Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, Volume I

500.A4b/547½

Memorandum by the Secretary to the British Empire Delegation of a Conversation at the Home of the Secretary of State, December 14, 1921, 4 p.m.⁸⁰

Secret

• Present:—
  • the united states of america
    • Mr. Hughes, accompanied by Mr. J. R. Clark
  • the british empire
    • Mr. Balfour, accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey
  • japan
    • Baron Kato M. Ichihashi (Interpreter)

capital ships.

Mr. Hughes summed up the situation as follows. He, on behalf of the United States of America, had proposed to meet the retention of the Mutsu and the scrapping of the Settsu by Japan by completing the Colorado and Washington and scrapping the North Dakota and Delaware. Baron Kato had agreed to this. Mr. Balfour had proposed to build two additional ships and to scrap a corresponding number of ships. Two questions had been left open. First, what was to be the tonnage of the new ships, and, second, how many ships were to be scrapped in compensation. No objection was felt by Baron Kato or himself to the building of two new British ships. The question arose as to whether the ships to be built were to be larger than 35,000 tons, which was the maximum allowed in the American programme and happened also to be the tonnage of the Mutsu. The question of replacement was affected, for if Great Britain built two 45,000-ton ships (Mr. Balfour interjected that they would be more), the question arose as to how Great Britain would be affected when the period of replacement began. In the original American programme 604,000 tons had been allowed to Great Britain as compared with 500,000 tons to America, the excess of 104,000 tons being granted in view of the fact that the British ships were older. If, however, Great Britain were to possess two new ships, this would have to be modified. The question therefore arose as to what degree of compensation should be arranged.

Mr. Balfour recalled that the reason why Great Britain had desired to have two super-Hoods rather than to begin again and to design two ships of 35,000 tons, was that the former had been complete as regards design, the placing of contracts, the assemblage of parts, the re-modelling of the contractors’ plant and machinery, with the result that Great Britain would obtain post-Jutland ships at least a year earlier. He had further pointed out that the Admiralty were anxious to have post-Jutland ships since the Hood was only partially a post-Jutland ship, and Great Britain possessed no other post-Jutland ship, whereas America would possess three, and Japan two. Though in their programme the American Government had done their best to meet British requirements by allowing the retention of a certain number of old ships, yet the naval mind was naturally very reluctant not to possess post-Jutland ships equal to those of other navies. As Mr. Hughes had justly observed, if these ships were built what would be the measure of compensation to be made? He himself had not mentioned any figure, but he was certainly prepared to sacrifice four ships of the King George Vth type, which were roughly equivalent in tonnage to two super-Hoods. Thus the question of tonnage would be left approximately as it was before. To that Mr. Hughes made a natural objection that Great Britain no longer had the right to so large an excess of tonnage, on the ground that the quality of her ships was inferior, because the possession of the two super-Hoods would provide her with ships of an improved quality. As it stood, that was a very powerful argument, and in the form in which he had just stated it it was unanswerable. He had then consulted his experts, who had pointed out that in giving up four King George Vths as compensation for the North Dakota and Delaware, the British were cutting off ships at the lower end of the list where the actual superiority in comparative value of the ships was to the advantage of the British. But when they looked higher up the list to capital ships which would be retained, the advantage was all with the United States of America. He invited Baron Kato’s attention to the corresponding ships on the list, from which he would see that the British ships were inferior both in tonnage and in age; in addition to which it must be borne in mind that the British ships had deteriorated beyond their age owing to the fact that they had undergone five years of war. That consideration ought to be present to his colleagues, as he had ventured to explain to Mr. Hughes when he had called on him on the previous evening. He had again seen his experts the same morning, and was better able to deal with the situation. That was the case he now presented to his colleagues.

