Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, Volume I

Report of the American Delegation, February 9, 1922⁸⁵

To the President: The undersigned, appointed by the President as Commissioners to represent the Government of the United States at the Conference on Limitation of Armament, have the honor to submit the following report of the Proceedings of the Conference.

On July 8, 1921, by direction of the President, the Department of State addressed an informal inquiry to the group of Powers known as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers—that is, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan⁸⁶—to ascertain whether it would be agreeable to them to take part in a conference on the subject of limitation of armament, to be held in Washington at a time to be mutually agreed upon. In making this inquiry, it was stated to be manifest that the question of limitation of armament had a close relation to Pacific and Far Eastern problems, and the President suggested that the Powers especially interested in these problems should undertake in connection with the Conference the consideration of all matters bearing upon their solution with a view to reaching a common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the Far East. The suggestion having been favorably received, formal invitations were issued to the Powers above mentioned⁸⁷ to participate in a Conference on Limitation of Armament to be held in Washington on the eleventh day of November, 1921, and an invitation was also extended to Belgium, China, The Netherlands, and Portugal⁸⁸ to participate in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions in connection with the Conference.

These invitations were formally accepted and the first session of the Conference was held at Continental Hall in the City of Washington on the twelfth day of November, 1921, the time of the first session being postponed in order to permit the Delegates to attend the ceremonies upon the burial of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington Cemetery on November eleventh.

The following Delegates attended the Conference:

For the United States of America:

• Charles Evans Hughes
• Henry Cabot Lodge
• Oscar W. Underwood
• Elihu Root

For Belgium:

• Baron de Cartier, Belgian Ambassador to the United States

For the British Empire:

• The Right Honorable A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P., Lord President of the Council⁸⁹
• The Right Honorable Lord Lee of Fareham, G. B. E., K. C. B., First Lord of the Admiralty
• The Right Honorable Sir Auckland Geddes, K. C. B., British Ambassador

• Canada—
  The Right Honorable Sir Robert Borden, G. C. M. G., K. C.
• Australia—
  Senator the Eight Honorable G. F. Pearce, Australian Minister for Defense
• New Zealand—
  The Honorable Sir John Salmond, Judge of the Supreme Court of New Zealand
• India—
  The Right Honorable Srinivasa Sastri, member of the Indian Council of State

For China:

• Mr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to United States of America
• Mr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of St. James
• Mr. Chung-Hui Wang, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Republic of China

For France:

• M. Aristide Briand, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs
• M. René Viviani, Deputy, Former President of the Council
• M. Albert Sarraut, Senator, Minister of Colonies
• M. Jules Jusserand, Ambassador of France to the United States

For Italy:

• Signor Carlo Schanzer, Senator
• Signor Vittorio Rolandi-Ricci, Senator, Italian Ambassador to the United States
• Signor Luigi Albertini, Senator

For Japan:

• Baron Tomasaburo Kato, Minister of Navy
• Baron Kijuro Shidehara, Ambassador at Washington
• Prince Iyesato Tokugawa, President of House of Peers
• Mr. Masanao Hanihara, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Netherlands:

• Jonkheer H. A. van Karnebeek, Minister for Foreign Affairs
• Jonkheer F. Beelaerts van Blokland, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Chief of the Political Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
• Dr. E. Moresco, Vice President of the Council of the Netherlands East Indies
• Dr. J. C. A. Everwijn, Netherlands Minister to the United States
• Jonkheer W. H. de Beaufort, Minister Plenipotentiary

For Portugal:

• Viscount d’Alte, Portuguese Minister to the United States
• Captain E. de Vasconcellos

American Advisory Committee

The President appointed an Advisory Committee of Twenty-One, with the following members: Honorable George Sutherland, Chairman; Mr. Charles S. Barrett; Mrs. Charles Sumner Bird; Mrs. Katherine Phillips Edson; Mrs. Eleanor Franklin Egan; Honorable Henry P. Fletcher, Under Secretary of State; Mr. Samuel Gompers; Honorable Herbert C. Hoover, Secretary of Commerce; Mr. John L. Lewis; Honorable John M. Parker, Governor of Louisiana; General John J. Pershing, U. S. A.; Honorable Stephen G. Porter, Member of Congress; Rear Admiral W. L. Kodgers, U. S. N.; Honorable Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy; Honorable Willard Saulsbury; Mr. Harold M. Sewall; Mr. Walter George Smith; Mr. Carmi A. Thompson; Mr. William Boyce Thompson; Honorable J. Mayhew Wainwright, Assistant Secretary of War; Mrs. Thomas G. Winter.

The Advisory Committee made careful studies of all the problems before the Conference, and their reports and advice were of the greatest value.

The Secretariat of the American Delegation was composed as follows: Mr. Basil Miles, Secretary of the Delegation; Mr. Irwin Laughlin, Counselor of Embassy, Secretary; Mr. J. Butler Wright, Counselor of Embassy, Secretary; Mr. Edward Bell, Counselor of Embassy, Secretary; Mr. Philip H. Patchin, Department of State, Secretary; Mr. Henry Suydam, Department of State, Secretary; Mr. F. L. Mayer, First Secretary of Embassy, Secretary; Mr. Tracy Lay, Consul, Secretary; Mr. W. L. Hurley, Department of State, Secretary; Mr. Stanley Washburn, Secretary; Mr. Laurence H. Green, Assistant Secretary; Mr. W. H. Beck, Assistant Secretary; Mr. T. L. Daniels, Third Secretary of Embassy, Assistant Secretary; Mr. Jefferson Patterson, Third Secretary of Embassy, Assistant Secretary; Mr. Stanley Hawks, Assistant Secretary; Mr. J. O. Denby, Third Secretary of Embassy, Assistant Secretary; Mr. John M. Vorys, Assistant Secretary.

Ceremonial, Protocol, Etc.—Honorable Robert Woods Bliss, Third Assistant Secretary of State; Mr. Warren D. Robbins, Counselor of Embassy; Mr. Charles Lee Cooke, Department of State; Mr. Richard Southgate, Second Secretary of Embassy; Mr. Hugh Millard, Third Secretary of Embassy.

Technical staff.—Limitation of Armament. For the Department of State: Honorable Henry P. Fletcher, Under Secretary of State; Mr. J. Reuben Clark, Special Counsel to the Department of State. For the War Department: Major General George O. Squier, Radio and Electrical Communications generally; Major General C. C. Williams, Chief of Ordnance; Major General M. M. Patrick, Chief of Air Service; Brigadier General William Mitchell, Aviation; Brigadier General Amos A. Fries, Chemical Warfare; Colonel John A. McA. Palmer, Organization and General Military Subjects; Colonel B. H. Wells, Organization and General Military Subjects; Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Heintzelman, Military Intelligence and Organization of Foreign Armies; Dr. Louis Cohen, Civilian Radio Engineer, Signal Corps. For the Navy Department: Honorable Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy; Admiral Robert E. Coontz, Technical Expert-General; Eear Admiral William A. Moffett, Aeronautics; Rear Admiral William V. Pratt, Technical Expert-General; Captain Frank H. Schofield, Technical Expert-General; Captain Luke McNamee, Technical Expert-General; Captain Samuel W. Bryant, Communications; Commander C. Hooper, Radio; Mr. L. W. Austin, Radio; Chemical Warfare, Professor Edgar F. Smith, University of Pennsylvania.

Pacific and Far Eastern questions.—Mr. John Van A. MacMurray, Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Mr. D. C. Poole, Chief, Division of Russian Affairs; Professor E. T. Williams, formerly Chief of Far Eastern Division, Department of State; Mr. Edward Bell, Counselor of Embassy; Mr. F. P. Lockhart, Department of State; Mr. J. S. Abbott, Department of Commerce; Mr. N. T. Johnson, Department of State; Mr. E. L. Neville, Department of State; Professor G. H. Blakeslee, Clark University; Mr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Department of State; Mr. J. P. Jameson, Department of State; Mr. Robert F. Leonard, Department of State; Mr. F. L. Mayer, Department of State; Mr. J. O. Denby, Department of State; Mr. J. L. Donaldson, Department of State.

Legal questions.—Mr. F. K. Nielsen, Solicitor of the Department of State; Mr. Chandler P. Anderson, formerly Counselor, Department of State; Professor George G. Wilson; Dr. James Brown Scott.

Economic questions and merchant marine.—Dr. W. S. Culbertson, Commissioner, United States Tariff Commission; Daniel H. Cox, United States Shipping Board.

Communications.—Mr. Leland Harrison, Counselor of Embassy; Mr. S. W. Stratton, Department of Commerce; Mr. J. H. Dellinger, Department of Commerce; Mr. Walter S. Rogers, Department of State; and Army and Navy officers.

The proceedings of the Conference were opened with prayer by Reverend William S. Abernethy, D. D., of the Calvary Baptist Church of Washington.

The President then delivered an address, expressing in these memorable words the spirit and purpose of the Government of the United States:

“Gentlemen of the Conference, the United States welcomes you with unselfish hands. We harbor no fears; we have no sordid ends to serve; we suspect no enemy; we contemplate or apprehend no conquest. Content with what we have, we seek nothing which is another’s. We only wish to do with you that finer, nobler thing which no nation can do alone.

“We wish to sit with you at the table of international understanding and good will. In good conscience we are eager to meet you frankly, and invite and offer cooperation. The world demands a sober contemplation of the existing order and the realization that there can be no cure without sacrifice, not by one of us, but by all of us.

“I do not mean surrendered rights, or narrowed freedom, or denied aspirations, or ignored national necessities. Our Republic would no more ask for these than it would give. No pride need be humbled, no nationality submerged, but I would have a mergence of minds committing all of us to less preparation for war and more enjoyment of fortunate peace.

“The higher hopes come of the spirit of our coming together. It is but just to recognize varying needs and peculiar positions. Nothing can be accomplished in disregard of national apprehensions. Rather, we should act together to remove the causes of apprehensions. This is not to be done in intrigue. Greater assurance is found in the exchanges of simple honesty and directness, among men resolved to accomplish as becomes leaders among nations, when civilization itself has come to its crucial test.

“It is not to be challenged that government fails when the excess of its cost robs the people of the way to happiness and the opportunity to achieve. If the finer sentiments were not urging, the cold, hard facts of excessive cost and the eloquence of economics would urge us to reduce our armaments. If the concept of a better order does not appeal, then let us ponder the burden and the blight of continued competition.

“It is not to be denied that the world has swung along throughout the ages without heeding this call from the kindlier hearts of men. But the same world never before was so tragically brought to realization of the utter futility of passion’s sway when reason and conscience and fellowship point a nobler way.

“I can speak officially only for our United States. Our hundred millions frankly want less of armament and none of war. Wholly free from guile, sure in our own minds that we harbor no unworthy designs, we accredit the world with the same good intent. So I welcome you, not alone in good will and high purpose, but with high faith.

“We are met for a service to mankind. In all simplicity, in all honesty and all honor, there may be written here the avowals of a world conscience refined by the consuming fires of war, and made more sensitive by the anxious aftermath. I hope for that understanding which will emphasize the guaranties of peace, and for commitments to less burdens and a better order which will tranquilize the world. In such an accomplishment there will be added glory to your flags and ours, and the rejoicing of mankind will make the transcending music of all succeeding time.”

Organization and Procedure

Following the address of the President, the Conference, on motion of Mr. Balfour, elected the Secretary of State of the United States as Chairman of the Conference and of each committee of which he should be a member.

The Honorable John W. Garrett, of Baltimore, Maryland, was elected Secretary-General.

A committee on Program and Procedure was appointed, consisting of heads of the Delegations or such representative as each Power might select for the purpose.

As the Conference was to concern itself with two groups of questions which, though related, required separate investigation and discussion, that is, (1) the question of limitation of armament, and (2) Pacific and Far Eastern questions, it became necessary to provide a course of procedure which would facilitate the work of the Conference in both fields. In the public discussions which preceded the Conference there were apparently two competing views: (1) that the consideration of armament should await the result of the discussion of the Far Eastern questions, and another, that the latter discussion should be postponed until an agreement for limitation of armament had been reached. It was not thought necessary to adopt either of these extreme views. It was proposed that the Conference should proceed at once to consider the question of the limitation of armament, but this was not deemed to require the postponement of the examination of Far Eastern questions. In order to serve both purposes, two committees were set up (1) consisting of the plenipotentiary delegates of the Five Powers, the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, to deal with questions of armament, and (2) consisting of the delegates of the Nine Powers, that is, the United States of America, Belgium, British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, and Portugal, to deal with Pacific and Far Eastern questions.

The work of the two committees proceeded along parallel lines without interference with each other and the conclusions reached in each were reported, from time to time, to the Conference in plenary session for its adoption. Each committee provided itself with the necessary sub-committees dealing with technical questions and with drafting, so that in the most expeditious manner all questions before the Conference were thoroughly considered.

The Conference held seven plenary or public sessions, at the last of which, on February 6, 1922, the treaties approved by the Conference were signed.

While the sessions of the committees were not public, a complete record was kept of all their proceedings, and at the close of each session of the Committees on Armament and on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions, respectively, a communiqué was made to the Press, which, generally, stated all that had taken place in the committee and, in all cases, set forth whatever matters of importance had received attention.

Thus, full publicity was given to the proceedings of the Conference. The minutes of the plenary sessions and of the committees of the Conference are submitted herewith.⁹⁰

The Agenda

In advance of the meeting of the Conference the Department of State prepared a tentative statement of agenda which was submitted to the invited Powers. It was as follows:

Limitation of Armament

• One. Limitation of Naval Armament, under which shall be discussed

  (a) Basis of limitation.

  (b) Extent.

  (c) Fulfillment.

• Two. Rules for control of new agencies of warfare.
• Three. Limitation of Land Armament.

Pacific and Far Eastern Questions

• One. Questions relating to China.
  • First: Principles to be applied.
  • Second: Application.

Subjects:	(a)	Territorial integrity.
	(b)	Administrative integrity.
	(c)	Open door—Equality of commercial and industrial opportunity.
	(d)	Concessions, monopolies, or preferential economic privileges.
	(e)	Development of railways, including plans relating to Chinese Eastern Railway.
	(f)	Preferential railroad rates.
	(g)	Status of existing commitments.

• Two. Siberia.
  • (similar headings).
• Three. Mandated Islands.
  • (unless questions earlier settled).
    Electrical Communications in the Pacific.

While this statement was not formally adopted by the Conference, the proceedings of the Conference followed closely the lines thus indicated.

Treaties and Resolutions

The following treaties were approved by the Conference and signed at the closing session on February 6, 1922:

(1) A treaty between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, limiting naval armament.⁹¹

(2) A treaty between the same Powers, in relation to the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare.⁹²

(3) A treaty between all Nine Powers relating to principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China.⁹³

(4) A treaty between the Nine Powers relating to Chinese customs tariff.⁹⁴

The following treaties were notified to the Conference:

(1) A treaty between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Japan, signed December 13, 1921, relating to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific Ocean.⁹⁵

(2) A treaty between the same Powers, supplementary to the above, signed February 6, 1922.⁹⁶

(3) A treaty between China and Japan, signed February 4, 1922, providing for the restoration to China of rights and interests in the Province of Shantung.⁹⁷

In addition, while the Conference was in session, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan reached an agreement in relation to the Island of Yap and the mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean, north of the Equator, which is to be embodied in a formal Convention.⁹⁸

In other matters, not requiring treaty form, the conclusions and agreements of the Conference are embodied in a series of Resolutions,⁹⁹ which are described below.

For convenience, these Treaties and Resolutions are set forth in an Appendix.¹

The proceedings of the Conference and the substance of the agreements to which reference has been made may be appropriately considered in the two main divisions already noted.

i. limitation of armament

It was recognized at the outset that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to provide at this Conference for the limitation of land forces.

So far as the army of the United States is concerned, there was no question presented. It has always been the policy of the United States to have the regular military establishment upon the smallest possible basis. At the time of the Armistice, there were in the field and in training in the American Army upwards of 4,000,000 men. At once, upon the signing of the Armistice, demobilization began and it was practically completed in the course of the following year, and to-day our regular establishment numbers less than 160,000 men. The British Empire has also reduced its land forces to a minimum. The situation on the Continent was vividly depicted in an eloquent address by M. Briand, speaking for the Government of France in which he stated his conclusions as follows:

“The thought of reducing the armaments, which was the noble purpose of this Conference, is not one from which we would feel disinterested from the point of view of land armaments. We have shown that already. Immediately after the armistice demobilization began, and demobilization began as rapidly and as completely as possible. According to the military laws of France there are to be three classes of men; that is, three generations of young men under the flag. That law is still extant; that law is still valid. It has not been abrogated yet, and the Government has taken the responsibility to reduce to two years the time spent under the flag, and instead of three classes—three generations of young men—we have only two that are doing military service. It is therefore an immediate reduction by one-third that has already taken place in the effectives—and I am speaking of the normal effectives of the metropolis, leaving aside troops needed for colonial occupation or the obligation imposed by the treaty in Rhineland or countries under plebiscite. We did not think that endeavor was sufficient, and in the future we have plans in order to further restrict the extent of our army. In a few days it is certain that the proposals of the Government will be passed in the Chamber, and in order to further reduce the military service by half. That is to say, there will be only one class and a half actually serving. The metropolitan French army would be therefore reduced by half, but if anybody asks us to go further, to consent to other reductions, I should have to answer clearly and definitely that it would be impossible for us to do it without exposing ourselves to a most serious danger.

“You might possibly come and tell us ‘This danger that you are exposed to, we see it, we realize it, and we are going to share it with you. We are going to offer you all means—put all means at your disposal in order to secure your safety.’ Immediately, if we heard those words, of course we would strike upon another plan. We should be only too pleased to demonstrate the sincerity of our purpose. But we understand the difficulties and the necessities of the statesmen of other countries. We understand the position of other peoples who have also to face difficult and troublous situations. We are not selfish enough to ask other people to give a part of their sovereign national independence in order to turn it to our benefit and come to our help. We do not expect it; but here I am appealing to your consciences, if France is to remain alone, facing the situation such as I have described, and without any exaggeration—you must not deny her what she wants in order to insure her security. You must let her do what she has to do, if need arise and if the time comes.”²

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“If by direction given to the labors of the Conference, it were possible somewhere over there in Europe—if it were possible to say that the outcome of this Conference is indirect blame and opprobrium cast upon France—if it was possible to point out France as the only country in the world that is still imperialistic, as the only country that opposes final disarmament, then, gentlemen, indeed this Conference would have dealt us a severe blow; but I am quite sure that nothing is further from your minds and from your intentions. If after listening to this argument, after weighing the reasons which you have just heard, you consider it then as valid, then, gentlemen, you will still be with us and you will agree with me in saying that France can not possibly do anything but what she has actually done.”

