462.00 R 29/3142: Telegram
The Chargé in France ( Whitehouse ) to the Secretary of State
420. L–19. I am confidentially advised by Meyer, the German Government’s Paris reparation representative, that his Government will submit a note to the commission late today in which the commission will be asked to consider German reparation possibilities. The note will be based on a letter addressed to the German Government by the commission on January 26, last,27 in which the commission declined to consider the German Government’s request for an [inquiry?], on the general grounds that the action which the German Government had taken at that time in suspending payments and deliveries to Belgium and France made it impossible for the commission to take any action on the German request. The German note today will formally announce the purpose of the German Government to meet its reparation engagements up to the limit of its capacity; according to Meyer this proposal should clear the field for the resumption of consideration of the reparation plan by the commission. The note will also make favorable reference to the plan proposed by Belgium.28 The Belgians filed today a long memorandum with the commission which had been received from the German Government containing the latter’s conciliatory [remarks?] on the Belgian scheme.
Delacroix, the Belgian member, expressed some hope that the reparation question would be opened in the commission, an action which would tend to ease German internal position, but France occupies such a dominating position that I have serious doubts that he will be able to stand firm unless he receives strong support from the British and the Italians.
The Italian member of the commission has advised me of his Government’s fears in regard to the internal situation in Germany, where bitter feeling is fast developing and a willingness to support Belgium’s efforts is forcing consideration of the plan in the commission. The Italians, however, are in doubt regarding the real intentions [Page 77] of the French and are convinced that Poincaré is actually committed to a policy of breaking up Germany.
Sir John Bradbury is now in London consulting the British Government. I feel that his personal inclination is that the situation be allowed to develop even to the point of the break-up of Germany, in the belief that the economic consequences will force France later to pass the hat and to accept dictation as to settlement. On the other hand, I know that there is much divergence of opinion in the British Cabinet and I have certain reasons for believing that Bradbury may be instructed to support Belgians and Italians in forcing the opening of a discussion on reparations settlement plan before the commission.
Poincaré’s attitude remains unchanged, and he cannot fail to realize that the only result of the present line of conduct will be the break-up of Germany. On October 16 last the German Chargé here called on Poincaré and formally but in secrecy advised him that passive resistance had been suspended, and at the same time requested conversation with the French Government regarding the commencement of work in the Ruhr. Poincaré replied that such a request from the German Government was unnecessary and that the French alone would deal with this question with the German industrials. The Chargé then informed Poincaré that the German Government was prepared to make proposals to the Reparation Commission because it believed that this was what Poincaré wanted. Poincaré replied that such a course as proposed did not interest him; that it was premature to send a note to the commission; and that if Germany did so, he would instruct the French delegate to decline to discuss such proposals until the situation should be reestablished as it was on January 11. In addition Poincaré stated that he would prevent the commission from negotiating directly with the German Government.
The foregoing is the substance of the French and German communiqués concerning the discussion between the Chargé and Poincaré and makes obvious the entirely unreasonable policy followed by Poincaré if he actually expects reparation payments from Germany in the future.
The foregoing is admittedly the situation as it exists today. I feel that the most critical situation will develop on Friday morning, October 26, when the commission will determine the disposition of the German note. French observers close to Poincaré intimate that he and Barthou have stated more or less openly that they would put the German note “in the garage” in the same manner that they had the Belgian plan. If this should happen Friday I can foresee no other result but the break-up of Germany. On the other hand, I feel that the whole situation hangs in such a fine balance that [Page 78] some mild expression of opinion from Washington might sway it in favor of a constructive line of action. There are ample premises for such an expression of opinion for, apart from the human suffering and the economic and social disturbances that are bound to result from the present French course of action, our own Berlin treaty and the army cost agreement are technically in jeopardy. On premises such as these we are in a position to act constructively in such a way as to appeal to the saner elements in Europe without running the danger of any important criticism. I realize that broad issues are involved which the Department must consider and which may make my suggestion impractical. The Department may rely on my maintaining complete silence here.
Should the Department give my suggestions favorable consideration, the following method would have additionally constructive results: (a) The Department immediately to advise the Belgian, British, French, and Italian Governments through diplomatic channels that the present situation in Germany is causing the Government of the United States great anxiety; that the break-up of Germany would jeopard seriously not only American interests but those of the whole of Europe; that the action of the Reparation Commission on Friday when taking the German plan under consideration will greatly influence the future course of financial rehabilitation in Germany, and that the Government of the United States hopes therefore that the Allied Governments will neglect no [proposal?] of negotiations which would have even the slightest chance of success; or (b) the Department to [issue?] a definite authoritative statement along lines similar to those proposed in (a), which I would be authorized to communicate to the Reparation Commission when the German plan comes up for consideration on Friday. The Department could rely upon my declining to be drawn into any ensuing discussion if I did not have specific instructions.
Suggestion (a) obviates publicity, but it has the disadvantage that the four Allied Governments will not have had time to digest it and to instruct their delegates on the commission before definite action has been taken in the commission, and irreparable injury has perhaps been done to Germany.
Suggestion (b) has the disadvantage that publicity can not be prevented, but it has the advantage that such publicity will in itself focus public opinion on the existing dangerous situation with the result that a serious study of the plan set forth in the German note would be rendered possible in the commission; in my judgment, this would have an important influence in preventing the dissolution of Germany.
Repeated by mail to London and Brussels today. Logan.
- Telegram in four sections.↩
- Not printed.↩
- The Belgian reparation plan, a copy of which was transmitted to the Department by Mr. James A. Logan, Jr., American unofficial representative on the Reparation Commission, in a letter of June 15, 1923 (not printed), was not a plan to determine the total amount of Germany’s reparation obligations, but was devoted entirely to suggesting sources of revenue which might be utilized for the annuities payable on reparation account (file no. 462.00 R 29/2845).↩