393.1123 Lincheng/237: Telegram
The Minister in China (Schurman) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 2—11:50 a.m.]
328. My 325, September 28, 10 a.m. At my invitation, the British, French, and Japanese representatives met with me in an informal conference on September 29 in order to consider the reply to be made to the Chinese note of September 24 before it should again be discussed by the diplomatic corps in its meeting on October 1. I presented the two following suggestions for consideration:
- 1.
- That the reply should be sent within a few days in view of unwarranted acts.
- 2.
- That in its reply the diplomatic corps should merely state that it found in the note of September 24 no reason for changing the demands presented in the diplomatic corps’ note of August 10 and that the demands made therein for indemnities, guarantees, and sanctions were renewed.
The first suggestion was endorsed by my colleagues. With respect to the second suggestion my French colleague proposed that in addition to renewing the demands contained in the diplomatic corps’ note [Page 702] of August 10 we should in a few words refute the fundamental contention made in the Chinese note that the outrage at Lincheng was not aimed at foreigners and point out Koo’s evasion of the fact that this affair was merely an incident in a general exhibition which was dangerous to foreigners. With these modifications my second suggestion was approved.
When the diplomatic corps met yesterday the program outlined above was gradually developed and was given unanimous approval. The former committee was instructed to draft the reply. It met and reached an agreement, adopting with a few changes a draft which at my request the French Minister had prepared. Tomorrow this draft will be circulated among the chiefs of missions and a meeting of the diplomatic corps will be held on the morning of October 4 to take final action.
This morning in the committee meeting we considered what action to take in case the new Chinese administration refused to comply with our demands. All agreed that it would be necessary to bring to view the possibility of nonrecognition, or else to put such a policy into actual operation.