Senator Schanzer described the Italian situation as follows:

“It is far from my mind to discuss what France considers indispensable for her national safety. That safety is as dear to us as it may be to them, and we are still morally by the side of our allies of yesterday and our friends of to-day.

“I wanted to say this. Only may I be allowed to express the wish and the hope that the general limitation of land armament may become a reality within the shortest possible space of time. Italy has fought the war for the highest aims which a country can seek, but Italy is in her soul a peace loving nation. I shall not repeat what I had the honor to state at the first meeting of the Conference, but I should like to emphasize again that Italy is one of the surest factors of the world’s peace, that she has no reason whatsoever of conflict with any other country, that she is following and putting constantly into action a policy inspired by the principle of maintaining peace among all nations.

“Italy has succeeded in coming to a direct understanding with the Serb, Croat, and Slovene people and in order to attain such an end had made considerable sacrifices for the interest of the peace of Europe. Italy has pursued toward the successor countries to her former enemies a policy not only of pacification, but of assistance. And when a conflict arose between Austria and Hungary, a conflict which might have dragged into war the Danubian peoples, has offered to the two countries in conflict her friendly help in order to settle the dispute. Italy has succeeded and in so doing has actively contributed to the peace of Europe.

“Moreover, Italy has acted similarly within her own frontiers and has reduced her armed forces in the largest possible measure. She has considerably curtailed her navy expenditures in comparison to the pre-war time. The total amount of her armed forces does not exceed 200,000 men and a further reduction to 175,000 men is already planned, and 35,000 colored troops.

“Our ordinary war budget for the present financial year amounts to $52,000,000, including $11,000,000 expenses for police forces; the extraordinary part of the war budget, representing expenses dependent for the liquidation of the war, expenses therefore of a purely transitory character, amounts to $62,000,000.

“However, although we have all reduced our armaments to the greatest possible extent, we consider it necessary, for a complete solution of the problem of limitation of armaments in Europe, to take into consideration the armaments of the countries either created or transformed as a result of the war. The problem is not a simple one. It must be considered as a whole. It is a serious and urgent problem, for which a solution at no far distant day is necessary.”

Baron Kato spoke as follows:

“I would like to say this morning just a few words on land armament limitation. Japan is quite ready to announce her hearty approval of the principle which aims to relieve a people of heavy burdens by limiting land armaments to those which are necessary for national security and the maintenance of order within the territory.

“The size of the land armaments of each state should be determined by its peculiar geographical situation and other circumstances, and these basic factors are so divergent and complicated that an effort to draw final comparisons is hardly possible. If I may venture to say it, it is not an easy task to lay down a general scheme for the limitation of land armaments, as in the case of limitation of naval armaments. Nevertheless, Japan has not the slightest intention of maintaining land armaments which are in excess of those which are absolutely necessary for purely defensive purposes, necessitated by the Far Eastern situation.”

Further consideration made it quite clear that no agreement for the limitation of land forces could be had at this time.

Limitation of Naval Armament

A different condition existed in relation to naval armament. It was believed by the Government of the United States that an agreement providing for a sweeping reduction and for an effective limitation for the future was entirely feasible. It was pointed out, after considering the failure of earlier endeavors for limitation of armaments that the Powers could no longer content themselves with investigations, with statistics, with reports, with the circumlocution of inquiry; that the time had come, and the Conference had been called, not for general resolutions or mutual advice, but for action.

The following general considerations were deemed to be pertinent.³

“The first is that the core of the difficulty is to be found in the competition in naval programs, and that, in order appropriately to limit naval armament, competition in its production must be abandoned. Competition will not be remedied by resolves with respect to the method of its continuance. One program inevitably leads to another, and if competition continues its regulation is impracticable. There is only one adequate way out and that is to end it now.

“It is apparent that this can not be accomplished without serious sacrifices. Enormous sums have been expended upon ships under construction and building programs which are now under way can not be given up without heavy loss. Yet if the present construction of capital ships goes forward other ships will inevitably be built to rival them, and this will lead to still others. Thus the race will continue so long as ability to continue lasts. The effort to escape sacrifices is futile. We must face them or yield our purpose.

“It is also clear that no one of the naval Powers should be expected to make these sacrifices alone. The only hope of limitation of naval armament is by agreement among the nations concerned, and this agreement should be entirely fair and reasonable in the extent of the sacrifices required of each of the Powers. In considering the basis of such an agreement, and the commensurate sacrifices to be required, it is necessary to have regard to the existing naval strength of the great naval Powers, including the extent of construction already effected in the case of ships in process. This follows from the fact that one nation is as free to compete as another, and each may find grounds for its action. What one may do another may demand the opportunity to rival, and we remain in the thrall of competitive effort.”

But it was necessary to go beyond general observations. It was apparent that, in this field of opportunity, it was essential that the American Government, as the convener of the Conference, should be prepared with a definite and practicable plan. After the most careful consideration and detailed examination of the problem, with the aid of the experts of the American Navy, a plan was prepared and, under instructions of the President, was presented to the Conference by the American Delegation.

The American Plan⁴

It was clear at the outset, and the negotiations during the Conference put it beyond doubt, that no agreement for the limitation of naval armament could be effected which did not embrace the navies of France and Italy. At the same time, it was recognized that neither of these nations, in view of the extraordinary conditions due to the World War, affecting their existing naval strength, could be expected to make the sacrifices which necessarily would lie at the basis of an agreement for limitation. These secrifices could, however, be reasonably expected of the United States, the British Empire, and Japan, and these were the Powers then actually engaged in the competitive building of warships. The American plan, therefore, temporarily postponed the consideration of the navies of France and Italy and definitely proposed a program of limitation for the United States, British Empire, and Japan. The proposal was one of renunciation of building programs, of scrapping of existing ships, and of establishing an agreed ratio of naval strength. It was a proposal of sacrifices, and the American Government, in making the proposal, at once stated the sacrifices which it was ready to make and upon the basis of which alone it asked commensurate sacrifices from others.

The American plan rested upon the application of these four general principles:⁵

• “(1) That all capital-shipbuilding programs, either actual or projected, should be abandoned;
• “(2) That further reduction should be made through the scrapping of certain of the older ships;
• “(3) That in general regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the Powers concerned;
• “(4) That the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement of strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.”

More specifically, the plan in relation to capital ships was as follows:

“capital ships

“United States:

“The United States is now completing its program of 1916 calling for 10 new battleships and 6 battle cruisers. One battleship has been completed. The others are in various stages of construction; in some cases from 60 to over 80 per cent of the construction has been done. On these 15 capital ships now being built over $330,000,000 have been spent. Still, the United States is willing in the interest of an immediate limitation of naval armament to scrap all these ships.

“The United States proposes, if this plan is accepted—

“(1) To scrap all capital ships now under construction. This includes 6 battle cruisers and 7 battleships on the ways and in course of building, and 2 battleships launched.

“The total number of new capital ships thus to be scrapped is 15. The total tonnage of the new capital ships when completed would be 618,000 tons.

“(2) To scrap all the older battleships up to, but not including, the Delaware and North Dakota. The number of these old battleships to be scrapped is 15. Their total tonnage is 227,740 tons.

“Thus the number of capital ships to be scrapped by the United States, if this plan is accepted, is 30, with an aggregate tonnage (including that of ships in construction, if completed) of 845,740 tons.

“Great Britain:

“The plan contemplates that Great Britain and Japan shall take action which is fairly commensurate with this action on the part of the United States.

“It is proposed that Great Britain—

• “(1) Shall stop further construction of the four new Hoods, the new capital ships not laid down but upon which money has been spent. These 4 ships, if completed, would have tonnage displacement of 172,000 tons.
• “(2) Shall, in addition, scrap her predreadnaughts, second-line battleships, and first-line battleships up to, but not including, the King George V class.

“These, with certain predreadnaughts which it is understood have already been scrapped, would amount to 19 capital ships and a tonnage reduction of 411,375 tons.

“The total tonnage of ships thus to be scrapped by Great Britain (including the tonnage of the 4 Hoods, if completed) would be 583,375 tons.

“Japan:

“It is proposed that Japan—

“(1) Shall abandon her program of ships not yet laid down, viz, the Kii, Owari, No. 7, and No. 8 battleships, and Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8, battle cruisers.

“It should be observed that this [idea] does not involve the stopping of construction, as the construction of none of these ships has been begun.

“(2) Shall scrap 3 capital ships (the Mutsu launched, the Tosa and Kaga in course of building) and 4 battle cruisers (the Amagi and Akagi in course of building, and the Atoga and Takao not yet laid down, but for which certain material has been assembled).

“The total number of new capital ships to be scrapped under this paragraph is seven. The total tonnage of these new capital ships when completed would be 289,100 tons.

“(3) Shall scrap all predreadnaughts and battleships of the second line. This would include the scrapping of all ships up to but not including the Settsu; that is, the scrapping of 10 older ships, with a total tonnage of 159,828 tons.

“The total reduction of tonnage on vessels existing, laid down, or for which material has been assembled (taking the tonnage of the new ships when completed), would be 448,928 tons.

“Thus, under this plan there would be immediately destroyed, of the navies of the three Powers, 66 capital fighting ships, built and building, with a total tonnage of 1,878,043.

“It is proposed that it should be agreed by the United States, Great Britain, and Japan that their navies, with respect to capital ships, within three months after the making of the agreement, shall consist of certain ships designated in the proposal and numbering for the United States 18, for Great Britain 22, for Japan 10.

“The tonnage of these ships would be as follows: Of the United States, 500,650; of Great Britain, 604,450; of Japan, 299,700. In reaching this result, the age factor in the case of the respective navies has received appropriate consideration.

“Replacement:

“With respect to replacement, the United States proposes:

“(1) That it be agreed that the first replacement tonnage shall not be laid down until 10 years from the date of the agreement;

“(2) That replacement be limited by an agreed maximum of capital ship tonnage as follows:

	Tons
For the United States	500,000
For the Great Britain	500,000
For Japan	300,000

“(3) That subject to the 10-year limitation above fixed and the maximum standard, capital ships may be replaced when they are 20 years old by new capital ship construction;

“(4) That no capital ship shall be built in replacement with a tonnage displacement of more than 35,000 tons.”

This proposal was presented on behalf of the American Delegation at the first session of the Conference, and at once evoked from the other delegates expressions of assent in principle. The question of a definite agreement, however, presented many difficulties requiring protracted negotiations, in which a conclusion was not finally reached until January 31, 1922, when the draft of the proposed Naval Treaty was adopted in the Committee on Limitation of Armament.

Capital Ship Ratio

It was obvious that no agreement for limitation was possible if the three Powers were not content to take as a basis their actual existing naval strength. General considerations of national need, aspirations and expectations, policy and program, could be brought forward by each Power in justification of some hypothetical relation of naval strength with no result but profitless and interminable discussion. The solution was to take what the Powers actually had, as it was manifest that neither could better its relative position unless it won in the race which it was the object of the Conference to end. It was impossible to terminate competition in naval armament if the Powers were to condition their agreement upon the advantages they hoped to gain in the competition itself. Accordingly, when the argument was presented by Japan that a better ratio—that is, one more favorable to Japan than that assigned by the American plan, should be adopted and emphasis was placed upon the asserted needs of Japan, the answer was made that if Japan was entitled to a better ratio upon the basis of actual existing naval strength, it should be, but otherwise it could not be accepted. The American plan fixed the ratio between the United States, the British Empire, and Japan as 5–5–3, or 10–10–6; Great Britain at once agreed, but the Japanese Government desired a ratio of 10–10–7.

There was general agreement that the American rule for determining existing naval strength was correct, that is, that it should be determined according to capital ship tonnage. There was, however, a further question and that was as to what should be embraced for that purpose within the capital ship tonnage of each nation. It was the position of the American Government that paper programs should not be counted, but only ships laid down or upon which money had been spent. It was also the position of the American Government that ships in course of construction should be counted to the extent to which construction had already progressed at the time of the convening of the Conference. The latter position was strongly contested by Japan upon the ground that a ship was not a ship unless it was completed and ready to fight. It was pointed out, however, that in case of an emergency a warship which was 90 per cent completed was to that extent ready and that only the remaining 10 per cent of construction was necessary; and, similarly, in the case of a ship 70 per cent or 50 per cent or other per cent completed the work done was so much of naval strength in hand. It was also pointed out that it did not follow that because a ship had been completed that it was ready for action; it might be out of repair; its engines, boilers, apparatus, armament, might need replacement. It was idle to attempt to determine naval strength on supposed readiness for action at a given day. Objections could be made to any standard of measurement but the most practicable standard was to take the existing capital ship tonnage, including the percentage of construction already effected in the case of ships which were being built. It was added that the American Government, while ready to sacrifice, in accordance with the terms of its proposal, its battleships and battle cruisers in course of construction, was not willing to ignore the percentage of naval strength represented by over $300,000,000 expended on the unfinished ships.

The American Government submitted to the British and Japanese naval experts its records with respect to the extent of the work which had been done on the ships under construction, and the negotiations resulted in an acceptance by both Great Britain and Japan of the ratio which the American Government had proposed.

Fortifications in the Pacific

Before assenting to this ratio the Japanese Government desired assurances with regard to the increase of fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific Ocean. It was insisted that while the capital ship ratio proposed by the American Government might be acceptable under existing conditions, it could not be regarded as acceptable by the Japanese Government if the Government of the United States should fortify or establish additional naval bases in the Pacific Ocean.

The American Government took the position that it could not entertain any question as to the fortifications of its own coasts or of the Hawaiian Islands, with respect to which it must remain entirely unrestricted. Despite the fact that the American Government did not entertain any aggressive purpose whatever, it was recognized that the fortification of other insular possessions in the Pacific might be regarded from the Japanese standpoint as creating a new naval situation, and as constituting a menace to Japan, and hence the American Delegation expressed itself as willing to maintain the status quo as to fortifications and naval bases in its insular possessions in the Pacific, except as above stated, if Japan and the British Empire would do the like. It was recognized that no limitation should be made with respect to the main islands of Japan or Australia and New Zealand, with their adjacent islands, any more than with respect to the insular possessions adjacent to the coast of the United States, including Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, or the Hawaiian Islands. The case of the Aleutian Islands, stretching out toward Japan, was a special one and had its counterpart in that of the Kurile Islands belonging to Japan and reaching out to the northeast toward the Aleutians. It was finally agreed that the status quo should be maintained as to both these groups.

After prolonged negotiations, the three Powers—the United States, the British Empire and Japan—made an agreement that the status quo at the time of the signing of the Naval Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, should be maintained in their respective territories and possessions, which were specified as follows (Naval Treaty, Article XIX):

• “(1) The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands;
• “(2) Hongkong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 110° east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its Territories, and (c) New Zealand;
• “(3) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: The Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.”

The same article of the treaty also contains the following provision with respect to the meaning of the maintenance of the status quo:

“The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace.”

The Case of the “Mutsu”

Among the ships which the American Government proposed should be scrapped by Japan was the Mutsu. It was the understanding of the American Government that this ship was still incomplete at the time of the meeting of the Conference, although it was nearly completed, that is, to the extent of about 98 per cent. It was proposed to be scrapped as all other ships which were in course of construction; thus the Government of the United States included among its own ships which were to be scrapped two ships which were about 90 per cent completed.

The Japanese Delegation, however, insisted that the Mutsu had actually been finished, was commissioned and fully manned before the Conference met. Apart from this point, this latest accession to the Japanese Navy was the especial pride of the Japanese people. It was their finest war vessel and, it is understood, had been built, in part at least, through popular subscriptions and in circumstances evoking patriotic pride in the highest degree.

It was deemed by the Japanese Delegation to be quite impossible to induce the consent of their Government to any proposal of limitation which would involve the scrapping of the Mutsu. Its retention, however, created serious difficulties because of the disproportion of advantage that would accrue to Japan through the possession of such a ship. Japan offered to scrap the Settsu, one of the older ships that was to have been retained by Japan under the American plan, and also recognized that the gain to Japan through the Mutsu should be offset by the completion on the part of the United States of two of her battleships under construction and by the construction on the part of Great Britain of two new ships.

It was accordingly agreed that the Government of the United States should finish two ships of the West Virginia class, that were under construction, and on their completion should scrap the North Dakota and the Delaware, which under the original plan were to have been retained. Great Britain, on her part, was to be permitted to build two new ships, and upon their completion was to scrap four (4) of the older ships which would otherwise have been retained. In this way the balance of the three navies was kept. Nor was there any serious change in the final agreement establishing the maximum limits of the capital ship replacement tonnage. The original American plan had called for the following:

• United States, 500,000 tons
• British Empire, 500,000 tons
• Japan, 300,000 tons

The plan as modified became:

• United States, 525,000 tons
• British Empire, 525,000 tons
• Japan, 315,000 tons

Thus maintaining the ratio of 5–5–3.

An important concession was made by Great Britain with respect to the two new ships which she was permitted to build. Great Britain, as stated in the American proposal, had already planned four (4) new Hoods. These ships had been designed and considerable time would have been saved in proceeding to build the two new ships according to the existing plans, but the new ships were designed greatly to exceed in tonnage any existing ship; their tonnage displacement, it is understood, was to be about 49,000 tons. Great Britain agreed not only to abandon her program for the four (4) new Hoods, but in building the two new ships that they should not exceed 35,000 tons standard displacement, respectively.

Thus, with respect to capital ships, the United States, the British Empire, and Japan were able to reach an agreement, but this was tentative and depended upon a suitable agreement being reached with France and Italy.

