500.A4b/547½
Memorandum of a Conversation at the Department of State, December 19, 192190
- Present:
- On the one part, Mr. Hughes, Secretary of State, assisted by his Secretary.
- On the other part, M. Sarraut, French Delegate to the Conference, M. Jusserand, Ambassador, and Admiral de Bon.
- Interpreter,—M. Camerlynck.
- The interview took place in Mr. Hughes’ office and began at 4:30 P.M.
From the very start a difference of opinion became apparent over the construction to be put on M. Briand’s acceptance of the figure of 175,000 tons for capital ships, it being Mr. Hughes’ understanding that the acceptance was unconditional and made it possible to take up the examination of the other naval questions. The French Delegation on the contrary held that M. Briand only consented to the figure of 175,000 tons on the express condition that France would keep the tonnage she considered indispensable as to her light cruisers, torpedo boats, and submarines.
Mr. Hughes read the personal letter he had sent to M. Briand and M. Briand’s answer; he also communicated a telegram sent by the State Department to Myron Herrick and Colonel Harvey and the answer from the last named which in Mr. Hughes’ opinion fully confirms the meaning of M. Briand’s letter.
M. Sarraut will confine himself to a few very simple remarks. He is not here for the purpose of bickering or haggling over the interpretation of texts, the truth is that the French Delegation understand the instruction it has received to mean that they are ordered to meet as far as possible the wishes expressed by the other powers, but without being bound to any absolute figure; that figure is to be examined and fixed in common accord. In support of their interpretation, there was read a paper from the Ministry of Marine received by the Havas News Agency suggesting that all reports concerning tonnage figures, being premature must be regarded as inaccurate. Mr. Hughes reads a telegram published by another news agency which makes a contrary statement. M. Sarraut declared that the two questions cannot in his judgment be separated, that is to say, it is impossible to accept a figure of tonnage for capital ships without deciding in the sense outlined in instructions the question of the light cruisers, torpedo boats, and submarines.
[Page 138]Admiral de Bon would have something to say about the first question itself and if he were given the floor could perhaps offer a practical solution of the question; but it would be advisable first to know whether Mr. Hughes agrees that the tonnage questions ought to be considered altogether.
Mr. Hughes answered that he has no other guide than M. Briand’s letter confirmed by the telegram from Ambassador Harvey. He understands that in the question of naval armament, France may be concerned for the defensive and not the offensive. That is why M. Briand says that with regard to the capital ships which are a means of attack, he gives his Delegation instructions as desired by Mr. Hughes; but as regards light ships for defense he declares that he could not possibly accept any corresponding diminution. And so he accepts the tonnage as to capital ships, but makes precise reservations that acceptance cannot in any way be considered as restricting the freedom of the French Delegates with regard to the tonnage of light cruisers, torpedo boats, and submarines.
M. Sarraut without any wish to carry on the argument over the interpretation put on M. Briand’s letter inquires what would in any event be the attitude of the United States on the second parts of the discussion in view of the very positive declaration of M. Briand who would not agree to go below a certain figure.
Mr. Hughes answers that this is a matter for discussion in the Commission because views may widely differ on the question of submarines for instance. It might be that the United States would be led to taking a midway course between the two extremes as it is known that one power (Great Britain) wants to do away completely with submarines, while the others wish to keep a rather large number. So the United States would unquestionably not be in favor of wholly doing away with them and on the other part would firmly oppose submarines being used without restraint as an implement of war and the abuses indulged in by Germany in attacks on merchant vessels. Even on the question of using a submarine purely for defense differences of opinion have been expressed some allowing a limited number others absolutely objecting to their being used. In the last analysis it comes to deciding what can be justly and equitably done in self defense while establishing a restriction to forestall abuses and illegal acts. So the question becomes a technical one to be determined by experts and referred to the committee, so that all the powers which are represented may express their views with a full knowledge of the matter.
Ambassador Jusserand here offers the point that the two questions are bound into one and M. Sarraut again reads the passage in M. Briand’s letter and adds another and concluding passage in which figures are given, below which France would find it absolutely impossible [Page 139] to go, namely 330,000 as to light vessels and torpedo boats, and 90,000 as to submarines. And even on that score important sacrifices have been made even now to promote the success of the Conference. Neither public opinion nor parliament in France would permit going any farther on the question of national defense and safety. It stands to reason that France cannot yield with regard to capital ships without knowing how far she is going with regard to light vessels and submarines and after yielding on the first point, the solution of the second point cannot be left to the hazards of a discussion that may take a turn unfavourable to worse. So it is essential for us to arrive at an agreement so as to avoid any semblance of conflict and above all press controversies (for which we are not responsible and which can only embitter the questions.) And so we must by talking to one another in the most open and friendly way secure an explanation and get guarantees.
