500.A4a/162
Memorandum by the Secretary to the British Empire Delegation of a Conversation at the Home of the Secretary of State, December 9, 1921, 10 a.m.29
Secret
- Present:—
- the united states of america
- Mr. Hughes
- france
- M. Viviani, accompanied by M. Jusserand
- the british empire
- Mr. Balfour, accompanied by Mr. Malkin and Sir Maurice Hankey
- japan
- Baron Shidehara
- Baron Kato, accompanied by M. Saburi
- the united states of america
agreement relating to the pacific.
(1) Baron Shidehara said that he had tried to meet the American and British point of view as well as he could. It was important to avoid anything which in British eyes would be detrimental to the position of Australia or New Zealand. It was also necessary to avoid any form of agreement which would give other Powers an excuse to insist on participating in the arrangement. He was now prepared to give up the idea of excluding the Japanese islands from the arrangement. This would avoid any difficulty of an exchange of Notes or entry in a procès-verbal. He would, however, like to propose a small change in the wording. In Article I, after the word “controversy”, he would like to insert the words “bearing upon Pacific problems”.
Mr. Hughes suggested, as an alternative, the words “bearing on their relation to Pacific problems”. He was not enamoured of this particular draft, and did not like the phrase “Pacific problems” although it expressed the idea which he desired to convey.
[Page 24]Mr. Balfour asked whether possibly this might not be regarded by the world as a clumsy draft?
Mr. Hughes agreed, and suggested the following alternative: “controversy involving their relation to Pacific problems”.
Mr. Balfour suggested to substitute “arising out of” for “involving”. If Mr. Hughes’ proposal were adopted it would be necessary to alter the word “relations” (of harmonious accord) lower down in the Article.
M. Jusserand suggested that the words “relations of” might be omitted in this case.
Mr. Hughes said that on thinking the matter over he did not like the use of the word “relations” in his own draft.
Mr. Malkin suggested the following: “a controversy arising out of any matter in the Pacific in which they are concerned”.
Mr. Hughes did not care for this draft. He was inclined to think that his own suggestion had not sufficiently taken into account the bearing of the word “controversy”. If a controversy arose between two Parties it must be in relation to the rights or interests of those parties. He therefore thought it was unnecessary to introduce the word “relation”, and suggested the following: “a controversy arising out of Pacific problems”.
Mr. Balfour suggested “due to a difference between them in connection with any Pacific problem”.
Mr. Hughes suggested that the word “controversy” contained the full thought of a difference without it being necessary to specify. He suggested the following words: “controversy in connection with any Pacific question”. Mr. Hughes pointed out that this document would be submitted to very close scrutiny. The question arose, therefore, whether ambiguity might not arise as to what was a “Pacific question”. What he was anxious to do was to provide in this instrument not only for the settlement of questions on which agreement was likely easily to be reached relating only to the islands, but other controversies which, though not arising out of questions relating to island possessions, would affect the security of those possessions. He therefore suggested the following words: “a controversy involving their said rights in the above-mentioned region”. The question might not arise out of the rights in these insular possessions and dominions, but might involve or react on the rights and ownership of these territories.
Mr. Balfour asked if the following explanation of Mr. Hughes’ policy was correct, namely, that the root idea in this document related to insular rights, but that other controversies might arise which would involve the security of those rights. That is to say, if he understood correctly, Mr. Hughes wished to give the peace-making [Page 25] aspects of this instrument a wider scope. He thought that that was all to the good.
Mr. Hughes explained that supposing some question arose off the coast of the United States of America, even though it did not arise out of any island question, it might involve the security of all these islands. What he desired was that if diplomacy failed in such a case resort should be made to the provisions of this Treaty.
Mr. Balfour said that for purposes of testing this proposal he would drive it to its logical conclusion. Supposing a difference arose in the Mediterranean between Japan and Great Britain, would it not have to be brought before the conference contemplated in this agreement, if Mr. Hughes’ proposal was adopted?
Mr. Hughes said that he had assumed that any such question arising, or any question between Great Britain and France in the Channel, would not be affected by this agreement. If the trouble arose in the Pacific, however, even though it did not arise out of the rights in the islands, it would be within the scope of the agreement. To meet the difficulty, however, he proposed the following draft:—“a controversy arising out of Pacific questions and involving the aforementioned rights of the High Contracting Parties.”
After some further discussion, provision was made to meet the points considered above by adopting the following formula for the Preamble and Article I of the Treaty:—
“The United States of America, the British Empire, France and Japan, with a view to the preservation of the general peace and the maintenance of their rights with respect to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean, have determined to conclude a treaty to this effect and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries (here insert names of Heads of States and Plenipotentiaries as is in the Treaty of Versailles, but omitting South Africa) who, having communicated their Full Powers, found in good and due form, nave agreed as follows:—
I
The High Contracting Parties engage as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific.