France and Italy

The scheme of reduction accepted by the United States, Great Britain, and Japan involved the scrapping of capital ships to the extent of approximately 40 per cent of the existing strength. It was realized that no such reduction could be asked of either France or Italy and that the case of their navies required special consideration.

France had seven (7) dreadnaughts with a tonnage of 164,500 tons, and three (3) predreadnaughts, making a total of about 221,000 tons. In the case of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan it was provided that their predreadnaughts should be scrapped without any provision for replacement, and there was to be, in addition, a reduction of about 40 per cent of the naval strength represented by dreadnaughts and superdreadnaughts. Reducing in the same proportion as the United States has reduced, France’s tonnage of capital ships would be fixed at 102,000 tons, or, if the predreadnaughts of France were taken into the calculation on her side although omitted on the side of the United States, the total tonnage of France’s capital ships being taken at 221,000 tons, a reduction on the same basis would leave France with only 136,000 tons. This was deemed to be impracticable. It was thought entirely fair, however, that France, in the replacement schedule, should be allowed a maximum tonnage equivalent to the existing tonnage of her seven (7) dreadnaughts with a slight increase, that is, that the maximum limit of capital ships, for the purpose of replacement, should be fixed at 175,000 tons.

Italy sought parity with France, and this principle having been accepted in the course of the discussion, it was likewise proposed that Italy should be allowed 175,000 tons of capital ships in replacement. The present tonnage of Italy is about 182,800 tons. The proposed maximum limit of 175,000 tons was at once accepted by Italy.

France expressed the desire to be allowed 10 capital ships, which, at a tonnage of 35,000 tons each, would have given her 350,000 tons. This was deemed to be excessive as a part of a plan for the limitation of armament, and, had it been insisted upon, would probably have made impossible an agreement for an effective limitation of capital ship tonnage. But, after discussion, France consented to the maximum limit of 175,000 tons for capital ships.

Auxiliary Craft

In the original American proposal it was stated that the allowance of auxiliary combatant craft to each Power should be in proportion to the capital ship tonnage. The proposal for the three Powers—the United States, Great Britain, and Japan—was that the total tonnage of cruisers, flotilla leaders, and destroyers allowed each Power should be as follows:

• United States, 450,000 tons
• Great Britain, 450,000 tons
• Japan, 270,000 tons

And that the total tonnage of submarines allowed each of these Powers should be:

• United States, 90,000 tons
• Great Britain, 90,000 tons
• Japan, 54,000 tons

In the same proportion as the capital ship tonnage, this would have left for France and Italy, in the case of cruisers, flotilla leaders and destroyers, a maximum of 150,000 tons for each of these Powers; and, in the case of submarines, a maximum of 30,000 tons each.

The American Delegation felt that the original proposal for submarines was too high, and, aided by the advice of our naval experts, proposed that the maximum limit for the United States and Great Britain in submarine tonnage should be 60,000 tons each; and that France, Japan and Italy should retain the tonnage in submarines that they now have, that is, should maintain the status quo as regards submarine tonnage. It was understood that the present submarine tonnage of France was 31,391 tons; of Japan 31,452 tons, and of Italy somewhat less, about 21,000 tons. This proposition was not accepted, being opposed both by Japan and France. Japan stated her willingness to adhere to the original proposal, which allowed her 54,000 tons in submarines.

In accepting the allowance for capital ships, France had made a distinct reservation. It was said that it would be impossible for the French Government to accept reductions for light cruisers, torpedo boats and submarines corresponding to those which were accepted for capital ships. Accordingly, France maintained that her necessities required that she should be allowed 330,000 tons for cruisers, etc., and 90,000 tons for submarines.

M. Sarraut thus stated the position of the French Government:

“After examining, on the other hand, the composition of the forces needed by France in auxiliary craft and submarines, which are especially intended for the protection of her territory and its communications, the Cabinet and the Supreme Council of National Defense, have reached the conclusion that it is impossible to accept a limitation below that of 330,000 tons for auxiliary craft and 90,000 tons for submarines, without imperiling the vital interests of the country and of its colonies and the safety of their naval life.

“The French delegation has been instructed to consent to no concession on the above figures.

“To sum up, France accepts, as regards capital ships, the sacrifice which she must face in order to meet the views of the Conference and which represents an important reduction of her normal sea power. She limits the program of the future establishment of her fleet to 330,000 tons for auxiliary craft and to 90,000 tons for submarines.”

In view of the insistence on the part of the French Delegation that they could not abate their requirements as to auxiliary craft and submarines, the British Delegation stated that they were unable to consent to a limitation of auxiliary craft adapted to meet submarines.

For this reason it was found to be impossible to carry out the American plan so far as limitation of auxiliary craft and submarines was concerned.

The Naval Treaty

The agreement finally reached was set forth in the Naval Treaty, signed on February 6, 1922.

With respect to capital ships, while there are certain changes in detail, the integrity of the plan proposed on behalf of the American Government has been maintained, and the spirit in which that proposal was made, and in which it was received, dominated the entire negotiations and brought them to a successful conclusion.

[Here follows a summary in extenso of the treaty printed on page 247.]

This is a summary of the engagements of the Naval Treaty. Probably no more significant treaty was ever made. Instead of discussing the desirability of diminishing the burdens of naval armament, the Conference has succeeded in limiting them to an important degree.

It is obvious that this agreement means ultimately an enormous saving of money and the lifting of a heavy and unnecessary burden. The Treaty absolutely stops the race in competition in naval armament. At the same time it leaves the relative security of the great naval powers unimpaired. No national interest has been sacrificed; a wasteful production of unnecessary armament has been ended.

While it was desired that an agreement should be reached for the limitation of auxiliary craft and submarines, its importance should not be overestimated. Limitation has been effected where it was most needed, both with respect to the avoidance of the heaviest outlays and with reference to the promptings to war, which may be found in excessive preparation. Moreover, it is far from probable that the absence of limitation, in the other field, will lead to production of either auxiliary craft or submarines in excess of their normal relation to capital ships. Peoples are not in a mood for unnecessary naval expenditures.

The limitation of capital ships, in itself, substantially meets the existing need, and its indirect effect will be to stop the inordinate production of any sort of naval craft.

Rules for Control of New Agencies of Warfare

Submarines

The British Delegation submitted a proposition for the abolition of submarines. This proposal was put upon the records in the following form:

“The British Empire Delegation desires formally to place on record this [its] opinion that the use of submarines whilst of small value for defensive purposes, leads inevitably to acts which are inconsistent with the laws of war and the dictates of humanity, and the Delegation desires that united action should be taken by all nations to forbid their maintenance, construction, or employment.”

The proposal was discussed at length, the British Delegation bringing forward in its support arguments of great force based upon the experience of Great Britain in the recent war. It met with opposition from France, Italy, and Japan.

The American Delegation not only had the opinion of their naval advisers in opposition to the proposal, but also had received a careful report upon the subject from the Advisory Committee of Twenty-One appointed by the President. This report was presented by the American Delegation as setting forth in a succinct manner the position of their Government. In this report it was stated:⁸

“Unlimited submarine warfare should be outlawed. Laws should be drawn up prescribing the methods of procedure of submarines against merchant vessels both neutral and belligerent. These rules should accord with the rules observed by surface craft. Laws should also be made which prohibit the use of false flags and offensive arming of merchant vessels. The use of false flags has already ceased in land warfare. No one can prevent an enemy from running ‘amuck’ but immediately he does, he outlaws himself and invites sure defeat by bringing down the wrath of the world upon his head. If the submarine is required to operate under the same rule as combatant surface vessels no objection can be raised as to its use against merchant vessels. The individual captains of submarines are no more likely to violate instructions from their government[s] upon this point than are captains of any other type of ship acting independently.

“submarines against combatant ships

“Against enemy men of war the submarine may be likened to the advance guard on land which hides in a tree or uses underbrush to conceal itself. If the infantry in its advance encounters an ambuscade, it suffers greatly even if it is not totally annihilated. However, an ambuscade is entirely legitimate. In the same fashion a submarine strikes the advancing enemy from concealment and no nation cries out against this form of attack as illegal. Its Navy simply becomes more vigilant, moves faster and uses its surface scouts to protect itself.

“The submarine carries the same weapons as surface vessels, i. e., torpedoes, mines, and guns. There is no prohibition of their use on surface craft and there can be none on submarines. Submarines are particularly well adapted to use mines and torpedoes. They can approach to the desired spot without being seen, lay their mines or discharge their torpedoes and make their escape.

“The best defense against them is eternal vigilance and high speed. This causes added fatigue to the personnel and greater wear to the machinery. The continual menace of submarines in the vicinity may so wear down a fleet that when it meets the enemy it will be so exhausted as to make its defeat a simple matter.

“The submarine as a man-of-war has a very vital part to play. It has come to stay. It may strike without warning against combatant vessels, as surface ships may do also, but it must be required to observe the prescribed rules of surface craft when opposing merchantmen, as at other times.

“the submarine as a scout

“As a scout the submarine has great possibilities—it is the one type of vessel able to proceed unsupported into distant enemy waters and maintain itself to observe and report enemy movements. At present its principal handicaps are poor habitability and lack of radio power to transmit its information. However, these may be overcome in some degree in the future. Here, again, the submarine has come to stay—it has great value, a legitimate use, and no nation can decry its employment in this fashion.⁹

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“The submarine is particularly an instrument of weak naval powers. The business of the world is carried on upon the surface of the sea. Any navy which is dominant on the surface prefers to rely on that superiority. While navies comparatively weak, may but threaten that dominance by developing a new form of attack to attain success through surprise. Hence submarines have offered and secured advantages until the method of successful counterattack has been developed.

“The United States Navy lacks a proper number of cruisers. The few we have would be unable to cover the necessary area to obtain information. Submarines could greatly assist them as they can not be driven in by enemy scouts.

“The cost per annum of maintaining 100,000 tons of submarines fully manned and ready is about thirty million dollars. For the work which will be required of them in an emergency, this cost is small when taken in connection with the entire Navy. The retention of a large submarine force may at some future time result in the United States holding its outlying possessions. If these colonies once fall the expenditure of men necessary to recapture them will be tremendous and may result in a drawn war which would really be a United States defeat. The United States needs a large submarine force to protect its interests.

“The Committee is therefore of the opinion that unlimited warfare by submarines on commerce should be outlawed. The right of visit and search must be exercised by submarines under the same rules as for surface vessels. It does not approve limitation in size of submarines.”

Illegal Submarine Warfare—Use of Submarines Against Merchant Ships—Poison Gas

While the Conference was unable either to abolish or limit submarines, it stated, with clarity and force, the existing rules of international law which condemned the abhorrent practices followed in the recent war in the use of submarines against merchant vessels. The resolutions adopted by the Conference as to the use of submarines against merchant vessels, and with respect to the use of poison gas, were put in the form of a treaty which was signed on February 6, 1922. The substantive portions of this Treaty are as follows:

[Here follow the first five articles of the treaty which is printed in full on page 267.]

Mr. Root, in presenting this Treaty for the approval of the Conference, said:

“You will observe that this treaty does not undertake to codify international law in respect of visit, search or seizure of merchant vessels. What it does undertake to do is to state the most important and effective provisions of the law of nations in regard to the treatment of merchant vessels by belligerent warships, and to declare that submarines are, under no circumstances, exempt from these humane rules for the protection of the life of innocent noncombatants.

“It undertakes further to stigmatize violation of these rules, and the doing to death of women and children and noncombatants by the wanton destruction of merchant vessels upon which they are passengers and by [as] a violation of the laws of war, which as between these five great powers and all other civilized nations who shall give their adherence [thereto,] shall be henceforth punished as an act of piracy.

“It undertakes further to prevent temptation to the violation of these rules by the use of submarines for the capture of merchant vessels, and to prohibit that use altogether. It undertakes further to denounce the use of poisonous gases and chemicals in war, as they were used to the horror of all civilization in the war of 1914–1918.

“Cynics have said that in the stress of war these rules will be violated. Cynics are always near-sighted, and often and usually¹⁰ the decisive facts lie beyond the range of their vision.

“We may grant that rules limiting the use of implements of warfare made between diplomatists will be violated in the stress of conflict. We may grant that the most solemn obligation assumed by governments in respect of the use of implements of war will be violated in the stress of conflict; but beyond diplomatists and beyond governments there rests the public opinion of the civilized world, and the public opinion of the world can punish. It can bring its sanction to the support of a prohibition with as terrible consequences as any criminal statute of Congress or of Parliament.

“We may grant that in matters which are complicated and difficult, where the facts are disputed and the argument is sophistic, public opinion may be confused and ineffective, yet when a rule of action, clear and simple, is based upon the fundamental ideas of humanity and right conduct, and the public opinion of the world has reached a decisive judgment upon it, that rule will be enforced by the greatest power known to human history, the power that is the hope of the world, [and] will be a hope justified.”

Commission to Revise Rules of War

The Conference adopted the following Resolution for the appointment of a commission to examine the rules made necessary by recent experience with respect to new agencies of warfare:

• “I. That a Commission composed of not more than two members representing each of the above-mentioned Powers shall be constituted to consider the following questions:
  • “(a) Do existing rules of International Law adequately cover new methods of attack or defense resulting from the introduction or development, since the Hague Conference of 1907, of new agencies of warfare?
  • “(b) If not so, what changes in the existing rules ought to be adopted in consequence thereof as a part of the law of nations?
• “II. That notices of appointment of the members of the Commission shall be transmitted to the Government of the United States of America within three months after the adjournment of the present Conference, which after consultation with the Powers concerned will fix the day and place for the meeting of the Commission.
• “III. That the Commission shall be at liberty to request assistance and advice from experts in International Law and in land, naval, and aerial warfare.
• “IV. That the Commission shall report its conclusions to each of the Powers represented in its membership.
  “Those Powers shall thereupon confer as to the acceptance of the report and the course to be followed to secure the consideration of its recommendations by the other civilized Powers.”

A further resolution was adopted at the same time, as follows:

“Resolved, That it is not the intention of the Powers agreeing to the appointment of a Commission to consider and report upon the rules of International Law respecting new agencies of warfare that the Commission shall review or report upon the rules or declarations relating to submarines or the use of noxious gases and chemicals already adopted by the Powers in this Conference.”

Aircraft

It was found to be impracticable to adopt rules for the limitation of aircraft in number, size, or character, in view of the fact that such rules would be of little or no value unless the production of commercial aircraft were similarly restricted. It was deemed to be inadvisable thus to hamper the development of a facility which could not fail to be important in the progress of civilization.

ii. pacific and far eastern questions

When the Conference was called there existed with regard to the Far East causes of misunderstanding and sources of controversy which constituted a serious potential danger. These difficulties centered principally about China, where the developments of the past quarter of a century had produced a situation in which international rivalries, jealousies, distrust, and antagonism were fostered.

The people of China are the inheritors of the oldest extant civilization of the world; but it is a civilization which has followed a course of development different from that of the West. It has almost wholly ignored the material, the mechanical, the scientific, and industrial mastery of natural resources, which has so characterized our Western civilization in its later growth, and has led among us to the creation of an intricate industrial system. The spirit of Chinese civilization has, moreover, been pacifist, and lacking in the consciousness of nationality as we understand that term. In its political aspects, the ideal of that civilization was to follow the principle of self-government by the family or guild to an extreme. The throne had imposed upon the people virtually no authority and exercised virtually no functions save to preserve order and to collect taxes for the maintenance of the throne as a symbol of national or racial unity.

So long as China lived as a race apart, as a self-contained agricultural country, such a political ideal was possible of realization; and we who are the inheritors of so different a tradition can not but pay respect to China’s civilization.

It is perhaps one of the tragedies of human evolution that the fine civilization which had developed in China and which had spread to other lands of eastern Asia was of necessity withered by contact with our more material western system of living. The Asiatic nations seem to have been conscious of this in their early contacts with the European world; and for a time they sought to exclude the new influences. Failing in that, they met the problem in different ways. Japan, with its highly centralized system, which, in marked contrast with the political ideals of China, had instilled into its people a national consciousness and loyalty and obedience in a singular degree, had found it possible within a comparatively few decades to adapt itself to membership in the family of modern nations; and by what is doubtless the most extraordinary transformation in history, took on so much of the material development and political tradition of the West as enabled her empire to become what it is to-day, one of the foremost nations of the world.

China, on the other hand, with its age-long devotion to a political ideal which scarcely involved the concept of the State, and which had afforded its people no experience of coordinated action for political ends, was slower to adapt itself to conditions arising out of what it regarded as the intrusion of the West. Even after it had ceased actually to oppose this intrusion, it still sought to hold itself aloof and to carry on a passive resistance to the new influences which were at work. Against powerful, well-knit governments of the European type, strongly nationalistic, and in some instances availing themselves of military force, China could oppose only the will of a weak and loose-knit government, lacking even the support of a national self-consciousness on the part of its people. Against the organized commercial and industrial enterprises of the West, China had no similar organization to oppose, and no means of exploiting on any adequate scale the coveted latent wealth of the country. It was melancholy but perhaps inevitable that a realization of this situation should have led to a scramble among the Powers of greatest military and industrial strength with a view to obtaining the fullest possible opportunity to profit by the riches and the weakness of China. In this scramble, not only were the rights of China ignored or violated, but a number of the stronger Powers found themselves in a situation of mutual antagonism as a result.

It was in the midst of this scramble, in the year 1899, that Secretary Hay sought to establish the principle of the open door and to obtain general acceptance for certain concrete applications of it which at least would minimize the existing danger. And when, in the following year, a portion of the Chinese people were beguiled into the futile antiforeign protest that we know as the Boxer Uprising, Secretary Hay joined with the open-door principle its corollary, that is, the preservation of Chinese territorial and administrative integrity. These two related principles have since had their influence in restraint of the temptation to encroach upon the rights of China or upon the rights of other friendly states in China. But it is unfortunately the fact that these principles, helpful as they might have been, were never a matter of binding international obligation among all the powers concerned; and although generally professed, they were in some instances disregarded, and each such case afforded an excuse and a temptation to treat them thereafter more and more as mere counsels of perfection for which no nation could be held strictly to account. This disintegrating tendency had become more marked in the period following China’s overthrow of its ancient dynasty and its assumption of the status of a republic. This development has inevitably brought with it a period of transition.

