723.2515/1343
Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the Chilean Ambassador (Mathieu), July 6, 1922
The Chilean Ambassador called at the Secretary’s request.
The Secretary said that he had taken up the matter of his suggestions with the Peruvian Ambassador and with the Peruvian delegates and later with Dr. Porras; that the Peruvian Government found great difficulty with respect to the contingency that would arise in case the arbitrator should decide that a plebiscite should not be held. The Peruvian Govermnent felt naturally apprehensive that in this event, Chile being in possession, there would be no success [Page 498] in the negotiations. The Peruvians had suggested that it should be agreed that in case the direct negotiations failed to produce an agreement between the two Governments, there should be an arbitration by the United States. The Secretary had pointed out to Dr. Porras that this would be open to the objection that if Peru chose to refuse to agree the arbitration would inevitably follow, and hence it was essentially similar to the original Peruvian proposal.
The Secretary felt, however, that the Peruvians were naturally apprehensive that in case it were decided that a plebiscite should not be held, Chile being in possession, there would be difficulty in reaching an agreement. The Secretary thought that it was desirable that there should be some provision which would give the assurance that Chile would at once undertake the negotiations and would make every endeavor to reach a satisfactory conclusion. The Secretary said that Dr. Porras had suggested that in the contingency supposed the parties should have recourse to the good offices of the United States. The Secretary recalled to the Ambassador the fact that at the outset the Secretary had stated that the United States would be willing to use its good offices in a manner acceptable to both Governments. The Secretary said that he had not desired to make the suggestion that the parties should agree to have recourse to the good offices of the United States, but as Dr. Porras had made the suggestion, the Secretary could say personally that he thought it a very reasonable one. He said that Dr. Porras had authorized him to say that this suggestion was acceptable to the Peruvian Government, and hence Chile had it in her power now to dispose of the controversy.
The Chilean Ambassador seemed somewhat depressed by the suggestion and said that it seemed to him practically the same as an agreement for arbitration and that he feared his Government would so regard it. The Secretary pointed out that good offices were quite distinct from arbitration; that the Chilean Government did not bind themselves to accept any suggestion made by the United States.
The Ambassador pointed out that any suggestion made by the United States would have very great weight and might almost be controlling. The Secretary replied that this would not be so unless there was an entirely reasonable suggestion which would be justified in the opinion of the world, and that if it were such he had no doubt Chile would be glad to accept it. The Secretary said that if the United States made a suggestion that was not entirely fair and reasonable in all the circumstances, Chile would have no difficulty in pointing it out and in rejecting it.
The Ambassador said he felt it was very difficult and he was afraid that his Government would not accept the proposal.
[Page 499]The Secretary said that he had exhausted his efforts and he thought that the parties now could agree upon a reasonable basis; that he had declined to support the Peruvians’ desire for an entire revision of the Treaty; that he had recognized the reasonableness of Chile’s opposition to the proposal for a wide arbitration in case it were decided that the plebiscite should not be held, without an opportunity to reach an agreement by direct negotiations; that on the other hand he had recognized the justice of Peru’s insistence that the question whether a plebiscite should be held should be submitted to arbitration. The Secretary felt that he had gone as far as he could, and he intimated that if the Conference now failed, it would be simply because Chile in the contingency suggested declined to have recourse to the good offices of the United States.
The Secretary then emphasized to the Ambassador the great importance of dealing with the matter promptly. He said that the Peruvians had made this suggestion; that undoubtedly it would become public; that in the event Chile ultimately consented it would appear that she had yielded to the Peruvian demand. Whereas, if Chile promptly said that, of course, she never had had any objection to the good offices of the United States and that this was entirely in accord with her wishes, she could avoid such a result and settle the matter at once without any loss of prestige.
The Ambassador seemed to be impressed by this and said he would see what he could do.
The Secretary said that it had been assumed in the negotiations that the United States would be the arbitrator; that he had not taken this matter up because he felt that if the parties could not agree upon the scope of the arbitration it was not necessary to consider who should be the arbitrator. The Secretary indicated, however, that it would be desirable, if possible, to have an arbitrator other than the United States Government itself. The Secretary said that he preferred a jurist; it might be a board of jurists or a single jurist. The Secretary said he had in mind such a man as Elihu Root, who might be called upon to serve, although the Secretary did not know whether or not he would be willing.