If there should develop between any two of the High Contracting Parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them, they shall invite the other High Contracting Parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment.”
proposed plenary session.
(2) Mr. Hughes then raised the question of the form in which the arrangement should be announced. He asked if Baron Shidehara [Page 26] had yet received a reply from Japan in regard to the Anglo-American agreement on mandated territories?
Baron Shidehara said he had received no reply as yet, and the telegraphic congestion was very bad.
Mr. Hughes said that in that event it would be necessary for him to make a reservation in announcing the new quadruple arrangement, to the effect that it was conditional on an agreement being reached in regard to the mandated islands.
M. Jusserand said that as yet he had had no answer from Paris.
Mr. Hughes said that he proposed to arrange a Plenary Session for the following day at 11 a.m. He asked his colleagues whether they thought it would not be a useful plan at the same time to bring before the Conference all the resolutions which had been passed in the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions?
Mr. Balfour said he was in favour of this. It was part of the system on which the Conference worked,—to do a good deal of the actual detail in private and to announce it as soon as possible. It would be inconsistent with that plan not to announce these agreements.
M. Jusserand said it was important to ensure that there should be no controversy in open session in regard to the new arrangement.
Mr. Hughes said he had already seen Senator Schanzer30 and the Italian Ambassador twice, and had told them that nothing had been included in the quadruple arrangement in regard to any matter in which Italy had an interest. He had said that he would never have asked them to come to this Conference if there were any risk of their being excluded in such a case. He had, in strict confidence, communicated to them a copy of the draft arrangement. They had then said that if the arrangement were confined within geographical limits with which they had no concern, there would be no objection.
M. Jusserand pointed out that these arrangements had been concluded outside the immediate work of the Conference.
Mr. Hughes said he proposed to arrange for a meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Nine Powers the same afternoon, and to tell them that he proposed to announce the arrangement in Plenary Session the following afternoon. In fact, the Heads of Delegations would act as shock-absorbers, and if anybody had any objections to raise they would give the necessary explanations. He would adopt the assumption that neither the Netherlands nor Portugal would wish to assume the responsibilities which were involved wish to take part in the arrangement. So far as China was concerned, he would tell them that an announcement was to be made of all the resolutions agreed to [Page 27] up to the present in regard to her. It was inadvisable to court the risk of trouble in open session, and he thought this could be avoided by the meeting he proposed. If anyone then wished to raise a question in open session, at least he and his colleagues would be prepared.
M. Viviani thought it was important, when summoning the Heads of Delegations, to let them know that it was merely to give information and not to ask their advice. Otherwise they would all wish to communicate with their respective Governments, and we should again be held up.
Mr. Hughes agreed, and said he would tell them he wanted to give them certain information in order that they might not be taken by surprise. He did not propose to give them a copy of the document, owing to the risk of leakage, and intended to tell them so. He understood that he was to take the following action:—
- (a)
- To have copies prepared of the Quadruple Agreement and circulated at once;
- (b)
- To get together all the resolutions that had been passed by the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern questions;
- (c)
- To summon a meeting of Heads of Delegations that afternoon.
Mr. Hughes then asked M. Jusserand if he had heard from France.
M. Jusserand said he had not.
M. Viviani thought it would be unwise to assume French acquiescence.
Mr. Balfour suggested that perhaps an announcement could be made with a statement that it was subject to confirmation from France.
M. Viviani thought this would be very risky. He himself had advised acceptance, but he could not be sure that his Government would accept.
M. Jusserand said the only danger he saw was a possibility that the French Government might wish to include Indo-China.
(Some discussion took place at this point as to the great complications which would be raised if Indo-China, being on the mainland, were included in the Agreement).
Eventually Mr. Hughes undertook to summon the meeting of the Nine Powers at 4 o’clock. If, however, the French Delegation had not heard from France by that hour and he felt there was a risk of the meeting of the Plenary Session on the following day taking place, he would use his discretion to postpone the 4 o’clock meeting.
A copy of the Treaty as finally agreed to is attached.
-
No agreed official minutes of this conversation were made. The American delegation used the memorandum prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey.
The file copy of this memorandum bears corrections by Secretary Hughes. Words which he crossed out are indicated by canceled type; words which he inserted are printed in italics.
↩ - See the memorandum of Dec. 3, 1921, by the Secretary of State, p. 5.↩