The democratic system of government represents the final and most difficult stage in the political experience of a people; and its adoption has universally been accompanied, as it was in our own case, by a period of painful adjustment to new and difficult requirements. In China, perhaps, the singular lack of political experience, or even of a helpful governmental tradition, made this development infinitely difficult, and for approximately ten years China has been exhibiting the weakness and political disturbance which seem to be the price that must be paid for the institution of popular government. In these circumstances, the weakening of the restraints upon the action of foreign nations seeking to participate in the economic development of China has perhaps not unnaturally led to a greater indifference to China’s rights and interests, and to a greater disregard of the dangers arising out of international rivalries.

A situation had thus been created in which the Chinese people nursed a sense of grievance and even of outrage; and the foreign nations found their relations complicated by mutual suspicion and resentment.

Throughout considerable areas of the territory of China claims were made to so-called spheres of interest which not only placed a check upon the normal economic development of the country and interfered with its administration, but also sought to restrict the free commercial intercourse of those peoples, which, like ourselves, considered that they had a full right, with the sanction of treaty engagements, to deal without control or interference with the Chinese people in whatever part of China and in whatever sort of legitimate business or enterprise they might find mutually profitable.

Such was the unhealthy situation that had come to exist in the Far East; and those who regarded it with a view to its effects upon the relationships of the several nations concerned could not but be conscious that plans for the limitation of armaments could scarcely have more than a temporary success if it were not possible to dispel the growing sense of uneasiness and mutual distrust which had arisen out of those conditions.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance

It may be stated without reservation that one of the most important factors in the Far Eastern situation was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This Alliance has been viewed by the people of the United States with deep concern. Originally designed as a measure of protection in view of the policies of Russia and Germany in Far Eastern affairs, the continuance of the Alliance after all peril from those sources had ceased could not fail to be regarded as seriously prejudicial to our interests. Without reviewing the reasons for this disquietude, it was greatly increased by the “state of international tension” which had arisen in the Pacific area. The question constantly recurred: The original sources of danger having-been removed, against whom and for what purposes was the Alliance maintained? The difiiculty lay in the fact that the Treaty was not one that had to be renewed. It ran until it was formally denounced by one of the two parties. Great Britain accordingly found itself, as Mr. Balfour has expressed it, “between the possibilities of two misunderstandings—a misunderstanding if they retained the Treaty, a misunderstanding if they denounced the Treaty.”

It was, therefore, a matter of the greatest gratification that the American Delegation found that they were able to obtain an agreement by which the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should be immediately terminated. No greater step could be taken to secure the unimpeded influence of liberal opinion in promoting peace in the Pacific region.

The Four-Power Treaty

This agreement between the United States, British Empire, France, and Japan, which was signed on December 13, 1921, provided as follows:

I

“The High Contracting Parties agree as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.

“If there should develop between any of the High Contracting Parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them, they shall invite the other High Contracting Parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment.

II

“If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.

III

“This Treaty shall remain in force for ten years from the time it shall take effect, and after the expiration of said period it shall continue to be in force subject to the right of any of the High Contracting Parties to terminate it upon twelve months’ notice.

IV

“This Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the High Contracting Parties and shall take effect on the deposit of ratifications, which shall take place at Washington, and thereupon the agreement between Great Britain and Japan, which was concluded at London on July 13, 1911, shall terminate.”¹²

It was accompanied by the following statement signed at the same time:

“In signing the Treaty this day between The United States of America, The British Empire, France, and Japan it is declared to be the understanding and intent of the Signatory Powers:

• “1. That the Treaty shall apply to the Mandated Islands in the Pacific Ocean; provided, however, that the making of the Treaty shall not be deemed to be an assent on the part of The United States of America to the mandates and shall not preclude agreements between The United States of America and the Mandatory Power respectively in relation to the mandated islands.
• “2. That the controversies to which the second paragraph of Article I refers shall not be taken to embrace questions which according to principles of international law lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective Powers.”¹³

Accordingly, the signing of the Treaty on the part of the United States was subject to the making of a convention with Japan concerning the status of the Island of Yap and what are termed the mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator, the negotiations in regard to which have been concluded,¹⁴ and also to the reservations with respect to what are termed the mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean south of the Equator. The position of the United States in regard to mandates is not in any way affected by this Treaty.

Further, it is distinctly stated that the controversies to which the Treaty refers do not embrace questions which, according to principles of international law, lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective Powers. Illustrations of questions of this sort are immigration and tariff matters, so far as they are unaffected by existing treaties.

It will be observed that the Treaty relates only to “insular possessions and insular dominions.” It contains no provision with respect to continental territory either in the East or in the West.

Under Article I, the parties do not agree to give any support to claims, but only to respect rights that actually exist. When controversies arise of the character stated in the Article, the Powers merely agree to confer together concerning them. No Power binds itself to anything further; and any consents or agreements must be reached in accordance with its constitutional methods. The reference to “consideration and adjustment” does not imply that any agreement can be made at a conference relating to a controversy which would be binding upon the United States, unless that agreement is made by constitutional authority. The present Treaty promises not an agreement of any sort, but merely consultation. The same is true of the provision in Article II.

As Senator Lodge said, in communicating the terms of the Treaty to the Conference:

“To put it in a few words, the treaty provides that the four signatory powers will agree as between themselves to respect their insular possessions and dominions in the region of the Pacific, and that if any controversy should arise as to such rights, all the high contracting parties shall be invited to a joint conference looking to the adjustment of such controversy. They agree to take similar action in the case of aggression by any other power upon these insular possessions or dominions. The agreement is to remain in force for 10 years, and after ratification under the constitutional methods of the high contracting parties the existing agreement between Great Britain and Japan, which was concluded at London on July 13, 1911, shall terminate. And that is all. Each signer is bound to respect the rights of the others and before taking action in any controversy to consult with them. There is no provision for the use of force to carry out any of the terms of the agreement, and no military or naval sanction lurks anywhere in the background or under cover of these plain and direct clauses.”

This statement was made in open Conference, in the presence of all the Delegates who signed the Treaty, and must be regarded as an authoritative and accepted exposition of its import.

A question arose whether the main islands of Japan were within the scope of the Treaty. This had been considered while the Treaty was being negotiated, and it had been understood that they had been included. The words “insular possessions and insular dominions” were deemed comprehensively to embrace all islands of the respective powers in the region described.

The American Delegation did not regard it as important whether the main islands of Japan were included or excluded, save that it was understood that their exclusion might give rise to difficulties with respect to the position of Australia and New Zealand. After the Treaty was signed, it became apparent that in view of the sentiment both in this country and in Japan, it would be preferable to exclude the main islands of Japan from the Treaty, and it was ascertained that Australia and New Zealand would not object to this course.

It was thought desirable that specific mention should be made of the Japanese islands to which the Treaty should apply.

Accordingly, on February 6, 1922, the Four Powers signed a Treaty, supplementary to the Treaty of December 13, 1921, providing¹⁶—

“the term ‘insular possessions and insular dominions’ used in the aforesaid Treaty, shall, in its application to Japan, include only Karafuto (or the southern portion of the island of Sakhalin), Formosa and the Pescadores, and the islands under the mandate of Japan.”

It was further provided that this agreement should have the same force and effect as the Treaty to which it was supplementary, and thus it is subject to the reservations made at the time the Treaty of December 13, 1921, was signed.

The Shantung Controversy¹⁷

The most acute question, perhaps, in the Far East was that relating to Shantung, and it was also apparently the most difficult to settle satisfactorily.

At the outbreak of the European War, Japan, as the ally of Great Britain, dispatched to Germany an ultimatum¹⁸ requiring the German Government to deliver over to the Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, and with a view to its eventual restoration to China, the Kiaochow territory for which Germany had obtained from China a lease of 99 years by virtue of a Convention signed in 1898. Upon this ultimatum being disregarded by Germany, Japan landed forces in the Province of Shantung, which besieged and captured the City of Tsingtao and, in November, 1914, took possession of the whole leased territory of Kiaochow and of the German-owned Shantung Eailway, running from that territory to the City of Tsinanfu, the capital of Shantung Province.

During the following year, as the result of the so-called “21 Demands” which Japan presented to China,¹⁹ there was signed on May 25, 1915, a Treaty²⁰ by which the Chinese Government agreed “to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung and it was further agreed that the whole of Kiaochow Bay should be opened as a commercial port, with a municipal concession to be established under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan at a place to be designated by the Japanese Government, while an international concession might be established if the other foreign Powers should so desire.

By a further Exchange of Notes dated September 24, 1918, it was arranged that the Shantung Railway should be operated jointly by Japan and China, and that it should thereafter be protected not by Japanese troops but by a special police force composed of Chinese under Japanese direction.

This latter arrangement, however, was never ratified by China, which continued to protest against Japan’s claim to have succeeded to the position of Germany with respect to the leased territory of Kiaochow, the Shantung Railway, and other matters in the Province of Shantung.

This question was raised at the Peace Conference at Paris, China insisting upon the restitution to itself of all rights and privileges which Germany had possessed in Tsingtao. The decision of the Conference was, however, adverse to this claim; and by Articles 156,157, and 158 of the Treaty of Versailles, it was provided that Germany should renounce in favor of Japan all her rights, title, and privileges relative to the Province of Shantung, particularly those concerning the leased territory of Kiaochow and the movable and immovable property of the German Government therein, the Shantung Railway, the mines operated by German nationals, and the submarine cables to Chefoo and to Shanghai which were the property of the German state. The cession thus made by the Treaty was nevertheless qualified by a declaration made in behalf of the Japanese Delegation, to the effect that “the policy of Japan consists in handing back the Shantung Peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao.” By reason of this dissatisfaction with the disposition of the Shantung question made by the Versailles Treaty, the Chinese Government not only withheld its signature of that Treaty, but declined to entertain any proposals made by the Japanese Government for the adjustment of the question upon what it deemed to be the vague and arbitrary basis of restoring to China the “political sovereignty” (which China contended had not been affected by Japan’s taking over the German position), while retaining for Japan the economic privileges—including the only deep-water harbor in the Province, the only railway thence to the interior, the only coal and iron mines of the Province which have proved to be of value—so as to leave Japan in effective domination of the economic life of the Province of Shantung.

The question could not be brought, technically, before the Washington Conference, as all the nations represented at the Conference table, save the United States, China, and The Netherlands, were bound by the Treaty of Versailles. Japan could, of course, at once oppose any action by any of these Powers at the Conference which could be regarded as a departure from the terms of that Treaty.

It was quite clear, however, that the Conference furnished a most favorable opportunity for negotiations between China and Japan in which by mutual agreement a solution of the difficulty might be found. In order that the parties might be brought together, the good offices of Mr. Balfour and Mr. Hughes, individually, were tendered to both parties, with their consent, and conversations looking to a settlement were begun. These conversations continued for many weeks and had the happy result of complete agreement, which was embodied in a Treaty signed on the part of China and Japan on February 4, 1922. The main outlines of this Treaty are as follows:²¹

“Japan will, within six months from the date of the Treaty, restore to China the former German leased territory of Kiaochow, and all public properties therein, without charge except for such additions and improvements as may have been made by Japan during the period of her occupation;

“All Japanese troops are to be withdrawn as soon as possible—from the line of the Railway within six months at the latest, and from the leased territory not later than 30 days from the date of its transfer to China;

“The customhouse at Tsingtao is at once to be made an integral part of the Chinese Maritime Customs:

“The Shantung (Tsingtao-Tsinanfu) Railway and appurtenant properties are to be transferred to China, the transfer to be completed within 9 months, at the latest, from the date of coming into force of the Treaty; the value of the property to be determined by a commission upon the basis of approximately 53,000,000 gold marks, already assessed against Japan by the Reparations Commission as the value of the railway property taken by Japan from Germany in 1914; the value fixed being paid by China to Japan by Chinese Government treasury notes, secured on the properties and revenues of the Railway, and running for a period of 15 years, but redeemable either in whole or in part at any time after 5 years from the date of payment; pending the complete redemption of such treasury notes, the Chinese Government to employ a Japanese subject as traffic manager, and a Japanese subject as one of two joint chief accountants, under the authority and control of the Chinese managing director of the railway;

“The rights in the construction of two extensions or the Shantung Railway, reserved in 1914 for German enterprise, and subsequently granted to a Japanese syndicate, are to be opened to the activities of an international financial group on terms to be arranged between China and that group;

“The coal and iron mines formerly owned by the German Shantung Railway Company are to be handed over to a company to be formed under a special charter of the Chinese Government, in which Japanese capital may participate equal with Chinese capital;

“Japan relinquishes its claim to the establishment of an exclusive Japanese settlement in the leased territory, and China opens the whole of that territory to foreign trade, undertaking to respect all valid vested rights therein;

“China is enabled to purchase, for incorporation in its Government salt monopoly, the salt fields now operated in the leased territory by Japanese subjects, on the understanding that it will allow the export on reasonable terms of salt to meet the shortage in Japan;

“Japan relinquishes to China all claims with respect to the Tsing-tao-Chefoo and Shanghai cables, except such portions as were utilized by Japan during the war for the laying of the cable from Tsingtao to Sasebo;

“Japan is to transfer to China for fair compensation the wireless stations at Tsingtao and Tsinanfu;

“Japan renounces all preferential rights in respect of foreign assistance in persons, capital, and material stipulated in the Kiaochow Convention of 1898 between China and Germany.[”]

Wei-Hai-Wei

On the announcement to the Conference of the conclusion of the agreement relating to Shantung, Mr. Balfour, on behalf of the British Government, proposed to restore Wei-Hai-Wei to China. Mr. Balfour said:

“The circumstances under which Weihaiwei thus came under the control of [Great] Britain have now not only provisionally changed, but they have altogether disappeared. The rest of the Province 01 Shantung is now handed back under suitable conditions to the complete sovereignty of China. Under like suitable conditions I have to announce that Great Britain proposes to hand back Weihaiwei to the country within whose frontier it lies.

“It has so far been used merely as a sanatorium or summer resort for ships of war coming up from the tropical or more southern portions of the China station. I doubt not that arrangements can be made under which it will remain available for that innocent and healthful purpose in time to come. But Chinese sovereignty will now be restored, as it has been restored in other parts of the Province, and we shall be largely guided in the arrangements that we propose at once to initiate by the example so happily set us by the Japanese and Chinese negotiators in the case of Shantung. They have received from this great assembly unmistakable proof of your earnest approval, and most surely they deserve it.”

Principles and Policies in Relation to China

The work of the Conference in connection with Far Eastern matters was largely devoted to the effort to give new vigor and reality to the coordinated principles of territorial and administrative integrity of China and of the “Open Door” or equality of opportunity for all nations in China. These principles have been called coordinate, but they are, in fact, different aspects of the same principle. For any impairment of the sovereignty of China must affect the rights and interests of other powers in relation to China; and any attempt to establish a particularistic and exclusive system in favor of any foreign nation thereby creates conditions prejudicial to China’s freedom of action in relation to other Powers. The distinction between the two phases of this question would therefore seem to be one of relative emphasis rather than of kind.

As the foundation of its work in relation to China, the Conference adopted the following fundamental principles, in agreeing:

• “(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
• “(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;
• “(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
• “(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.”

Thus were reaffirmed the postulates of American policy which were no longer to be left to the exchanges of diplomatic notes, but were to receive the sanction of the most solemn undertaking of the Powers.

This statement was supplemented by the agreement that the Powers attending the Conference “would not enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement or understanding, either with one another, or individually, or collectively, with any Power or Powers, which would infringe or impair these principles.”

In the light of experience, it was deemed important that there should be a more definite statement of what was connoted by the “Open Door” or the principle of equal opportunity, and accordingly the Conference adopted the following resolutions:

“I. With a view to applying more effectually the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the Powers other than China represented at this Conference agree—

• “(a) Not to seek or to support their nationals in seeking any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China;
• “(b) Not to seek or to support their nationals in seeking any such monopoly or preference as would deprive other nationals of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China or of participating with the Chinese Government or with any local authority in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.

“It is understood that this agreement is not to be so construed as to prohibit the acquisition of such properties or rights as may be necessary to the conduct of a particular commercial, industrial or financial undertaking or to the encouragement of invention and research.

“II. The Chinese Government takes note of the above agreement and declares its intention of being guided by the same principles in dealing with applications for economic rights and privileges from Governments and nationals of all foreign countries whether parties to that agreement or not.”

There still remained the efforts of nationals, as distinguished from governments, in derogation of the Open Door principle, to create for themselves spheres of influence in China in order to enjoy mutually exclusive opportunities. This sort of endeavor the Powers agreed to restrain by resolving:

“Resolved, That the Signatory Powers will not support any agreements by their respective nationals with each other designed to create Spheres of Influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory.”

It was also apparent, in connection with the particular subject of railways, that safeguards should be erected against practices of unjust discrimination, although there was no intent to intimate that any unfair discrimination lay at the door of China. Accordingly the Conference took action as follows:

“The Chinese Government declares that throughout the whole of the railways in China it will not exercise or permit any unfair discrimination of any kind. In particular, there shall be no discrimination whatever, direct or indirect, in respect of charges or of facilities on the ground of the nationality of passengers or the countries from which or to which they are proceeding, or the origin or ownership of goods or the country from which or to which they are consigned, or the nationality or ownership of the ship or other means of conveying such passengers or goods before or after their transport on the Chinese railways.

“The other Powers represented at this Conference take note of the above declaration and make a corresponding declaration in respect of any of the aforesaid railways over which they or their nationals are in a position to exercise any control in virtue of any concession, special agreement, or otherwise.”

The agreements evidenced by these Resolutions, and constituting a Magna Charta for China, were embodied in the Treaty signed on February 6, 1922.

In this Treaty it was also provided that the Contracting Powers agreed fully to respect Chinese rights as a neutral in time of war to which China is not a party, and China declared that when she was a neutral she would observe the obligations of neutrality.

Again, in order to aid the carrying out of these stipulations of the Treaty, provision was made for consultation among the Powers concerned with respect to their application. It was provided:

“The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present Treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned.”

