893.51/3846: Telegram
The Minister in China ( Schurman ) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 31—8:35 p.m.]
241. My telegram number 231, May 24, 1 p.m.20 Department’s telegram 130, May 25.21 London gives British colleague discretion to act with his three colleagues as suggested in identic telegram and also concurs in our interpretation of consortium attitude. Alston22 writes: “I gather that Sir Charles Addis23 is not convinced that offer of financial [apparent omission] is yet justified by the present prospect of stable government. Until the situation becomes clearer my Government do not therefore consider that they would feel justified in pressing the consortium to consider the question more or less favorably.”
Political situation has developed and become clearer since Addis’s visit to China in consequence of military events North and South. All parties and leaders are today advocating unification and ready to make concessions for the sake of it. Reunion is the first plank in Wu Pei-fu’s24 platform and on May 15th Sun Yat-sen’s25 commissioner of Foreign Affairs said to Huston,26 “There was no reason why Dr. Sun and Wu Pei-fu should not come together in order to reach an agreement concerning the unification of China.”
Policy outlined Addis’s speech in New York March 28 is now obsolete. First, he said that apart from arranging comprehensive funding loan consortium could do nothing for Chinese Government until North and South China “are in the way of composing their differences and have the will to unite.” That unexpected condition of things has now arrived and the time is therefore propitious for consortium action. Secondly, he said that the time has come for consortium to negotiate independently with autonomous provinces or groups of them for construction railways within their respective borders. But this proposal would magnify provinces, obstruct and [Page 771] retard national sentiment now running so strongly in favor of unification. Furthermore no central government would approve the bonds. Probably Addis had particularly in mind desirability of completing and uniting Canton–Hankow line through negotiations with Canton Government.
The means approved by Wu Pei-fu and the political leaders generally with the exception of the President, as well as by public opinion for carrying out unification are the reconvocation of the old Parliament which Li Yuan-hung27 dismissed in 1917 and the recognition of the continuance in authority of the provisional constitution. This would necessarily eliminate President Hsü28 of which [whom] all China is weary and Wu Pei-fu is determined to get rid. Thirdly, it would rob the Canton Government of its vital issues. In the speeches to which I listened in Canton by Chen Chiung-ming,29 Wu Ting-fang,30 Frank Lee31 and others and the conversations I had with them, the burden of their criticism and denunciation was always that the Peking Government was unconstitutional …
While the situation is hopeful reunion is not yet an actuality. The conditions for it however have not been so favorable for years. The actual accomplishment depends on political leadership. If the right men take hold of the problem courageously they might possibly solve it unaided but the solution would be facilitated and hastened by financial assistance from consortium.
- Ante, p. 707.↩
- Not printed; see Department’s telegram no. 150, June 17, p. 719.↩
- Sir Beilby F. Alston, British Minister in China.↩
- Representative of British banking group.↩
- Inspector-General of Hupeh and Hunan.↩
- President of Canton Government.↩
- Jay Calvin Huston, vice consul at Canton.↩
- Resigned as President of Peking Government July 1, 1917.↩
- Hsu Shih-ch’ang, President, Peking Government.↩
- Governor of Kwangtung; Commander in Chief of Kwangtung troops; concurrent Minister of War in the Canton Government.↩
- Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canton Government.↩
- Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Canton Government.↩