893.00/4362: Telegram
The Minister in China (Schurman) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 14—12:11 a.m.]
217. My number 213, May 11, 3 p.m. Philoon returned on 12th. Reports that Martin regards protocol phrase “Peking to sea” as indicating now “Peking to Tangku.” That may explain delay in posting guards at other points than Tangshan where we now have 100 men and in protesting to Fengtien commanders against there [their?] entrenching on the railway.
Philoon urged posting such detachments and Martin informs me today he has sent three additional officers with orders to take portions of Tangshan force to Kuyeh and Kaiping. Their presence [Page 703] will produce good effect in guarding road and they will protest if road interfered with.
Evening 11th Philoon delivered the following to Colonel Martin:
“British and American Ministers presume commandants have protested to Fengtien commanders against their entrenching on railway. If they have not done so they are directed to inform Fengtien commanders this regarded as infraction of protocol since if [it?] menaces open communications.”
I have from beginning of conflict refused to accept view of British and some other Ministers that it was right or obligation of protocol of nations to hold zone two miles each side railway. I could not find it in the treaty and I considered it beyond possibility without international army.
Commandants informed diplomatic body at outset it was impossible to enforce even the resolutions of 191240 with the military forces at their disposal. …
Now that Chang Tso-lin’s defeated troops have taken up position in American sector close to valuable British mines, above-mentioned zone question has considerable practical importance. British view leads them to expect from our forces more than they have actually attempted. … my British colleague now evidently feels we should do something about existence of entrenchments on our sector against which our commandant apparently did not protest at outset. I imagine prompt protest would have made no difference in result and I have refused to go beyond above-cited protest against something that is not actual but only possible obstacle to open communication.
If Wu attacks Chang’s forces in their present position latter can, if defeated, cross Lan Lwan? River, destroy bridge and conduct orderly retreat through Japanese sector into Manchuria. Not only British property interests therefore but universal British partisanship for Wu make British desirous of seeing Chang in less favorable military position.
I have steadily adhered to strict impartiality between the two leaders. I should be glad to be instructed by Department whether the dismissal of Chang from all his offices and obvious adoption of Wu by Chinese Government makes any change in my attitude necessary or desirable.
President’s gubernatorial appointees for Manchurian provinces have refused to accept appointment. Circular telegrams have been sent to President and important officials by all associated bodies in Three Provinces headed by provincial assembly opposing mandate ordering Chang’s dismissal.
[Page 704]Pontius41 telegraphs May 12, 1 p.m.: “There is no intention now declare independence but conditions may bring about such action.”
I learn confidentially that Mukden commissioner of customs telegraphs 12th quoting commissioner in Foreign Office that Wu, one of the President’s four appointees, “will proceed Harbin to take control of the Chinese Eastern Railway.” Commissioner says “declaration of independence of Manchuria would be not surprising.” It is obvious that with independence under Chang, Japan could strengthen her position in Manchuria.
Well-informed observers here suspect Japan is helping Chang. Japanese Minister just returned to Peking secludes himself and secretaries profess ignorance of everything. Japanese commandant Tientsin equally uncommunicative. No one can find out anything about Japanese sector of railway.
Kailan Mining Administration May 12, 4 p.m. wired from Tangshan following telegram received from Chang Tso-lin:
“To all foreign ministers, all foreign consuls and all foreign residents at Tangshan: I have received from Hsü Shih-ch’ang a communication giving away the Three Eastern Provinces with the special area Jehol and Chahar also Inner and Outer Mongolia. All these are not recognized as territories of the Republic of China. I with my special position cannot but assume all the responsibilities thereof and do my utmost to protect the lives and properties of all the friendly nations, cultivating friendly relationship with them. All the important treaties which have been made under the Manchu regime and the Republic of China will be fully recognized and respected. The foreign ministers, the foreign consuls and the foreign residents who wish to conduct negotiations on other matters and affairs can communicate with my office at Lwanchow. I shall therefore have closer commercial relationships than ever before with the friendly nations in order to promote the happiness and prosperity of the peoples. Whatever treaties Hsu Shih-ch’ang will make after the first day of this month with reference to the Three Eastern Provinces and Inner and Outer Mongolia, Jehol and Chahar which do not have any direct permission will not be recognized by me and I shall look upon them as something done with bad intention by Hsu Shih-ch’ang. (Signed) Chang Tso-lin, Commander in Chief of the Fengtien troops.”