This involves no impairment of national sovereignty, no sacrifice of national interests, no provision for agreements reached apart from the constitutional methods of the respective Powers, but a simple opportunity for consultation, examination, and expression of views whenever any question under the specified stipulations of the Treaty may arise.

It is believed that through this Treaty the Open Door in China has at last been made a fact.

Board of Reference

In order further to provide a procedure for dealing with questions which might arise under the provisions of the Treaty, relating to equality of opportunity and unfair discrimination in railroad service, a Resolution was adopted providing for the constitution of a Board of Reference, which would furnish a facility for investigation and report. The Resolution was adopted in the following terms:

“Desiring to provide a procedure for dealing with questions that may arise in connection with the execution of the provisions of Articles III and V of the Treaty to be signed at Washington on February 6th, 1922, with reference to their general policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other Powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity;

“Resolve that there shall be established in China a Board of Reference to which any questions arising in connection with the execution of the aforesaid Articles may be referred for investigation and report.

“The Special Conference provided for in Article II of the Treaty to be signed at Washington on February 6th, 1922, with reference to the Chinese Customs Tariff, shall formulate for the approval of the Powers concerned a detailed plan for the constitution of the Board.”

It will be observed that this Board, which is intended merely as a board of inquiry, is not yet constituted, and the recommendations of the Special Conference, with respect to its constitution, must be submitted for the approval of the Powers, which, of course, must act according to their constitutional methods in the adoption of any agreement containing a detailed plan.

Alienation of Territory

In connection with the presentation by China of the principles asserted in behalf of her territorial and administrative integrity, China placed upon the record of the Conference the following declaration:

“China, upon her part, is prepared to give an undertaking not to alienate or lease any portion of her territory or littoral to any Power.”

It was proper that to China should be given the opportunity to develop in the Conference those questions which more intimately affected her integrity and sovereignty, and her Delegation took occasion to indicate fully, and very ably, certain grounds of complaint which China had against various practices.

Extraterritoriality

By treaties between Great Britain and China, dated September 5, 1902; between the United States and China, dated October 8, 1903;²⁴ and between Japan and China dated October 8, 1903, these Powers agreed to give every assistance towards the attainment by the Chinese Government of its expressed desire to reform its judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of western nations and declared that they were also “prepared to relinquish extraterritorial rights when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration, and other considerations, warrant” them in so doing. In the light of these agreements, and taking into consideration existing conditions in China, it was resolved by the Powers in the Conference as follows:

“That the Governments of the Powers above named shall establish a Commission (to which each of such Governments shall appoint one member) to inquire into the present practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, and into the laws and the judicial system and the methods of judicial administration of China, with a view to reporting to the Governments of the several Powers above named their findings of fact in regard to these matters, and their recommendations as to such means as they may find suitable to improve the existing conditions of the administration of justice in China, and to assist and further the efforts of the Chinese Government to effect such legislation and judicial reforms as would warrant the several Powers in relinquishing, either progressively or otherwise, their respective rights of extraterritoriality;

“That the Commission herein contemplated shall be constituted within three months after the adjournment of the Conference in accordance with detailed arrangements to be hereafter agreed upon by the Governments of the Powers above named, and shall be instructed to submit its report and recommendations within one year after the first meeting of the Commission.

“That each of the Powers above named shall be deemed free to accept or to reject all or any portion of the recommendations of the Commission herein contemplated, but that in no case shall any of the said Powers make its acceptance of all or any portion of such recommendations either directly or indirectly dependent on the granting by China of any special concession, favor, benefit or immunity, whether political or economic.

“additional resolution

“That the non-signatory Powers, having by treaty extraterritorial rights in China, may accede to the resolution affecting extraterritoriality and the administration of justice in China by depositing within three months after the adjournment of the Conference a written notice of accession with the Government of the United States for communication by it to each of the signatory Powers.

“additional resolution

“That China, having taken note of the resolutions affecting the establishment of a Commission to investigate and report upon extraterritoriality and the administration of justice in China, expresses its satisfaction with the sympathetic disposition of the Powers hereinbefore named in regard to the aspiration of the Chinese Government to secure the abolition of extraterritoriality in China, and declares its intention to appoint a representative who shall have the right to sit as a member of the said Commission, it being understood that China shall be deemed free to accept or to reject any or all of the recommendations of the Commission. Furthermore, China is prepared to cooperate in the work of this Commission and to afford to it every possible facility for the successful accomplishment of its tasks.”

Foreign Postal Agencies in China

The following Resolution was adopted by the Conference in relation to foreign postal agencies in China:

• “A. Recognizing the justice of the desire expressed by the Chinese Government to secure the abolition of foreign postal agencies in China, save or except in leased territories or as otherwise specifically provided by treaty, it is resolved:

  (1) The four Powers having such postal agencies agree to their abandonment subject to the following conditions:

  (a) That an efficient Chinese postal service is maintained;

  (b) That an assurance is given by the Chinese Government that they contemplate no change in the present postal administration so far as the status of the foreign Co-Director General is concerned.

  (2) To enable China and the Powers concerned to make the necessary dispositions, this arrangement shall come into force and effect not later than January 1, 1923.

• “B. Pending the complete withdrawal of foreign postal agencies, the four Powers concerned severally undertake to afford full facilities to the Chinese customs authorities to examine in those agencies all postal matters (excepting ordinary letters, whether registered or not, which upon external examination appear plainly to contain only written matter) passing through them, with a view to ascertaining whether they contain articles which are dutiable or contraband or which otherwise contravene the customs regulations or laws of China.”

Armed Forces in China

The following Resolution was adopted in relation to foreign troops in China, including police and railroad guards:—

“Whereas The Powers have from time to time stationed armed forces, including police and railway guards, in China to protect the lives and property of foreigners lawfully in China;

“And whereas It appears that certain of these armed forces are maintained in China without the authority of any treaty or agreement;

“And whereas The Powers have declared their intention to withdraw their armed forces now on duty in China without the authority of any treaty or agreement, whenever China shall assure the protection of the lives and property of foreigners in China;

“And whereas China has declared her intention and capacity to assure the protection of the lives and property of foreigners in China:

“Now to the end that there may be clear understanding of the conditions upon which in each case the practical execution of those intentions must depend;

“It is resolved: That the Diplomatic Representatives in Pekin of the Powers now in Conference at Washington, to wit, the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, and Portugal, will be instructed by their respective Governments, whenever China shall so request, to associate themselves with three representatives of the Chinese Government to conduct collectively a full and impartial inquiry into the issues raised by the foregoing declarations of intention made by the Powers and by China and shall thereafter prepare a full and comprehensive report setting out without reservation their findings of fact and their opinion with regard to the matter hereby referred for inquiry, and shall furnish a copy of their report to each of the nine Governments concerned which shall severally make public the report with such comment as each may deem appropriate. The representatives of any of the Powers may make or join in minority reports stating their differences, if any, from the majority report.

“That each of the Powers above named shall be deemed free to accept or reject all or any of the findings of fact or opinions expressed in the report, but that in no case shall any of the said Powers make its acceptance of all or any of the findings of fact or opinions either directly or indirectly dependent on the granting by China of any special concession, favor, benefit, or immunity, whether political or economic.”

Radio Stations in China

The following action was taken with respect to radio stations:

• “1. That all radio stations in China, whether maintained under the provisions of the international protocol of September 7, 1901, or in fact maintained in the grounds of any of the foreign legations in China, shall be limited in their use to sending and receiving government messages and shall not receive or send commercial or personal or unofficial messages, including press matter: Provided, however, that in case all other telegraphic communication is interrupted, then, upon official notification accompanied by proof of such interruption to the Chinese Ministry of Communications, such stations may afford temporary facilities for commercial, personal, or unofficial messages, including press matter, until the Chinese Government has given notice of the termination of the interruption;
• “2. All radio stations operated within the territory of China by a foreign government or the citizens or subjects thereof under treaties or concessions of the Government of China, shall limit the messages sent and received by the terms of the treaties or concessions under which the respective stations are maintained;
• “3. In case there be any radio station maintained in the territory of China by a foreign government or citizens or subjects thereof without the authority of the Chinese Government, such station and all the plant, apparatus, and material thereof shall be transferred to and taken over by the Government of China, to be operated under the direction of the Chinese Ministry of Communications upon fair and full compensation to the owners for the value of the installation, as soon as the Chinese Ministry of Communications is prepared to operate the same effectively for the general public benefit;
• “4. If any questions shall arise as to the radio stations in leased territories, in the South Manchurian Railway Zone or in the French Concession at Shanghai, they shall be regarded as matters for discussion between the Chinese Government and the Government concerned;
• “5. The owners or managers of all radio stations maintained in the territory of China by foreign powers or citizens or subjects thereof shall confer with the Chinese Ministry of Communications for the purpose of seeking a common arrangement to avoid interference in the use of wave lengths by wireless stations in China, subject to such general arrangements as may be made by an international conference convened for the revision of the rules established by the International Radio Telegraph Convention, signed at London, July 5, 1912.”

The following declaration in connection with this Resolution was made by the Powers other than China:

“The Powers other than China declare that nothing in paragraphs 3 or 4 of the Resolutions of 7th December, 1921, is to be deemed to be an expression of opinion by the Conference as to whether the stations referred to therein are or are not authorized by China.

“They further give notice that the result of any discussion arising under paragraph 4 must, if it is not to be subject to objection by them, conform with the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity approved by the Conference.”

There was also a declaration by China, upon the same subject, as follows:

“The Chinese Delegation takes this occasion formally to declare that the Chinese Government does not recognize or concede the right of any foreign Power or of the nationals thereof to install or operate, without its express consent, radio stations in legation grounds, settlements, concessions, leased territories, railway areas, or other similar areas.”

Railways in China

In addition to the resolutions already mentioned relating to unfair discrimination, a general resolution was adopted by the Conference in relation to railways in China:

“The Powers represented in this Conference record their hope that to the utmost degree consistent with legitimate existing rights, the future development of railways in China shall be so conducted as to enable the Chinese Government to effect the unification of railways into a railway system under Chinese control, with such foreign financial and technical assistance as may prove necessary in the interests of that system.”

And China placed the following declaration as to railways upon the records of the Conference:

“The Chinese Delegation notes with sympathetic appreciation the expression of the hope of the Powers that the existing and future railways of China may be unified under the control and operation of the Chinese Government with such foreign financial and technical assistance as may be needed. It is our intention as speedily as possible to bring about this result. It is our purpose to develop existing and future railways in accordance with a general programme that will meet the economic, industrial, and commercial requirements of China. It will be our policy to obtain such foreign financial and technical assistance as may be needed from the Powers in accordance with the principles of the Open Door or equal opportunity; and the friendly support of these Powers will be asked for the effort of the Chinese Government to bring all the railways of China, now existing or to be built, under its effective and unified control and operation.”

Chinese Customs Tariff

Important action was taken with respect to the Chinese customs tariff, and the Resolutions adopted upon this subject by the Conference were embodied in a Treaty signed on February 6th.²⁵ In presenting this Treaty to the Conference, Senator Underwood reviewed the history of Chinese customs, and stated the purpose and effect of the Treaty. In view of the intricacy of the matter, this statement is given in full, as follows:

“I realize fully that the Delegates seated at this table understand why the Nine Powers have agreed with China on the adoption of a customs tariff, but in this Twentieth Century treaties have ceased to be compacts of governments, and if they are to live and survive [they] must be the understandings of the people themselves.

“It may seem an anomaly to the people of the world who have not studied this question that this Conference, after declaring that they recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, should engage with China in a compact about a domestic matter that is a part of her sovereignty, and to announce the treaty without an explanation may lead to misunderstanding, and therefore I ask the patience of the Conference for a few minutes that I may put in, the record a statement of the historic facts that have led up to present conditions, that makes it necessary that this Conference should enter into this agreement.

“The conclusions which have been reached with respect to the Chinese maritime customs tariff are two in number, the first being in the form of an agreement for an immediate revision of existing schedules, so as to bring the rate of duty up to a basis of 5 per cent effective. The second is in the form of a treaty and provides for a special conference which shall be empowered to levy surtaxes and to make other arrangements for increasing the customs schedules above the rate of 5 per cent effective.

“In order to understand the nature and the reasons for these agreements, it is well to bear in mind the historical background of the present treaty adjustment, which places such a large control of the Chinese customs in the hands of foreign powers.

“The origin of the Chinese customs tariff dates back to the Fourteenth Century, but the administration system was of such a nature that constant friction arose with foreign merchants engaged in trade with that country, and culminated in an acute controversy relating to the smuggling of opium, sometimes known as the Opium War of 1839–1842.

“This controversy ended in 1842 with the Treaty of Nankin, between China and Great Britain. The Treaty of Nankin marked the beginning of Chinese relations on a recognized legal basis with the countries of the Western World, and is likewise the beginning of the history of China’s present tariff system.

“By the Treaty of Nankin it was agreed that five ports should be opened for foreign trade, and that a fair and regular tariff of export and import customs and other dues should be published.

“In a subsequent treaty of October 8, 1843, a tariff schedule way adopted for both imports and exports, based on the general rate of 5 per cent ad valorem.

“In 1844 the first treaty between China and the United States was concluded.²⁶ In this treaty the tariff upon which China had agreed with Great Britain was made an integral part of its provisions, and most-favored-nation treatment was secured for the United States in the following terms:

“Citizens of the United States resorting to China shall in no case be subject to other or higher duties than are or shall be required of the people of any other nation whatever, and if additional advantages or privileges of whatever description be conceded hereafter by China to any other nation, the United States and the citizens thereof shall be entitled thereupon to a complete, equal, and impartial participation in the same.”

“In the same year a similar treaty between China and France was concluded, and in 1847 a like treaty was entered into with Sweden and Norway.

“After an interval of a little over a decade, friction again developed and a war ensued.

“In 1851, when negotiations were again resumed, silver had fallen in value, prices of foreign commodities had changed, and the former schedule of duties no longer represented the rate of 5 per cent ad valorem.

“In 1858 China concluded what was known as the Tientsin Treaty with the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and France.²⁸

“The British Treaty, which was the most comprehensive, being completed by agreement as to the tariff and rules of trade, was signed at Shanghai on November 8, 1858. By this agreement a schedule of duties was provided to take the place of the schedule previously in force. Most of the duties were specific, calculated on the basis of 5 per cent of the then prevailing values of articles.

“The tariff schedule thus adopted in 1858 underwent no revision except in reference to opium until 1902.

“The beginning of foreign administrative supervision of the Chinese maritime customs dates back to the time of the Taiping Rebellion, when, in September, 1853, the city of Shanghai was captured by the Taiping rebels. As a consequence the Chinese customs was closed and foreign merchants had no offices to collect customs duties.

“In order to meet the emergency, the foreign consuls collected the duties until June 29, 1854, when an agreement was entered into with the British, American, and French consuls for the establishment of a foreign board of inspectors. Under this agreement a board of foreign inspectors was appointed, and continued in office until 1858, when the tariff commission met and agreed to rules of trade, of which Article X provided that a uniform customs system should be enforced at every port, and that a high officer should be appointed by the Chinese government to superintend the foreign trade, and that this officer might select any British subject whom he might see fit to aid him in the administration of the customs revenue, and in a number of other matters connected with commerce and navigation. In 1914, just as the Great War was breaking, there were 1,357 foreigners in the Chinese customs service, representing twenty nationalities among a total of 7,441 employees.

“It is appropriate to observe that the present administrative system has given very great satisfaction in the matter of its efficiency and its fairness to the interests of all concerned, and in that connection I desire to say that, when the consideration of this tariff treaty was before the Subcommittee that prepared it, there was a general and I may say universal sentiment about the table from the Delegates representing the Nine Powers, that on account of the disturbed conditions in China to-day, unsettled governmental conditions, it was desirous [desirable], if it met with the approval of China, that there should be no disturbance at this time of the present administration of the customs system, and in response to that sentiment, which was discussed at the table, Dr. Koo, speaking for the Chinese Government, made a statement which I have been directed by the full committee to report to this Plenary Session, which is as follows:

“The Chinese Delegation has the honor to inform the Committee on the Far Eastern Questions of the Conference on the Limitation of Armament that the Chinese Government have no intention to effect any change which may disturb the present administration of the Chinese Maritime Customs.”

“Speaking only for myself, desiring that in the not distant future China may have the opportunity when she has a parliamentary government established in China, representing her people, to exercise in every respect her full sovereignty, I hope the day may come in the not far distant future when China will regulate her own customs tariffs.

“But for the present, on account of the disturbed conditions in China, it is manifest that there must be an agreement and understanding between China and the other nations involved in her trade, and I want to say that this agreement as it is presented to the Conference as of to-day, meets the approbation and the approval of the representatives of the Chinese Government.

“Between the period of 1869 and 1901 a series of agreements were entered into which established special tariff privileges with various powers respecting movements of trade. This period culminated in a greatly involved state of affairs which led to the Boxer Revolution, out of which grew the doctrine of the Open Door.

“In 1902, in accordance with the terms of the Boxer protocol, a commission met at Shanghai to revise the tariff schedule. This revision applied only to the import duties and to the free list. Most of the duties were specific in character, and the remainder were at five per cent ad valorem. Nonenumerated goods were to pay 5 per cent ad valorem. All the duties remained subject to the restrictions of the earlier treaties, and those of the export duties which are still in force, are the specific duties contained in the schedule of 1858.

“In 1902, a treaty was concluded between China and Great Britain which laid a basis for the subsequent treaties between China and the United States²⁹ and China and Japan in 1903, along similar lines. In the preamble of the British treaty, the Chinese Government undertakes to discard completely the system of levying likin and other dues on goods at the place of production, in transit and at destination.

“The British Government in turn consents to allow a surtax on foreign goods imported by British subjects, the amount of this surtax on imports not to exceed the equivalent of one and one-half times the existing import duty. The levy of this additional surtax being contingent upon the abolition of the likin has never gone into effect, but remains, nevertheless, the broad basis upon which the general schedules of Chinese tariff duties may be increased.

“It is clear from the foregoing brief summary that two measures were necessary in dealing with the Chinese customs, the first being that of the revising of the tariff schedules as they exist, so as to make them conform to the rate of five per cent effective, as provided by the treaty.