Mr. Hughes said the point which Mr. Balfour made was very clear. When the American Delegation had made their original proposal and had left to Great Britain 604,000 tons to America’s 500,000 tons, notwithstanding that the standard aimed at was 500,000, they had fully taken into account the age of the vessels and the strain of the war. The point now to be considered was the extent to which the production of two great ships of perhaps 48,000 tons, which would be far more powerful than anything possessed by the navies of Japan or the United States, would change the situation. It was manifest that it would alter the tonnage by 96,000 tons. (Mr. Balfour interpolated “Even more”.) If it was more, continued Mr. Hughes, the argument would be strengthened. If 96,000 tons were added to the British tonnage in capital ships and the four King George Vths (which were the last ships on the list and were reckoned at about 24,100 tons apiece, namely, 96,400 tons in all) were scrapped, it would leave the tonnage exactly as it was before. That was to say, instead of four old ships, Great Britain would possess two brand-new ships superior to anything in the world, or to anything possessed by the United States of America or Japan. Ton for ton the new ships would balance the old, but the strength of the two would be far greater than the strength of the old; in fact, the tonnage argument took no account of the superiority and efficiency of the fleet to which the two ships had been added. The question was, therefore, as to what would be fair compensation for the great gain in efficiency. If it was said that the tonnage of the two new ships and the four ships to be scrapped was equal and the superiority of the two ships was left out of the argument, Great Britain would still possess a superiority of 104,000 tons as compared with the original standard of 500,000 tons. This standard number had now been increased to 525,000 tons, which left a balance of 75,000 tons to be accounted for. The question was whether this was not too great a disparity. In the opinion of the American experts there was a considerable disparity between the ships of the Royal Sovereign and Queen Elizabeth classes and the corresponding classes of American ships, but it was not sufficient to compensate for the advantage of 75,000 tons. They thought, therefore, that one additional large ship should be taken off the British list. If this were done he thought that his experts would not object to the British excess. Supposing the Tiger, which was a ship of 29,000 tons, was deducted, it would leave Great Britain with an advantage of 46,000 tons. He did not think his experts would object to that. He had to keep in view the effect not only on his Japanese friends but also on France and Italy. He had not yet spoken to the French Delegation on the subject, but he felt sure if the British tonnage were increased they would make it a basis for an enlarged claim. If Great Britain would be willing to take out one additional big ship he would be able to justify the excess.

Mr. Balfour said he was now going to raise a point which he was not sure if Mr. Hughes had in mind, although he ought to have it in mind. Mr. Hughes proposed to allow Great Britain to continue with her two big super-Hoods if she would sacrifice five ships. He would have to consult his experts as to whether it should be the Tiger or some other ship, but he thought the final result would not be very much affected by this. In explaining the new point, however, he wanted Mr. Hughes to cast his mind forward into the period when normal building and replacement had begun, when ships were being scrapped and other ships were being built to replace them in order to produce the results as laid down in the programme. Great Britain would still be in possession of two ships considerably larger than any American and Japanese ships. America would feel bound to say, “You have at your own wish completed two very large ships; now that we are in the normal state of replacement, the result is that you have an advantage over us of from 25,000 to 30,000 tons. (Mr. Hughes interjected that it would be rather more.) This is an intolerable position”.

Mr. Hughes pointed out that the original British tonnage had been 604,000 tons. If from that was deducted one 29,000-ton ship it would be 575,000 British tons against 525,000 American tons, namely, a difference of 50,000 tons.

Mr. Balfour said that he had been discussing the case where the normal situation had been completely reached. America and Great Britain would have 15 ships, and Japan 9, of 35,000 tons, but two of the British ships would be in the region of 49,000 tons. America would then turn round and say that the plan had been that both were to have an equality in tonnage, but that Great Britain had now obtained an advantage of 30,000 tons, so that something must be done to equalise. He asked if Mr. Hughes had considered this point.

Mr. Hughes replied that he had. His thought, however, had been that when Mr. Balfour came to consider the matter with his experts he would see that when this period was reached these big ships would prove an embarrassment. Great Britain would have had them on her hands for 20 years, so that a long time would elapse before they could be replaced. In the meantime they would be occupying a big share of her tonnage and would defer her right to replace with 35,000-ton ships. What he had been wondering was how the British Delegation would propose to surmount the difficulty, which was one from which escape was not easy. The reason for this was that though it was a simple matter now to consider excess and to put it on a firm basis by scrapping other ships, yet, as the normal period was reached, the excess tonnage of these ships would prove a disadvantage.

Mr. Balfour said he was not disinclined to agree. He wished to point out, however, that the American experts were inclined to exaggerate the offensive capacity of the super-Hoods. He understood that they were very large because they had been provided with a strong defence against submarines and aircraft, which involved a very great increase in tonnage. Although very powerful offensively, they were not so powerful as the American experts had assumed.

Mr. Hughes said he had heard this, but nevertheless they accounted for would give rise to a great disparity.

Mr. Balfour said that what it came to was that the British Empire Delegation would have to choose between two ships of 35,000 tons, with a sacrifice of two King George Vths, and two super-Hoods, with a sacrifice of four King George Vths and the Tiger. In referring to the 35,000 tons, however, he would like to remark that for the moment he wished to have it regarded as an open question as to whether a 35,000 tons limit was to be preserved. He must discuss the question without prejudice to that, for he believed he could give reasons for an increase in this maximum figure.