Mr. Hughes inquires the meaning of that. As President of the Commission his goodwill is equally assured to all, but he does not know what Japan and Italy think. The only sentiment known is that of Great Britain. As for the United States the Naval Experts are of opinion that 90,000 for submarines is much too high for any one of the powers. It seems unnecessary furthermore to carry on the discussion here, and if France makes the two questions one and is unable to go below a certain figure under positive instructions, that fact should be laid before the Committee.
M. Jusserand remarks that this comes to taking the advice of Japan and Italy on questions concerning which their opinion is not so very important while we were not consulted when it was a question of allowing Japan to keep the Mutsu.
M. Sarraut says that he will try and explain what the position of France is, not by using the language of diplomacy but through the bluntly outspoken utterance of “the man in the street” as it will be given in his own country. “We came here clearly intending to bring about the success of the Conference, first with the desire to give to the United States a testimonial of our sympathy, confidence, and gratitude, and next with the hope of helping it and arriving at practical and moral results. And so we were ready to make every sacrifice to the idea that guided the United States, but on naval questions the voice of France who had a great role in the past and will not disappear as a naval and colonial power, must be heard. But if we are asked to agree to being blotted out of the surface of the seas, to allow ourselves to be cut into shreds and be done away with piecemeal which would place us in such a situation that we cannot undergo such a responsibility to our country [sic]. The United States which is big enough to have and hold a fixed opinion, did bring its powerful influence into play and found decisive arguments with which to bring [Page 140] Great Britain and Japan around to its own views. He said that Mr. Hughes had been very successful with the other Powers in bringing them to his point of view and could he not give them the benefit of the same influence, which would save France from being dismantled and disarmed.”
“If we should go back to France after agreeing to that we should be greeted with hoots.”
Mr. Hughes said that he did not understand the statement with respect to France being cut into shreds or torn into pieces. So far as the use of his influence was concerned, it should be noted that if he had had any success with others, it was in instances where he was presenting the point of view of the United States and he would have greater difficulty in attempting to induce the acceptance of views held by other Powers which the United States did not believe to be well founded.
There are five powers to bring to an agreement and one must always revert to the same question. You ask us to reconsider our first estimate about submarines and to take your viewpoint into account. But the figure of 90,000 is already very high and if the percentage were applied to Japan for instance it would leave it but 54,000 tons.
Mr. Hughes here took up a discussion of the figures representing the present force of the French navy on that basis and taking the age factor into account France was supposed to have 163,000 tons. But now she asks not only to be excepted from the diminution but also to be allowed a large increase. In one instance she goes so far as to double, and in another triple the figures. This is the first time those figures are laid before me. I wish to examine them and to say nothing either for me or for others and it is proper to put the question to the commission. It is not the matter of one nation forcing a figure upon the others, but for everyone to decide what it can do considering the sacrifices agreed to, in the same direction by the other parties concerned.
M. Jusserand intimates that France simply wants the minimum indispensable for the defense of her colonies but in no wise intends to limit the armaments of others. Furthermore, there still remains to find out what the other nations that are not represented at the Conference may do. Admiral de Bon explains to Mr. Hughes the peculiar situation of France who has not carried out her naval program. He names figures and delivers a document which Mr. Hughes promises to examine with the utmost attention. He adds, that he sees no reason why France should wish to keep so high a tonnage while no danger threatens her either from Germany or from Russia. M. Sarraut answers that France harbors no more aggressive, intentions than other powers he feels sure have against her.
[Page 141]It is decided that the committee shall be called to meet on the following morning at 11 o’clock and that the French Delegation will give an account of the instructions it has received whereupon the other powers will be asked for their opinions. In the meanwhile no account of this interview or any document shall be given to the Press.
The conversation ended at 6:15 P.M.
- This memorandum was probably prepared by M. Camerlynck. The file copy bears the notations “Copy as corrected by Mr. Hughes” and “Copy given Mr. Camerlynck by Mr. Clark”.↩