“Second, to pave the way for the abolition of the likin, which constitutes the basis of higher rates. In the meantime, however, it is recognized that the Chinese Government requires additional revenue, and in order that this may be supplied, a special conference is charged with the levying of a surtax of two and one-half per cent on ordinary duties, and a surtax of five per cent on the luxuries, in addition to the established rate of five per cent effective.

“In 1896, an agreement was made between Russia and China for the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and as a part of this agreement, merchandise entering China from Russia was allowed to pass the border at one-third less than the conventional customs duties. Afterwards, similar reductions were granted to France, Japan, and Great Britain, where the merchandise entered China across her land borders and not by sea.

“This discrimination was unfair to the other nations, and not the least important paragraph in the proposed treaty is the one that abolishes this discrimination entirely.

“I will not read the formal parts of the treaty, and merely read the articles that are substantive.

[Here follow the first nine articles of the treaty of February 6, 1922, relating to the Chinese customs tariff, which is printed ante, page 282.]

“In conclusion, I can say that the adoption of this treaty and putting it into effect will in all probability double the existing revenues of China received from maritime and inland customs. I say in all human probability, because the amount of revenue of course is governed by the amount of imports and exports coming into a country and going out of a country, and of course no one can predict with absolute certainty.”

Reduction of Chinese Military Forces

In connection with the discussion of the Chinese revenue, and of the disturbed political conditions in China, the following resolution was adopted expressing the hope that the military forces of China might speedily be reduced:

“Whereas the Powers attending this Conference have been deeply impressed with the severe drain on the public revenue of China through the maintenance in various parts of the country, of military forces, excessive in number and controlled by the military chiefs of the provinces without coordination;

“And whereas the continued maintenance of these forces appears to be mainly responsible for China’s present unsettled political conditions;

“And whereas it is felt that large and prompt reductions of these forces will not only advance the cause of China’s political unity and economic development but will hasten her financial rehabilitation;

“Therefore, without any intention to interfere in the internal problems of China, but animated by the sincere desire to see China develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government alike in her own interest and in the general interest of trade;

“And being inspired by the spirit of this Conference whose aim is to reduce, through the limitation of armament, the enormous disbursements which manifestly constitute the greater part of the encumbrance upon enterprise and national prosperity:

“It is resolved: That this Conference express to China the earnest hope that immediate and effective steps may be taken by the Chinese Government to reduce the aforesaid military forces and expenditures.”

Existing Commitments

In order to insure complete information as to all commitments relating to China and also to provide in the future for suitable publicity, in regard to agreements that may hereafter be made by or with respect to China, the following resolutions were adopted:

“The Powers represented in this Conference, considering it desirable that there should hereafter be full publicity with respect to all matters affecting the political and other international obligations of China and of the several Powers in relation to China, are agreed as follows:

“1. The several Powers other than China will at their earliest convenience file with the Secretariat General of the Conference for transmission to the participating Powers, a list of all treaties, conventions, exchange of notes, or other international agreements which they may have with China, or with any other Power or Powers in relation to China, which they deem to be still in force and upon which they may desire to rely. In each case, citations will be given to any official or other publication in which an authoritative text of the documents may be found. In any case in which the document may not have been published, a copy of the text (in its original language or languages) will be filed with the Secretariat General of the Conference.

“Every Treaty or other international agreement of the character described which may be concluded hereafter shall be notified by the Governments concerned within sixty (60) days of its conclusion to the Powers who are signatories of or adherents to this agreement.

“II. The several Powers other than China will file with the Secretariat General of the Conference at their earliest convenience for transmission to the participating Powers, a list, as nearly complete as may be possible, of all those contracts between their nationals, of the one part, and the Chinese Government or any of its administrative subdivisions or local authorities, of the other part, which involve any concession, franchise, option, or preference with respect to railway construction, mining, forestry, navigation, river conservancy, harbor works, reclamation, electrical communications, or other public works or public services, or for the sale of arms or ammunition, or which involve a lien upon any of the public revenues or properties of the Chinese Government or of any of its administrative subdivisions. There shall be, in the case of each document so listed, either a citation to a published text, or a copy of the text itself.

“Every contract of the public character described which may be concluded hereafter shall be notified by the Governments concerned within sixty (60) days after the receipt of information of its conclusion to the Powers who are signatories of or adherents to this agreement.

“III. The Chinese Government agrees to notify in the conditions laid down in this agreement every treaty agreement or contract of the character indicated herein which has been or may hereafter be concluded by that Government or by any local authority in China with any foreign Power or the nationals of any foreign Power whether party to this agreement or not, so far as the information is in its possession.

“IV. The Governments of Powers having treaty relations with China, which are not represented at the present Conference, shall be invited to adhere to this agreement.”

It will be observed that the only object and requirement of these resolutions is appropriate publicity.

The Twenty-One Demands

The Chinese Delegation presented for the consideration of the Conference the questions arising upon what are called the “Twenty-One Demands,” including the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915.³¹ The position of the Japanese Government, the Chinese Government, and the American Government was set forth in statements on behalf of each, which were placed upon the records of the Conference.

The statement made by Baron Shidehara on behalf of the Japanese Delegation was as follows:

“At a previous session of this Committee, the Chinese Delegation presented a statement urging that the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915 be reconsidered and cancelled. The Japanese Delegation, while appreciating the difficult position of the Chinese Delegation, does not feel at liberty to concur in the procedure now resorted to by China with a view to cancellation of international engagements which she entered into as a free sovereign nation.

“It is presumed that the Chinese Delegation has no intention of calling in question the legal validity of the compacts of 1915, which were formally signed and sealed by the duly authorized representatives of the two Governments, and for which the exchange of ratifications was effected in conformity with established international usages. The insistence by China on the cancellation of those instruments would in itself indicate that she shares the view that the compacts actually remain in force and will continue to be effective, unless and until they are cancelled.

“It is evident that no nation can have given ready consent to cessions of its territorial or other rights of importance. If it should once be recognized that rights solemnly granted by treaty may be revoked at any time on the ground that they were conceded against the spontaneous will of the grantor, an exceedingly dangerous precedent will be established, with far-reaching consequences upon the stability of the existing international relations in Asia, in Europe, and everywhere.

“The statement of the Chinese Delegation under review declares that China accepted the Japanese demands in 1915, hoping that a day would come when she should have the opportunity of bringing them up for reconsideration and cancellation. It is, however, difficult to understand the meaning of this assertion. It can not be the intention of the Chinese Delegation to intimate that China may conclude a treaty with any thought in mind of breaking it at the first opportunity.

“The Chinese Delegation maintains that the Treaties and Notes in question are derogatory to the principles adopted by the Conference with regard to China’s sovereignty and independence. It has, however, been held by the Conference on more than one occasion that concessions made by China ex contractu, in the exercise of her own sovereign rights, can not be regarded as inconsistent with her sovereignty and independence.

“It should also be pointed out that the term ‘Twenty-one Demands,’ often used to denote the Treaties and Notes of 1915, is inaccurate and grossly misleading. It may give rise to an erroneous impression that the whole original proposals of Japan had been pressed by Japan and accepted in toto by China. As a matter of fact, not only ‘Group V’ but also several other matters contained in Japan’s first proposals were eliminated entirely or modified considerably, in deference to the wishes of the Chinese Government, when the final formula was presented to China for acceptance. Official records published by the two Governments relating to those negotiations will further show that the most important terms of the Treaties and Notes, as signed, had already been virtually agreed to by the Chinese negotiators before the delivery of the ultimatum, which then seemed to the Japanese Government the only way of bringing the protracted negotiations to a speedy close.

“The Japanese Delegation can not bring itself to the conclusion that any useful purpose will be served by research and re-examination at this Conference of old grievances which one of the nations represented here may have against another. It will be more in line with the high aim of the Conference to look forward to the future with hope and confidence.

“Having in view, however, the changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915, the Japanese Delegation is happy to avail itself of the present occasion to make the following declaration:

• “1. Japan is ready to throw open to the joint activity of the International Financial Consortium³⁴ recently organized the right of option granted exclusively in favor of Japanese capital, with regard, first, to loans for the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and, second, to loans to be secured on taxes in that region; it being understood that nothing in the present declaration shall be held to imply any modification or annulment of the understanding recorded in the officially announced notes and memoranda which were exchanged among the Governments of the countries represented in the Consortium and also among the national financial groups composing the Consortium, in relation to the scope of the joint activity of that organization.
• “2. Japan has no intention of insisting on her preferential right under the Sino-Japanese arrangements in question concerning the engagement by China of Japanese advisers or instructors on political, financial, military or police matters in South Manchuria.
• “3. Japan is further ready to withdraw the reservation which she made, in proceeding to the signature of the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915, to the effect that Group V of the original proposals of the Japanese Government would be postponed for future negotiations.

“It would be needless to add that all matters relating to Shantung contained in those Treaties and Notes have now been definitely adjusted and disposed of.

“In coming to this decision, which I have had the honor to announce, Japan has been guided by a spirit of fairness and moderation, having always in view China’s sovereign rights and the principle” of equal opportunity.”

In response Chief Justice Wang made the following statement for the Chinese Government:

“The Chinese Delegation has taken note of the statement of Baron Shidehara made at yesterday’s session of the Committee with reference to the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of May 25, 1915.³⁵

“The Chinese Delegation learns with satisfaction that Japan is now ready to throw open to the joint activity of the banking interests of other Powers the right of option granted exclusively in favor of Japanese capital with regard, first, to loans for the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and, second, to loans secured on taxes in that region; and that Japan has no intention of insisting upon a preferential right concerning the engagement by China of Japanese advisors or instructors on political, financial, military, or police matters in South Manchuria; also that Japan now withdraws the reservation which she made to the effect that Group V of her original demands upon China should be postponed for future negotiation.

“The Chinese Delegation greatly regrets that the Government of Japan should not have been led to renounce the other claims predicated upon the Treaties and Notes of 1915.

“The Japanese Delegation expressed the opinion that abrogation of these agreements would constitute ‘an exceedingly dangerous precedent,’ ‘with far-reaching consequences upon the stability of the existing international relations in Asia, in Europe, and everywhere.’

“The Chinese Delegation has the honor to say that a still more dangerous precedent will be established with consequences upon the stability of international relations which can not be estimated, if, without rebuke or protest from other Powers, one nation can obtain from a friendly, but in a military sense, weaker neighbor, and under circumstances such as attended the negotiation and signing of the Treaties of 1915, valuable concessions which were not in satisfaction of pending controversies and for which no quid pro quo was offered. These treaties and notes stand out, indeed, unique in the annals of international relations. History records scarcely another instance in which demands of such a serious character as those which Japan presented to China in 1915, have, without even pretense of provocation, been suddenly presented by one nation to another nation with which it was at the time in friendly relations.

“No apprehension need be entertained that the abrogation of the agreements of 1915 will serve as a precedent for the annulment of other agreements, since it is confidently hoped that the future will furnish no such similar occurrences.

“So exceptional were the conditions under which the agreements of 1915 were negotiated, [that] the Government of the United States felt justified in referring to them in the identic note of May 13, 1915, which it sent to the Chinese and Japanese Governments. That note began with the statement that ‘in view of the circumstances [of the negotiations] which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and of the agreements which have been reached as the result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic (Japan) that it can not recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into [or which may be entered into] between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the Open Door Policy.’

“Conscious of her obligations to the other Powers, the Chinese Government, immediately after signing the agreements, published a formal statement³⁶ protesting against the agreements which she had been compelled to sign, and disclaiming responsibility for consequent violations of treaty rights of the other Powers. In the statement thus issued, the Chinese Government declared that although they were ‘constrained to comply in full with the terms of the (Japanese) ultimatum’ they nevertheless ‘disclaim any desire to associate themselves with any revision which may be thus effected, of the various conventions and agreements concluded between the other Powers in respect of the maintenance of China’s territorial independence and integrity, the preservation of the status quo, and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.’

“Because of the essential injustice of these provisions, the Chinese Delegation, acting in behalf of the Chinese Government and of the Chinese people, has felt itself in duty bound to present to this Conference, representing the Powers with substantial interests in the Far East, the question as to the equity and justice of these agreements and therefore as to their fundamental validity.

“If Japan is disposed to rely solely upon a claim as to the technical or juristic validity of the agreements of 1915, as having been actually signed in due form by the two Governments, it may be said that so far as this Conference is concerned, the contention is largely irrelevant, for this gathering of the representatives of the nine Powers has not had for its purpose the maintenance of the legal status quo. Upon the contrary, the purpose has been, if possible, to bring about such changes in existing conditions upon the Pacific and in the Far East as might be expected to promote that enduring friendship among the nations of which the President of the United States spoke in his letter of invitation to the Powers to participate in this Conference.

“For the following reasons, therefore, the Chinese Delegation is of the opinion that the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Exchange of Notes of May 25, 1915, should form the subject of impartial examination with a view to their abrogation:

• “1. In exchange for the concessions demanded of China, Japan offered no quid pro quo. The benefits derived from the agreements were wholly unilateral.
• “2. The agreements, in important respects, are in violation of treaties between China and the other powers.
• “3. The agreements are inconsistent with the principles relating to China which have been adopted by the Conference.
• “4. The agreements have engendered constant misunderstandings between China and Japan, and, if not abrogated, will necessarily tend, in the future, to disturb friendly relations between the two countries, and will thus constitute an obstacle in the way of realizing the purpose for the attainment of which this Conference was convened. As to this, the Chinese Delegation, by way of conclusion, can, perhaps, do no better than quote from a Resolution introduced in the Japanese Parliament, in June, 1915, by Mr. Hara, later Premier of Japan, a Resolution which received the support of some one hundred and thirty of the members of the Parliament.

“The Resolution reads:

“‘Resolved, that the negotiations carried on with China by the present Government have been inappropriate in every respect; that they are detrimental to the amicable relationship between the two countries, and provocative of suspicions on the part of the Powers; that they have the effect of lowering the prestige of the Japanese Empire; and that, while far from capable of establishing the foundation of peace in the Far East, they will form the source of future trouble.’

“The foregoing declaration has been made in order that the Chinese Government may have upon record the view which it takes, and will continue to take, regarding the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Exchanges of Notes of May 25, 1915.”

The attitude and policy of the American Government was thus stated by the Secretary of State of the United States:

“The important statement made by Baron Shidehara on behalf of the Japanese Government makes it appropriate that I should refer to the position of the Government of the United States as it was set forth in identical notes addressed by that Government to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Government on May 13, 1915.

“The note to the Chinese Government was as follows:

‘In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and of the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic that it can not recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the Treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the Open Door Policy.

‘An identical note has been transmitted to the Imperial Japanese Government.’

“That statement was in accord with the historic policy of the United States in its relation to China, and its position as thus stated has been, and still is, consistently maintained.

“It has been gratifying to learn that the matters concerning Shantung, which formed the substance of Group I of the original demands, and were the subject of the Treaty and exchange of notes with respect to the province of Shantung, have been settled to the mutual satisfaction of the two parties by negotiations conducted collaterally with this Conference, as reported to the Plenary Session on February 1st.

“It is also gratifying to be advised by the statement made by Baron Shidehara on behalf of the Japanese Government that Japan is now ready to withdraw the reservation which she made, in proceeding to the signature of the treaties and notes of 1915, to the effect that Group V of the original proposals of the Japanese Government—namely, those concerning the employment of influential Japanese as political, financial and military advisers; land for schools and hospitals; certain railways in South China; the supply of arms, and the right of preaching—would be postponed for future negotiations. This definite withdrawal of the outstanding questions under Group V removes what has been an occasion for considerable apprehension on the part alike of China and of foreign nations which felt that the renewal of these demands could not but prejudice the principles of the Integrity of China and of the Open Door.

“With respect to the Treaty and the notes concerning South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, Baron Shidehara has made the reassuring statement that Japan has no intention of insisting on a preferential right concerning the engagement by China of Japanese advisers or instructors on political, financial, military or police matters in South Manchuria.

“Baron Shidehara has likewise indicated the readiness of Japan not to insist upon the right of option granted exclusively in favor of Japanese capital with regard, first, to loans for the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; and, second, with regard to loans secured on the taxes of these regions; but that Japan will throw them open to the joint activity of the international financial Consortium recently organized.

“As to this, I may say that it is doubtless the fact that any enterprise of the character contemplated, which may be undertaken in these regions by foreign capital, would in all probability be undertaken by the Consortium. But it should be observed that existing treaties would leave the opportunity for such enterprises open on terms of equality to the citizens of all nations. It can scarcely be assumed that this general right of the Treaty Powers of China can be effectively restricted to the nationals of those countries which are participants in the work of the Consortium, or that any of the Governments which have taken part in the organization of the Consortium would feel themselves to be in a position to deny all rights in the matter to any save the members of their respective national groups in that organization. I, therefore, trust that it is in this sense that we may properly interpret the Japanese Government’s declaration of willingness to relinquish its claim under the 1915 treaties to any exclusive position with respect to railway construction and to financial operations secured upon local revenues, in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

“It is further to be pointed out that by Articles II, III, and IV of the Treaty of May 25, 1915, with respect to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Chinese Government granted to Japanese subjects the right to lease land for building purposes, for trade and manufacture, and for agricultural purposes in South Manchuria, to reside and travel in South Manchuria, and to engage in any kind of business and manufacture there, and to enter into joint undertakings with Chinese citizens in agriculture and similar industries in Eastern Inner Mongolia.

“With respect to this grant, the Government of the United States will, of course, regard it as not intended to be exclusive, and, as in the past, will claim from the Chinese Government for American citizens the benefits accruing to them by virtue of the most favored nation clauses in the treaties between the United States and China.

“I may pause here to remark that the question of the validity of treaties as between Japan and China is distinct from the question of the treaty rights of the United States under its treaties with China; these rights have been emphasized and consistently asserted by the United States.

“In this, as in all matters similarly affecting the general right of its citizens to engage in commercial and industrial enterprises in China, it has been the traditional policy of the American Government to insist upon the doctrine of equality for the nationals of all countries, and this policy, together with the other policies mentioned in the note of May 13, 1915, which I have quoted, are consistently maintained by this government. I may say that it is with especial pleasure that the Government of the United States finds itself now engaged in the act of reaffirming and defining, and I hope that I may add, revitalizing, by the proposed Nine-Power Treaty,³⁹ these policies with respect to China.”