Mr. Hughes, taking up the point of the two ships of 35,000 tons, pointed out that they would have an aggregate of 70,000 tons. Two King George Vths, however, would only have a tonnage of 48,000 tons. Consequently if only two ships were scrapped, not only would Great Britain obtain the advantage of two new ships, but if only 48,000 tons were to be scrapped she would obtain a further advantage of 32,000⁸¹ tons. It was true that Japan, owing to the addition of the Mutsu, was adding to her tonnage so as to raise it to 525,000 313,000 tons, but the disparity granted to Great Britain owing to the age of her ships would now vanish, because the 35,000-ton ships would have been added. The two 35,000–ton ships would aggregate 70,000 tons, and if this was added to the original tonnage of 104,000 tons the result would be a surplus of British tonnage of 174,000 tons. As compared with the new American standard of 525,000 tons, this would give an advantage of 159,000 149,000 tons. If this amount were reduced ton for ton, it would be necessary to scrap older ships to the total of 159,000 149,000 tons. Some compensation, however, was due to Great Britain owing to the inferiority of the Royal Sovereign and Queen Elizabeth Classes. Hence a serious problem arose for consideration in connection with the two ships of 35,000 tons. This problem was how to compensate for the increased efficiency of the new ships. To put the matter in a concrete form, supposing Great Britain were to build two 35,000-ton ships, this would make a total of 70,000. If she were to scrap four of the King George Vth Class this would account for 96,000 tons. Deducting this from the 674,000 tons it would leave Great Britain with 578,000 tons, that is to say, an excess of about 50,000 tons above the American standard, which seemed to him to be a very liberal allowance to make for the Royal Sovereign and Queen Elizabeth Classes. In other words, the result would be similar to that produced in the case of the calculation for the two super-Hoods, where the Tiger, of 29,000 tons, was also to be scrapped as compensation for their greater efficiency. If only two King George Vths were scrapped to compensate for two 35,000-ton ships, it would leave Great Britain 48,000 tons ahead in addition to the excess efficiency of the new ships.

Mr. Balfour asked what was Mr. Hughes’ view, therefore?

Mr. Hughes said that he had not discussed the matter finally with his experts, but he thought if Great Britain were to build the two super-Hoods and scrapped four King George Vths and one Tiger, she would still have an excess of 50,000 tons, but this would be compensated for by the advantage America had over the Royal Sovereign and Queen Elizabeth Classes; but if Great Britain was willing to content herself with two ships of 35,000 tons, though she would still have to sacrifice the four King George Vths, she would be able to save the Tiger. The excess of British tonnage would in this case still have to be justified to the French, but he thought that, having regard to the fact that the Mutsu was launched, and to the age of the older British ships, this could be done.

Mr. Balfour said he thought this was a fair statement of the general argument. He thought he would have to discuss the matter again with his experts. He would like to be in a position to say that agreement had been reached subject to the choice between two alternatives, namely:—

• First alternative: Great Britain to build two super-Hoods and to scrap five old ships.
• Second alternative: Great Britain to build two 35,000-ton ships and to scrap four ships, though he could not say whether his experts would agree that four was the proper equivalent.

Mr. Hughes agreed that this was the proposition, provided that Baron Kato was in agreement.

Baron Kato said he had no objection to the alternative proposals.

Mr. Balfour proposed that as this was a matter he would have to discuss with his experts he would leave this question, which involved a certain amount of bargaining, and raise a question of naval merits, which related to the 35,000-ton basis. The British experts wanted the 35,000 tons raised either to 40,000 tons on the American basis or else to 35,000 tons on the legend ton basis. This raised an important point. All three navies were limiting size and number of capital ships, but the Conference was placing no limitation on the development of air power; they might find it impossible to limit submarines, and they certainly could not limit the development of mines. Thus they were limiting their power in capital ships, and leaving the development of aerial and submarine attack untouched, so that all nations, small and great, could develop these to the fullest possible extent. He doubted whether the three Powers were well-advised in this. His advisers thought that it was necessary to develop and increase the amount of protection. It was not possible to do that and to maintain the gun power. He was well aware that there was a difference of technical opinion between the British naval experts, on the one hand, and those of the United States and Japan on the other. The latter put heavier guns into their ships, and the British used the weight in other directions. However, all, as naval Powers, were in the same boat as regards the importance of developing methods of protection. He wished that his colleagues would consult their experts as to whether it was not necessary for this reason to increase the size of the capital ships. The question also arose as to whether they should not keep in mind the possibility, if the power of aerial and submarine attack should develop, of meeting again to re-consider the situation.

