself at a peace conference with the cause of the Christian minorities would increase still more our difficulty in dealing with the Nationalists with respect to the future of our benevolent institutions and concerning our capitulatory rights. In case it is not practicable to hold a conference on capitulatory rights the only other plan I can suggest is to negotiate a separate agreement with Turkey as soon as the Government at Constantinople and the Nationalists get together and we can deal with a central authority. It will be exceedingly difficult for us to carry on these negotiations as we will be faced by Turks flushed with recent military and possibly diplomatic victory and we will have but little means of bargaining.

Bristol