This review of the action of the Conference in relation to China can not properly be closed without referring to the important declaration made by Baron Shidehara on behalf of the Japanese Delegation at the close of the Conference. In this declaration Baron Shidehara made clear what is meant by Japan in referring to her “special interests” in China, As thus defined these special interests are not claimed to connote either political domination or exclusive privileges, or any “claim or pretension” prejudicial to China or to any other foreign nation, or any antagonism to the principle of the open door and equal opportunity. Baron Shidehara said:

“We are vitally interested in a speedy establishment of peace and unity in China and in the economic development of her vast natural resources. It is, indeed, to the Asiatic mainland that we must look primarily for raw materials and for the markets where our manufactured articles may be sold. Neither raw materials nor the markets can be had unless order, happiness, and prosperity reign in China, under good and stable government. With hundreds of thousands of our nationals resident in China, with enormous amounts of our capital invested there, and with our own national existence largely dependent on that of our neighbor, we are naturally interested in that country to a greater extent than any of the countries remotely situated.

“To say that Japan has special interests in China is simply to state a plain and actual fact. It intimates no claim or pretension of any kind prejudicial to China or to any other foreign nation.

“Nor are we actuated by any intention of securing preferential or exclusive economic rights in China. Why should we need them? Why should we be afraid of foreign competition in the Chinese market provided it is conducted squarely and honestly? Favored by geographical position, and having fair knowledge of the actual requirements of the Chinese people, our traders and business men can well take care of themselves in their commercial, industrial, and financial activities in China, without any preference or exclusive rights.

“We do not seek any territory in China, but we do seek a field of economic activity beneficial as much to China as to Japan, based always on the principle of the open door and equal opportunity.”

Siberia

Questions directly affecting Russian (or Siberian) interests were only two, viz, the question of the continued presence of Japanese troops in certain Russian territory, and that relating to the affairs of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

With respect to the first, statements were made by Japan and the United States and spread upon the minutes of the Conference. M. Sarraut, on behalf of France, also made a statement supporting in general terms the position of the United States and expressing confidence that Japan would fulfill its promises eventually to withdraw its forces from Russian territory, and in general to respect the integrity of Russia.

The statement by Baron Shidehara on behalf of Japan was as follows:

“The Military expedition of Japan to Siberia was originally undertaken in common accord and in cooperation with the United States in 1918.⁴² It was primarily intended to render assistance to the Czecho-Slovak troops who in their homeward journey across Siberia from European Russia, found themselves in grave and pressing danger at the hands of hostile forces under German command. The Japanese and American expeditionary forces together with other allied troops fought their way from Vladivostok far into the region of the Amur and the Trans-Baikal Provinces to protect the railway lines which afforded the sole means of transportation of the Czecho-Slovak troops from the interior of Siberia to the port of Vladivostok. Difficulties which the Allied forces had to encounter in their operations in the severe cold winter of Siberia were immense.

“In January, 1920, the United States decided to terminate its military undertaking in Siberia, and ordered the withdrawal of its forces. For some time thereafter Japanese troops continued alone to carry out the duty of guarding several points along the Trans-Siberian Railways in fulfillment of Inter-Allied arrangements and of affording facilities to the returning Czecho-Slovaks.

“The last column of Czecho-Slovak troops safely embarked from Vladivostok in September, 1920.⁴³ Ever since then Japan has been looking forward to an early moment for the withdrawal of her troops from Siberia. The maintenance of such troops in a foreign land is for her a costly and thankless undertaking, and she will be only too happy to be relieved of such responsibility. In fact, the evacuation of the Trans-Baikal and the Amur Provinces was already completed in 1920. The only region which now remains to be evacuated is a southern portion of the Maritime Province around Vladivostok and Nikolsk.

“It will be appreciated that for Japan the question of the withdrawal of troops from Siberia is not quite as simple as it was for other Allied Powers. In the first place, there is a considerable number of Japanese residents who had lawfully and under guarantees of treaty established themselves in Siberia long before the Bolshevik eruption, and were there entirely welcomed. In 1917, prior to the Joint American-Japanese military enterprise, the number of such residents was already no less than 9,717. In the actual situation prevailing there, those Japanese residents can hardly be expected to look for the protection of their lives and property to any other authorities than Japanese troops. Whatever districts those troops have evacuated in the past have fallen into disorder, and practically all Japanese residents have had precipitately to withdraw, to seek for their personal safety. In so withdrawing, they have been obliged to leave behind large portions of their property, abandoned and unprotected, and their homes and places of business have been destroyed. While the hardships and losses thus caused the Japanese in the Trans-Baikal and the Amur provinces have been serious enough, more extensive damages are likely to follow from the evacuation of Vladivostok in which a larger number of Japanese have always been resident and a greater amount of Japanese capital invested.

“There is another difficulty by which Japan is faced in proceeding to the recall of her troops from the Maritime Province. Due to geographical propinquity, the general situation in the districts around Vladivostok and Nikolsk is bound to affect the security of Korean frontier. In particular, it is known that these districts have long been the base of Korean conspiracies against Japan. Those hostile Koreans, joining hands with lawless elements in Russia, attempted in 1920 to invade Korea through the Chinese territory of Chientao. They set fire to the Japanese Consulate at Hunchun, and committed indiscriminate acts of murder and pillage. At the present time they are under the effective control of Japanese troops stationed in the Maritime Province, but they will no doubt renew the attempt to penetrate into Korea at the first favorable opportunity that may present itself.

“Having regard to those considerations, the Japanese Government have felt bound to exercise precaution in carrying out the contemplated evacuation of the Maritime Province. Should they take hasty action without adequate provision for the future they would be delinquent in their duty of affording protection to a large number of their nationals resident in the districts in question and of maintaining order and security in Korea.

“It should be made clear that no part of the Maritime Province is under Japan’s military occupation. Japanese troops are still stationed in the southern portion of that Province, but they have not set up any civil or military administration to displace local authorities. Their activity is confined to measures of self-protection against the menace to their own safety and to the safety of their country and nationals. They are not in occupation of those districts any more than American or other Allied troops could be said to have been in occupation of the places in which they were formerly stationed.

“The Japanese Government are anxious to see an orderly and stable authority speedily reestablished in the Far Eastern possessions of Russia. It was in this spirit that they manifested a keen interest in the patriotic but ill-fated struggle of Admiral Kolchak. They have shown readiness to lend their good offices for prompting the reconciliation of various political groups in Eastern Siberia. But they have carefully refrained from supporting one faction against another. It will be recalled, for instance, that they withheld all assistance from General Rozanow against the revolutionary movements which led to his overthrow in January, 1920, They maintained an attitude of strict neutrality, and refused to interfere in these movements, which it would have been quite easy for them to suppress if they had so desired.

“In relation to this policy of nonintervention, it may be useful to refer briefly to the past relations between the Japanese authorities and Ataman Semenoff,⁴⁴ which seem to have been a source of popular misgiving and speculation. It will be remembered that the growing rapprochement between the Germans and the Bolshevik Government in Russia in the early part of 1918 naturally gave rise to apprehensions in the allied countries that a considerable quantity of munitions supplied by those countries and stored in Vladivostok might be removed by the Bolsheviks to European Russia for the use of the Germans. Ataman Semenoff was then in Siberia and was organizing a movement to check such Bolshevik activities and to preserve order and stability in that region. It was in this situation that Japan, as well as some of the Allies, began to give support to the Cossack chief. After a few months, such support by the other powers was discontinued. But the Japanese were reluctant to abandon their friend, whose efforts in the allied cause they had originally encouraged; and they maintained for some time their connection with Ataman Semenoff. They had, however, no intention whatever of interfering in the domestic affairs of Russia, and when it was found that the assistance rendered to the Ataman was likely to complicate the internal situation in Siberia, they terminated all relations with him, and no support of any kind has since been extended to him by the Japanese authorities.

“The Japanese Government are now seriously considering plans which would justify them in carrying out their decision of the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Province, with reasonable precaution for the security of Japanese residents and of the Korean frontier regions. It is for this purpose that negotiations were opened some time ago at Dairen between the Japanese representatives and the agents of the Chita Government.

“Those negotiations at Dairen are in no way intended to secure for Japan any right or advantage of an exclusive nature. They have been solely actuated by a desire to adjust some of the more pressing questions with which Japan is confronted in relation to Siberia. They have essentially in view the conclusion of provisional commercial arrangements, the removal of the existing menace to the security of Japan and to the lives and property of Japanese residents in Eastern Siberia, the provision of guarantees for the freedom of lawful undertakings in that region, and the prohibition of bolshevik propaganda over the Siberian border. Should adequate provisions be arranged on the line indicated the Japanese Government will at once proceed to the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Province.

“The occupation of certain points in the Russian Province of Sakhalin is wholly different, both in nature and in origin, from the stationing of troops in the Maritime Province. History affords few instances similar to the incident of 1920 at Nikolaievsk,⁴⁵ where more than seven hundred Japanese, including women and children, as well as the duly recognized Japanese Consul and his family and his official staff, were cruelly tortured and massacred. No nation worthy of respect will possibly remain forbearing under such a strain of provocation. Nor was it possible for the Japanese Government to disregard the just popular indignation aroused in Japan by the incident. Under the actual condition of things, Japan found no alternative but to occupy, as a measure of reprisal, certain points in the Russian Province of Sakhalin in which the outrage was committed, pending the establishment in Russia of a responsible authority with whom she can communicate in order to obtain due satisfaction.

“Nothing is further from the thought of the Japanese Government than to take advantage of the present helpless conditions of Russia for prosecuting selfish designs. Japan recalls with deep gratitude and appreciation the brilliant role which Russia played in the interest of civilization during the earlier stage of the Great War. The Japanese people have shown and will continue to show every sympathetic interest in the efforts of patriotic Russians aspiring to the unity and rehabilitation of their country. The military occupation of the Russian Province of Sakhalin is only a temporary measure, and will naturally come to an end as soon as a satisfactory settlement of the question shall have been arranged with an orderly Russian Government.

“In conclusion, the Japanese Delegation is authorized to declare that it is the fixed and settled policy of Japan to respect the territorial integrity of Russia, and to observe the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of that country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in every part of the Russian possessions.”

The reply on behalf of the American Government which was made by the Secretary of State, reviewed the position which the United States had consistently maintained in diplomatic interchanges with Japan and maintained explicitly this attitude of protest. The statement is as follows:

“The American Delegation has heard the statement by Baron Shidehara and has taken note of the assurances given on behalf of the Japanese Government with respect to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Province of Siberia and from the Province of Sakhalin. The American Delegation has also noted the assurance of Japan by her authorized spokesman that it is her fixed and settled policy to respect the territorial integrity of Russia, and to observe the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of that country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in every part of the Russian possessions.

“These assurances are taken to mean that Japan does not seek, through her military operations in Siberia, to impair the rights of the Russian people in any respect, or to obtain any unfair commercial advantages, or to absorb for her own use the Siberian fisheries, or to set up an exclusive exploitation either of the resources of Sakhalin or of the Maritime Province.

“As Baron Shidehara pointed out, the military expedition of Japan to Siberia was originally undertaken in common accord and in cooperation with the United States. It will be recalled that public assurances were given at the outset by both Governments of a firm intention to respect the territorial integrity of Russia and to abstain from all interference in Russian internal politics. In view of the reference by Baron Shidehara to the participation of the American Government in the expedition of 1918, I should like to place upon our records for transmission to the Conference the purposes which were then clearly stated by both Governments.

“The American Government set forth its aims and policies publicly in July, 1918.⁴⁷ The purposes of the expedition were said to be, first, to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces; second, to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves might be willing to accept assistance; and, third, to guard the military stores at Vladivostok.

“The American Government opposed the idea of a military intervention, but regarded military action as admissible at the time solely for the purpose of helping the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen, and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves might be willing to accept assistance. It was stated that the American Government proposed to ask all associated in this course of action to unite in assuring the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that none of the Governments uniting in action either in Siberia or in northern Russia contemplated any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or thereafter, but that each of the Associated Powers had the single object of affording such aid as should be acceptable, and only such aid as should be acceptable, to the Russian people in their endeavor to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny.

“What I have just stated is found in the public statement of the American Government at that time.

“The Japanese Government, with the same purpose, set forth its position in a statement published by the Japanese Government on August 2, 1918,⁴⁸ in which it was said:

“‘The Japanese Government, being anxious to fall in with the desires of the American Government and also to act in harmony with the Allies in this expedition, have decided to proceed at once to dispatch suitable forces for the proposed mission. A certain number of these troops will be sent forthwith to Vladivostok. In adopting this course, the Japanese Government remain unshaken in their constant desire to promote relations of enduring friendship with Russia and the Russian people, and reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that, upon the realization of the projects [objects] above indicated, they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether political or military.’

“The United States of America withdrew its troops from Siberia in the spring of 1920, because it considered that the original purposes of the expedition had either been accomplished or would not longer be subserved by continued military activity in Siberia. The American Government then ceased to be a party to the expedition, but it remained a close observer of events in Eastern Siberia and has had an extended diplomatic correspondence upon this subject with the Government of Japan.

“It must be frankly avowed that this correspondence has not always disclosed an identity of views between the two Governments. The United States has not been unmindful of the direct exposure of Japan to Bolshevism in Siberia and the special problems which the conditions existing there have created for the Japanese Government, but it has been strongly disposed to the belief that the public assurances given by the two Governments at the inception of the joint expedition nevertheless required the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from all Russian territory—if not immediately after the departure of the Czecho-Slovak troops, then within a reasonable time.

“As to the occupation of Sakhalin in reprisal for the massacre of the Japanese at Nikolaievsk, the United States, not unimpressed by the serious character of that catastrophe, but, having in mind the conditions accepted by both Governments at the outset of the joint expedition, of which the Nikolaievsk massacres must be considered an incident, it has regretted that Japan should deem necessary the occupation of Russian territory as a means of assuring a suitable adjustment with a future Russian Government.

“The general position of the American Government was set forth in a communication to Japan of May 31, 1921.⁴⁹ In that communication appears the following statement:

“‘The Government of the United States would be untrue to the spirit of cooperation which led it, in the summer of 1918, upon an understanding with the Government of Japan, to dispatch troops to Siberia, if it neglected to point out that, in its view, continued occupation of the strategic centers in Eastern Siberia—involving the indefinite possession of the port of Vladivostok, the stationing of troops at Habarovsk, Nikolaievsk, De Castries, Mago, So-phiesk, and other important points, the seizure of the Russian portion of Sakhalin, and the establishment of a civil administration, which inevitably lends itself to misconception and antagonism—tends rather to increase than to allay the unrest and disorder in that region.

“‘The military occupation’—I am still reading from the note of May 31, 1921—‘The military occupation in reprisal for the Nikolaievsk affair is not fundamentally a question of the validity of procedure under the recognized rules of international law.’

“The note goes on to say that ‘the issue presented is that of the scrupulous fulfillment of the assurances given to the Russian people, which were a matter of frank exchanges and of apparently complete understanding between the Government[s] of the United States and of Japan. These assurances were intended by the Government of the United States to convey to the people of Russia a promise on the part of the two Governments not to use the joint expedition, or any incidents which might arise out of it, as an occasion to occupy territory, even temporarily, or to assume any military or administrative control over the people of Siberia.’

“Further, in the same note, the American Government stated its position as follows:

“‘In view of its conviction that the course followed by the Government of Japan brings into question the very definite understanding concluded at the time troops were sent to Siberia, the Government of the United States must in candor explain its position and say to the Japanese Government that the Government of the United States can neither now nor hereafter recognize as valid any claims or titles arising out of the present occupation and control, and that it can not acquiesce in any action taken by the Government of Japan which might impair existing treaty rights or the political or territorial integrity of Russia.

“‘The Government of Japan will appreciate that, in expressing its views, the Government of the United States has no desire to impute to the Government of Japan motives or purposes other than those which have heretofore been so frankly avowed. The purpose of this Government is to inform the Japanese Government of its own conviction that, in the present time of disorder in Russia, it is more than ever the duty of those who look forward to the tranquilization of the Russian people, and a restoration of normal conditions among them, to avoid all action which might keep alive their antagonism and distrust toward outside political agencies. Now, especially, it is incumbent upon the friends of Russia to hold aloof from the domestic contentions of the Russian people, to be scrupulous to avoid inflicting what might appear to them a vicarious penalty for sporadic acts of lawlessness, and, above all, to abstain from even the temporary and conditional impairment by any foreign Power of the territorial status which, for them as for other peoples, is a matter of deep and sensitive national feeling transcending perhaps even the issues at stake among themselves.’

“To that American note the Japanese Government replied in July, 1921,⁵⁰ setting forth in substance what Baron Shidehara has now stated to this Committee, pointing out the conditions under which Japan had taken the action to which reference was made, and giving the assurances, which have here been reiterated, with respect to its intention and policy.

“While the discussion of these matters has been attended with the friendliest feeling, it has naturally been the constant and earnest hope of the American Government—and of Japan as well, I am sure—that this occasion for divergence of views between the two Governments might be removed with the least possible delay. It has been with a feeling of special gratification, therefore, that the American Delegation has listened to the assurances given by their Japanese colleague, and it is with the greatest friendliness that they reiterate the hope that Japan will find it possible to carry out within the near future her expressed intention of terminating finally the Siberian expedition and of restoring Sakhalin to the Russian people.”

On behalf of the French Government M. Sarraut said—

“he gave his full and unreserved adherence to this resolution.⁵¹ In giving this unreserved adherence, he liked to remember that France was the oldest ally, perhaps, of Russia, and in this respect it was with a particular feeling of gratification that he would state that he had listened with great pleasure to the exchange of views that had just taken place before the Committee between the representatives of the United States and Japan. The French Government would hear with the same feelings the formal assurance given by Baron Shidehara of the intention of the Japanese Government concerning Siberia; of Japan’s desire to withdraw her troops from Russia as soon as possible; of its firm intention not to interfere in the domestic affairs of Russia; and of its firm purpose to respect the integrity of Russia.