Mr. Hughes said that as all the calculations of the present Conference had been made on the basis of the American tonnage he thought it would be best to adhere to this and to consider Mr. Balfour’s proposal for an increase to 40,000 tons. He himself was as innocent of knowledge on this question as anyone. His own idea was that it was not so important what the figure was as that there should be a figure. His object was to avoid competition in size more than anything else. That being the main consideration, they had taken 35,000 tons as the limit, since this was the size of the largest ship afloat. He himself had not read very much naval literature, but he had been struck with the great difficulty of making any prognosis in regard to naval architecture. It was impossible to find any basis of calculation as to the way in which it was likely to develop. Some invention might make capital ships perfectly useless, or, on the contrary, some counter discovery might make them more valuable than ever. Hence, if their mutual interests were threatened there would be no difficulty in making arrangements to extend the tonnage. In regard to the proposal for immediate extension, however, if 40,000 tons were taken as the basis it might be found later that they ought to have taken 45,000 tons, or 50,000 tons, or, alternatively, they might prefer to keep it at 30,000 35,000 tons. At present all were totally in the dark as regards the future. He himself would not be disposed to interpose any particular difficulty in regard to a change in the figure, except that he disliked encouraging any increase in size. Supposing Great Britain were to build two super-Hoods, he himself might feel some satisfaction in it, since he was glad to see a great and friendly Power adequately equipped, but he did not much like going to the Conference with a proposal that Great Britain should have ships bigger than any other nation in the world. This would be taken badly by the world, but and he would not like to say that he had to agree to it because of the necessity. If, added to that, the whole world was going to follow Great Britain’s example and build bigger ships, it would be a further step in the same direction, which would not be popular.

Mr. Balfour said that Great Britain felt the air and mine peril more than the United States of America, because their ships had to work in narrow seas where there were many Powers which could threaten them.

Mr. Hughes pointed to the enormous expense of building these ships.

Mr. Balfour said he did not pretend to like this, and he feared the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be very depressed.

Baron Kato said he would like to say a word on the point raised by Mr. Balfour, from the standpoint of an expert. He thought there was much wisdom in the proposal to limit the size, but he thought that the size of the guns should also be limited; otherwise there would be a competition in guns also. In regard to this, if 16 inches were fixed as the maximum size of guns, then a competition would arise as to the nature of the gun. The competition would take place in regard to its technical character, and each nation would try and make a more powerful gun of that calibre than was now known of. In regard to vessels, he thought that 35,000 tons was an ideal medium, from an expert point of view.

Mr. Balfour said that at any rate the practical point was that he must consult his experts as to the two alternative proposals, which he summed up as follows:—

• Alternative I. Great Britain to build two super-Hoods and to scrap four King George Vths and one Tiger.
• Alternative II. Great Britain to build two 35,000-ton ships and to scrap four King George Vths.

He said he was anxious, in discussing the matter with his experts, to do justice to Mr. Hughes’ arguments. As Sir Maurice Hankey had found a difficulty in taking down the exact argument used by Mr. Hughes before, he would ask him to repeat it.

Mr. Hughes said that the original proposal as regards the United States and Great Britain involved the following results so far as tonnage was concerned:—

The United Status of America	500,000 tons
Great Britain	604,000 tons
Difference	104,000 tons

Great Britain now proposed to build two 35,000 ton ships, making an aggregate of 70,000 tons. Adding the 70,000 tons to the 104,000 excess, the total excess was 174,000 tons. From this it was necessary to deduct the four King George Vths, namely, 96,000 tons. This left a result of 78,000 tons excess over the original American scheme of 500,000 tons, namely, 578,000 tons as compared with 500,000 tons. The American standard, however, had now been increased to 525,000 tons, which left an excess of 53,000 tons. This was to be taken to represent the difference of efficiency between the British Royal Sovereign and Queen Elizabeth Classes and the corresponding American Classes, owing to the greater age of the former. He thought that that was a very liberal allowance, considering the excess of tonnage which the two new British ships would have over the Maryland’s. The question was whether that was an adequate or inadequate allowance. If only three King George Vths were scrapped the disparity would be 77,000 tons. That struck him as being rather too liberal an allowance.

Baron Kato said the proposal was agreeable to him.

Mr. Hughes said he thought it would be agreeable to his experts.

The Conference adjourned at 5–20 p.m., to re-assemble at Mr. Hughes’ house at 6–30 p.m.

[

M. P. A. Hankey

]

Washington , December 14, 1921.

80. No agreed official minutes of this conversation were made. The American delegation used the memorandum prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey.

    The file copy of this memorandum bears corrections by Secretary Hughes. Words which he crossed out are indicated by canceled type; words which he inserted are printed in italics.

81. Apparently this should read “22,000”.