462.00 R 296/13½
Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the Italian Ambassador (Caetani), June 23, 1923
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German Reparations. The Ambassador said he was about to go to Europe and it would be very helpful to know the attitude of the Secretary with respect to the question of reparations; that he understood what his attitude was and which some Governments took when he made his suggestion for an International Commission of Experts, and he supposed that he entertained the same view.
The Secretary said that, of course, it would be agreeable at any time to have an arrangement made for an adjustment upon a fair and reasonable basis on the outstanding questions; that, however, he was not disposed to think that France was prepared to agree to any plan of examination by an international commission. The Secretary said that he felt that an essential condition of settlement was that the Germans should recognize their obligations; that the German industrialists must feel that they could not rely upon other Governments to aid Germany in evading her just obligations. The Secretary said he had no desire to see a prostrated Germany or a dismembered Germany, but that Germany must recognize the fact that [Page 66] she was defeated and must pay to the fullest extent of her ability. The Secretary said he thought that the last German note, though unsatisfactory in detail, offered a basis for negotiations. The first thing was the appreciation by the Germans of the fact that they must pay and then that the French should enter into direct negotiations with the Germans, and that demands should be formulated. Public opinion would have a very important influence, because of the state of sentiment at this time, both in Germany and in France. The Secretary said that the American Government did not desire to dictate in any way; that it did not care to make any uninvited suggestions; that it was always ready in every practicable way to use its good offices, but so far as he could see the desire abroad was more that it should become a partisan than that it should be an impartial adviser.