“France had full trust in Japan, who had always proved a loyal and trustworthy friend. It was quite certain that this assurance would be carried out. France accepted this with all the more pleasure because it was exactly the program which the French Government had adopted in 1918 and which led them to interfere in Siberia under the same conditions as those set forth so exactly by the Secretary of State of the United States. At this point he could not fail to restate quite clearly France’s intention, like that of her Allies, to respect the integrity of Russia, and to nave the integrity of Russia respected, and not to interfere in her internal policy.

“France remained faithful to the friendship of Russia, which she could not forget. She entertained feelings of gratitude to the Russian people, as she did to her other Allies. Russia had been her friend of the first hour, and she was loyal; she had stuck to her word until the Russian Government was betrayed in the way with which those present were familiar. France also remained faithful to the hope that the day would come when through the channel of a normal and regular government great Russia would be able to go ahead and fulfill her destiny. Then it would be good for her to find unimpaired the patrimony that had been kept for her by the honesty and loyalty of her allies. It was with this feeling that the French Delegation with great pleasure concurred in the adoption of the present resolution.”

These statements did not immediately effect a change in the Siberian situation but they were nonetheless of the utmost importance. In the first place, the position of the United States was publicly and definitely reasserted. Further, while Japan did not fix a date for the withdrawal of her troops, she did give the most solemn and comprehensive assurance to all the Powers represented in the Conference of her fixed and settled policy “to respect the territorial integrity of Russia, and to observe the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of that country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in every part of the Russian possessions.”

This constitutes a pledge which no doubt will be fully redeemed. While Japan has not fixed the date for the withdrawal of her troops from Siberia, she has renounced all claims of territorial aggrandizement, of political domination, or of exclusive or preferential privilege.

Chinese Eastern Railway

The other question affecting Siberian interests directly; that is, that of the Chinese Eastern Railway, was also of the nature of a continuing diplomatic problem insusceptible of definite disposition at the Conference. This railway involves a great complexity of international interests; that of the United States is to assure its continued operation as a free avenue of commerce, to discharge the responsibility for the railroad which the United States assumed to some extent in 1919 in cooperation with Japan and four other Powers in an arrangement for the supervision and assistance of this and other links in the Trans-Siberian system,⁵³ and to recover its just claims for advances.

In order to ascertain what, if anything, the Conference might usefully do to preserve the railway and increase its technical efficiency, the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions, and its technical sub-committee, gave the problem the most careful consideration.

It was finally found to be impossible to do more than to adopt the following resolution:

“Resolved, That the preservation of the Chinese Eastern Railway for those in interest requires that better protection be given to the railway and the persons engaged in its operation and use, a more careful selection of personnel to secure efficiency of service, and a more economical use of funds to prevent waste of the property; that the subject should immediately be dealt with through the proper diplomatic channels.”

The Powers other than China made the following reservation:

“The Powers other than China in agreeing to the resolution regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway reserve the right to insist hereafter upon the responsibility of China for performance or nonperformance of the obligations towards the foreign stockholders, bondholders, and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company which the Powers deem to result from the contracts under which the railroad was built and the action of China thereunder and the obligations which they deem to be in the nature of a trust resulting from the exercise of power by the Chinese Government over the possession and administration of the railroad.”

While, as thus appears, it proved to be necessary to leave these questions for future diplomatic adjustment, not a little was accomplished in ascertaining and clarifying the views of the various governments. The discussions established unanimity among the Powers, other than China, as to the immediate need for more adequate protection of the railway and the impracticability of obtaining financial support without effective financial control, assuring the economical operation of the railway. The Conference effectively recognized Chinese sovereign rights in respect to the railway, but in the reservation above quoted made clear to China the immense responsibilities she might incur by a reckless use of her sovereign prerogatives. The Chinese delegates were impressed by this aspect of the question, and it is understood that they have already recommended to their Government that it take measures immediately and spontaneously to improve the military protection of the railway. It has been suggested to the Chinese delegates also, and has won a certain favorable response from them, that China would be well advised to take the initiative in the diplomatic interchanges which will ensue as a result of the resolution adopted, in requesting at once the cooperation of the other Powers in maintaining the railway. It may prove possible to arrive at practical results in this way while preserving Chinese sovereignty and amour propre. General assent was obtained at the Conference to the continuance in force of the agreement of 1919 for the supervision of the railway.

Mandated Islands

For some time there have been negotiations between the United States and Japan in relation to the so-called mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator.⁵⁴ While the Conference was in session these negotiations resulted in an agreement between the American Government and the Japanese Government, which is to be embodied in a treaty.⁵⁵ The points of the agreement are as follows:

1. It is agreed that the United States shall have free access to the Island of Yap on the footing of entire equality with Japan or any other nation, in all that relates to the landing and operation of the existing Yap–Guam cable or of any cable which may hereafter be laid by the United States or its nationals.

2. It is also agreed that the United States and its nationals are to be accorded the same rights and privileges with respect to radio-telegraphic service as with regard to cables. It is provided that so long as the Japanese Government shall maintain on the Island of Yap an adequate radiotelegraphic station, cooperating effectively with the cables and with other radio stations on ships and shore, without discriminatory exactions or preferences, the exercise of the right to establish radiotelegraphic stations at Yap by the United States or its nationals shall be suspended.

3. It is further agreed that the United States shall enjoy in the Island of Yap the following rights, privileges, and exemptions in relation to electrical communications:

(a) Eights of residence without restriction; and rights of acquisition and enjoyment and undisturbed possession, upon a footing of entire equality with Japan or any other nation or their respective nationals of all property and interests, both personal and real, including lands, buildings, residences, offices, works, and appurtenances.

(b) No permit or license to be required for the enjoyment of any of these rights and privileges.

(c) Each country to be free to operate both ends of its cables either directly or through its nationals including corporations or associations.

(d) No cable censorship or supervision of operation or messages.

(e) Free entry and exit for persons and property.

(f) No taxes, port, harbor, or landing charges, or exactions, either with respect to operation of cables or to property, persons, or vessels.

(g) No discriminatory police regulations.

4. Japan agrees that it will use its power of expropriation to secure to the United States needed property and facilities for the purpose of electrical communication in the Island, if such property or facilities can not otherwise be obtained. It is understood that the location and area of land to be so expropriated shall be arranged each time between the two Governments, according to the requirements of each case. American property and facilities for the purpose of electrical communication in the Island are to be exempt from the process of expropriation.

5. The United States consents to the administration by Japan of the mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator subject to the above provisions with respect to the Island of Yap, and also subject to the following conditions:

• “(a) The United States is to have the benefit of the engagements of Japan set forth in the mandate, particularly those as follows:

  “article 3

  “The Mandatory shall see that the slave trade is prohibited and that no forced labour is permitted, except for essential public work[s] and services, and then only for adequate remuneration.

  “The Mandatory shall also see that the traffic in arms and ammunition is controlled in accordance with principles analogous to those laid down in the Convention relating to the control of the arms traffic, signed on September 10th, 1919,⁵⁷ or in any convention amending same.

  “The supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to the natives shall be prohibited.”

  “article 4

  “The military training of the natives, otherwise than for purposes of internal police and the local defense of the territory, shall be prohibited. Furthermore, no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory.”

• “(b) With respect to missionaries, it is agreed that Japan shall ensure complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, which are consonant with public order and morality, and that missionaries of all such religions shall be free to enter the territory, and to travel and reside therein, to acquire and possess property, to erect religious buildings, and to open schools throughout the territory. Japan shall, however, have the right to exercise such control as may be necessary for the maintenance of public order and good government, and to take all measures required for such control.
• “(c) Japan agrees that vested American property rights will be maintained and respected.
• “(d) It is agreed that the treaties between the United States and Japan now in force shall apply to the mandated islands.
• “(e) It is agreed that any modifications in the Mandate are to be subject to the consent of the United States, and, further, that Japan will address to the United States a duplicate report on the administration of the Mandate.”

No agreement has yet been made with respect to the so-called mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean south of the Equator. The assent of the United States to these mandates has not yet been given, and the subject is left to negotiations between the United States and Great Britain.

No action was taken with respect to electrical communications in the Pacific. The allocation of the former German cables are matters to be dealt with by the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers and will be the subject of diplomatic negotiations.

General Summary

To estimate correctly the character and value of these several treaties, resolutions and formal declarations they should be considered as a whole. Each one contributes its part in combination with the others towards the establishment of conditions in which peaceful security will take the place of competitive preparation for war.

The declared object was, in its naval aspect, to stop the race of competitive building of warships which was in process and which was so distressingly like the competition that immediately preceded the war of 1914. Competitive armament, however, is the result of a state of mind in which a national expectation of attack by some other country causes preparation to meet the attack. To stop competition it is necessary to deal with the state of mind from which it results. A belief in the pacific intentions of other powers must be substituted for suspicion and apprehension.

The negotiations which led to the Four Power Treaty were the process of attaining that new state of mind, and the Four Power Treaty itself was the expression of that new state of mind. It terminated the Anglo-Japanese alliance and substituted friendly conference in place of war as the first reaction from any controversies which might arise in the region of the Pacific; it would not have been possible except as part of a plan including a limitation and a reduction of naval armaments, but that limitation and reduction would not have been possible without the new relations established by the Four Power Treaty or something equivalent to it.

The new relations declared in the Four Power Treaty could not, however, inspire confidence or be reasonably assured of continuance without a specific understanding as to the relations of the powers to China. Such an understanding had two aspects. One related to securing fairer treatment of China, and the other related to the competition for trade and industrial advantages in China between the outside powers.

An agreement covering both of these grounds in a rather fundamental way was embodied in the first article of the general Nine Power Treaty regarding China. In order, however, to bring the rules set out in that article out of the realm of mere abstract propositions and make them practical rules of conduct it was necessary to provide for applying them so far as the present conditions of government and social order in China permit. This was done by the remaining provisions of the general Nine Power Treaty and Chinese Customs Treaty and the series of formal resolutions adopted by the Conference in its Plenary Sessions and the formal declarations made a part of the record of the Conference.

The scope of action by the Conference in dealing with Chinese affairs was much limited by the disturbed conditions of government in China which have existed since the revolution of 1911, and which still exist, and which render effective action by that government exceedingly difficult and in some directions impracticable. In every case the action of the Conference was taken with primary reference to giving the greatest help possible to the Chinese people in developing a stable and effective government really representative of the people of China. Much was accomplished in that direction, and the rules of conduct set forth in the first article of the General Treaty regarding China have not merely received the assent of the Powers but have been accepted and applied to concrete cases.

The sum total of the action taken in the Conference regarding China, together with the return of Shantung by direct agreement between China and Japan, the withdrawal of the most unsatisfactory of the so-called “twenty-one demands,” and the explicit declaration of Japan regarding the closely connected territory of Eastern Siberia, justify the relation of confidence and good will expressed in the Four Power Treaty and upon which the reduction of armament provided in the Naval Treaty may be contemplated with a sense of security.

In conclusion, we may be permitted to quote the words of the President in closing the Conference:

“This Conference has wrought a truly great achievement. It is hazardous sometimes to speak in superlatives, and I will be restrained. But I will say, with every confidence, that the faith plighted here to-day, kept in national honor, will mark the beginning of a new and better epoch in human progress.

“Stripped to the simplest fact, what is the spectacle which has inspired a new hope for the world? Gathered about this table nine great nations of the world—not all, to be sure, but those most directly concerned with the problems at hand—have met and have conferred on questions of great import and common concern, on problems menacing their peaceful relationship, on burdens threatening a common peril. In the revealing light of the public opinion of the world, without surrender of sovereignty, without impaired nationality or affronted national pride, a solution has been found in unanimity, and to-day’s adjournment is marked by rejoicing in the things accomplished. If the world has hungered for new assurance, it may feast at the banquet which the Conference has spread.

“I am sure the people of the United States are supremely gratified, and yet there is scant appreciation [of] how marvelously you have wrought. When the days were dragging and agreements were delayed, when there were obstacles within and hindrances without, few stopped to realize that here was a conference of sovereign powers where only unanimous agreement could be made the rule. Majorities could not decide without impinging [on] national rights. There were no victors to command, no vanquished to yield. All had voluntarily to agree in translating the conscience of our civilization and give concrete expression to world opinion.

“And you have agreed in spite of all difficulties, and the agreements are proclaimed to the world. No new standards of national honor have been sought, but the indictments of national dishonor have been drawn, and the world is ready to proclaim the odiousness of perfidy or infamy.⁵⁸

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“It has been the fortune of this Conference to sit in a day far enough removed from war’s bitterness, yet near enough to war’s horrors, to gain the benefit of both the hatred of war and the yearning for peace. Too often, heretofore, the decades following such gatherings have been marked by the difficult undoing of their decisions. But your achievement is supreme because no seed of conflict has been sown, no reaction in regret or resentment ever can justify resort to arms.

“It little matters what we appraise as the outstanding accomplishments. Any one of them alone would have justified the Conference. But the whole achievement has so cleared the atmosphere that it will seem like breathing the refreshing air of a new morn of promise.

“You have written the first deliberate and effective expression of great powers, in the consciousness of peace, of war’s utter futility, and challenged the sanity of competitive preparation for each other’s destruction. You have halted folly and lifted burdens, and revealed to the world that the one sure way to recover from the sorrow and ruin and staggering obligations of a world war is to end the strife in preparation for more of it, and turn human energies to the constructiveness of peace.

“Not all the world is yet tranquillized. But here is the example, to imbue with new hope all who dwell in apprehension. At this table came understanding, and understanding brands armed conflict as abominable in the eyes of [an] enlightened civilization.”⁵⁸

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“No intrigue, no offensive or defensive alliances, no involvements have wrought your agreements, but reasoning with each other to common understanding has made new relationships among Governments and peoples, new securities for peace, and new opportunities for achievement and attending happiness.

“Here have been established the contacts of reason, here has [have] come the inevitable understandings of face-to-face exchanges when passion does not inflame. The very atmosphere shamed national selfishness into retreat. Viewpoints were exchanged, differences composed, and you came to understand how common, after all, are human aspirations; how alike, indeed, and how easily reconcilable are our national aspirations; how sane and simple and satisfying to seek the relationships of peace and security.

“When you first met, I told you of our America’s thought to seek less of armament and none of war; that we sought nothing which is another’s, and we were unafraid, but that we wished to join you in doing that finer and nobler thing which no nation can do alone. We rejoice in that accomplishment. …”⁶⁰

Respectfully submitted.

• Charles E. Hughes
• Henry Cabot Lodge
• Oscar W. Underwood
• Elihu Root

Washington, February 9, 1922.

85. Reprinted from S. Doc. 125, 67th Cong., 2d sess. For the complete texts of the resolutions discussed in this report, see p. 288.
86. Foreign Relations, 1921, vol. i, p. 18.
87. Ibid., p. 56.
88. Ibid., pp. 57 and 76.
89. Mr. Balfour also represented the Union of South Africa at the Conference.
90. Not printed.
91. Ante, p. 247.
92. Ante, p. 267.
93. Ante, p. 276.
94. Ante, p. 282.
95. Ante, p. 33.
96. Ante, p. 46.
97. Post, p. 948.
98. Vol. ii, p. 600.
99. Ante, pp. 288 ff.
1. Appendix not printed.
2. The omission which follows is indicated in the report of the delegation.
3. The quotation which follows is from the address of Secretary Hughes on assuming the office of Chairman of the Conference.
4. For complete text of the American proposal, see p. 53.
5. The quotations which follow are from the address of Secretary Hughes on assuming the office of Chairman of the Conference.
8. The report is printed in full in Conference on the Limitation of Armament, p. 492.
9. The omission which follows is indicated in the report of the delegation.
10. The words “and usually” do not appear in the official transcript of Mr. Root’s address.
12. Treaty as signed is printed on p. 33.
13. Declaration as signed is printed on p. 36.
14. Treaty of Feb. 11, 1922, vol. ii, p. 600.
16. Supplementary treaty is printed in full on p. 46.
17. For papers relating to this subject, see pp. 934 ff.
18. Foreign Relations, 1914, supp., p. 170.
19. Ibid., 1915, p. 99.
20. Ibid., p. 171.
21. The treaty as signed is printed on p. 948.
24. Malloy, Treaties, 1776–1909, vol. i, p. 261.
25. Ante, p. 282.
26. Malloy, Treaties, 1776–1909, vol. i, p. 196.
28. For treaty of June 18, 1858, between the United States and China, see Malloy, Treaties, 1776–1909, vol. i, p. 211.
29. Malloy, Treaties, 1776–1909, vol. i, p. 261.
31. See Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 79 ff.
34. For papers relating to the consortium, see pp. 761–801.
35. Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 197–204.
36. Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 178.
39. Ante, p. 276.
42. See Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. ii, ch. 1.
43. See ibid., 1920, vol. iii, pp. 561 ff.
44. For papers relating to this subject, see ibid., 1918, Russia, vol. ii, ch. i, and ibid., 1920, vol. iii, pp. 527 ff.
45. See Foreign Relations, 1920, vol. iii, pp. 511–524.
47. See the aide-mémoire of July 17, 1918, to the Allied Ambassadors, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. ii, p. 287, and the press statement quoted in the telegram of Aug. 3, 1918, to the Ambassador in Japan, ibid., p. 328.
48. See the memorandum received Aug. 2, 1918, from the Japanese Ambassador, ibid., p. 324.
49. Ibid., 1921, vol. ii, p. 702.
50. Memorandum of July 8, 1921, from the Japanese Embassy, Foreign Relations, 1921, vol. ii, p. 707.
51. Resolved, That the statements by the Japanese and American Delegations in respect to the presence of foreign troops in Siberia be reported to the Conference at its next Plenary Session to be spread upon its records.”
53. See Foreign Relations, 1919, vol. i, pp. 590 ff.
54. See ibid., 1921, vol. ii, pp. 287 ff.
55. The treaty was signed Feb. 11, 1922; vol. ii, p. 600.
57. Foreign Relations, 1920, vol. i, p. 180.
58. The omission which follows is indicated in the report of the delegation.
58. The omission which follows is indicated in the report of the delegation.
60. Omission indicated in the report of the delegation.