393.1123 Lincheng/159: Telegram
The Minister in China (Schurman) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 16—2:56 a.m.]
226. My telegram number 223, June 14, 5 p.m. Committee today adopted two guarantees for the future. The first, which I had introduced and earnestly advocated, is as follows:
“Banditry having become a grave menace to the lives, properties and rights of foreigners in China, the diplomatic body intend to keep themselves informed with respect to it and for that purpose they have decided to send into the provinces in which bandits are prevalent their own representatives to examine and report upon bandit conditions and whenever it appears to the diplomatic body that any military governor or other official controlling troops or any other provincial or local official has failed or is failing to protect foreigners in the efficacious manner stipulated in the aforesaid treaty the diplomatic body will demand that the penalties therein prescribed shall be summarily imposed upon the offender with such additional punishment by fine or otherwise as the circumstances may demand or warrant.”
The treaty referred to in the foregoing is the final protocol of 1901, annex number 16, last paragraph, see MacMurray page 301. The second guarantee, on which the British Minister has strenuously insisted, with the support of the Belgian, French, Dutch and Italian Ministers, contemplates reforms in the protection of the Chinese railways consisting “of the reorganization of the special Chinese police forces which would be placed under the control of Foreign Office and charged with assuring the protection of the railways that are at present or may hereafter come under the control of the Central Government”. A more detailed plan is to be sent later to the Chinese Government.
The British Minister, supported by the above-mentioned colleagues, argued that since the reorganized police forces must be regularly paid it was essential to have foreign accountants, traffic managers, and engineers. To this he said that his Government attached much [Page 660] importance. But Japanese Chargé d’Affaires said his Government, while favoring an effective police force, was opposed to foreign management of the railways.
No other guarantees for the future were proposed.
As regards sanctions it was decided to demand the punishment of offending civil and military officials and employees of the railway and others after the diplomatic body had received the report of the International Commission of Inquiry and any other information that might come to it from authentic sources.
Other sanctions are the demand for the settlement of outstanding questions of importance affecting all foreigners in China of which the first and dominant is the harbor improvement of Shanghai with the extension of the International Settlement and also the question of the Mixed Court. The remaining sanctions are not yet finally determined.
[Paraphrase.] It was generally felt that the terms which the Commission recommended for the settlement of the Lincheng outrage would not be accepted by the Chinese Government. [End paraphrase.]
In the opinion of the Commission, however, the terms are reasonable. The sanctions include no money indemnities and apart from punishment of individuals they will be as beneficial to the Chinese people as to foreigners.
[Paraphrase.] Assuming that the diplomatic corps adopts the demands of the committee, a serious impasse would result if the demands were resisted by the Chinese Government. My British colleague remarked that if such a situation should develop it would be necessary to use force. He intimated that he would recommend to his Government that the British garrison be strengthened and the fleet be prepared to act. It seemed to me that the expression of the Japanese Chargé was unresponsive to [this proposal?]. None of the other Ministers commented. My British colleague and I walked homeward together. On the way he observed that the Japanese would join if the British and American warships made a demonstration. He was also confident that the Dutch and French would be in complete accord. I said that in my opinion the American Government would be opposed to using force, but that I had received no instructions. While I did not tell the British Minister so, I have thought that in order to secure a settlement of the Lincheng outrage we might use the present political crisis to advantage. [End paraphrase.]
I should be greatly obliged for instructions or suggestions indicating even your tentative attitude with respect to any point in the committee’s report or the other matters referred to in this telegram.