861.48/982: Telegram
The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received October 24, 1:47 a.m.]
4789. Reports from various Allied sources and including Hoover’s Child Fund personnel indicate release of Petrograd from Bolshevists control imminent. All reports indicate that terrible conditions of suffering exist in Petrograd.
Hoover wisely left stocks of foodstuffs at Viborg and these stocks together with State Department’s recent delivery of flour at Reval available to carry Petrograd for approximately three weeks. As bridge on railroad line from Viborg to Petrograd destroyed Viborg stocks must be carried by water to Petrograd. Reported these stocks now being loaded on barges at Viborg preparatory to moving to Petrograd. Large railroad bridge on line Reval to Petrograd at Yamburg destroyed, necessitating water movement these supplies to Petrograd. These are problems for local Russian authorities aided by British to handle.
Hoover’s Child Fund representatives in Russian liberated territory outside Russia report that number of bread tickets issued by Bolsheviks October 1, 1919 to population Petrograd totaled 750,000 and that all reports confirm additional [population] of 750,000 in vicinity of Petrograd. These reports of population somewhat larger than was previously estimated and must be taken with reserve. The supply of this population after the consumption of the Viborg and Reval stocks is the immediate problem now facing the Russians after liberation Petrograd. The Russians are also faced by impending situation resulting from the freezing of the extreme eastern portion of the Gulf of Finland which closes sea approach to Petrograd. This freezing occurs annually at some date between December 1st and 15th. Under pre-war conditions Petrograd communication with open water and [was] through Reval and Libau. As already indicated these lines [Page 730] partially destroyed and similar destruction inevitable on Libau communications with Petrograd. In addition almost complete demoralization Russian railroads this territory and shortage railroad equipment reduces the carrying capacity of these Russian railway lines even if in repair to an almost negligible quantity. The same conditions apply to a greater or less extent with the possibility of utilizing the ice-free ports of Finland for the shipping of supplies to Petrograd. The foregoing situation demonstrates the urgent necessity for immediate action on the part of the Russians to push into Petrograd as soon as it falls the very maximum quantity of relief supplies before this freezing of the port of Petrograd. Logan has been in consultation with British and Russian authorities in an endeavor to help them out as much as possible in the recent emergency. We have presented to them very clearly the fact that all appropriations made by Congress for relief are exhausted and that under existing laws no credits can be made available in America for the purchase of food supplies and that it rests squarely upon the Russians through their own means to establish the necessary credits in England and America for this purpose. British have presented the same position to the Russians. It is understood however that the Russians have approximately £3,000,000 in England which was earmarked for munition purchases and Logan has been insisting that the Russians release sufficient of this money so that the English Wheat Executive can guarantee to Sweden the replacement of 20,000 tons of cereal flour which is reported the Swedes have in surplus and which the Swedes will lay down in Petrograd if replacement is guaranteed. It is hoped this arrangement can be effected within the next few days and if it is effected in Petrograd situation will be protected for a few months after the exhaustion of the existing American stocks at Petrograd. Bakhmeteff has cabled Sazonoff that the American Cabinet is considering the possibility of authorizing our Grain Corporation to assume a credit for 20,000 tons of flour for Petrograd and that he will probably be able to obtain the necessary tonnage to move this on American Government credit. We have no advice as to whether or not this information is correct but if it is so, this movement should be started without delay so that deliveries can be effected before Petrograd is blocked by ice.
Denikin has always held that he opposed the export of the large existing wheat surplus in Southern Russia as this surplus would be eventually needed for the supply of the Moscow and Petrograd population. Logan has therefore been emphasizing to the Russians the necessity that as now Petrograd is likely to fall it is incumbent upon the Russians to arrange through Denikin for the immediate [Page 731] release of wheat in the Black Sea. Logan pointed out to the Russians that it would be foolish for them to use their foreign credits in purchasing double the price foreign cereals when they themselves could meet the Petrograd supply with their own wheat at half the cost. He has been insisting that the Russians start releasing the supply already accumulated at Black Sea ports and has about effected arrangements with the British Wheat Executive that they will arrange to take this wheat f.o.b. Black Sea ports delivering same under the Mediterranean programs and diverting corresponding Atlantic cargoes into Petrograd. Denikin’s business manager is now in Paris and it is hoped that an arrangement along these lines can be effected shortly. We have just been informed that Denikin has agreed to delivery of 40,000 tons of wheat to the French in exchange for certain war supplies. We are trying to ascertain if this wheat is immediately available for shipment and if so will use our best endeavors with French for them to defer delivery so that this amount can be immediately applied to the Petrograd situation.
The foregoing is a résumé of the Petrograd situation as we see it and the line of action we are following in regard to the helping the Russians meet it. If Petrograd falls we urgently request the State Department give all possible publicity to the fact of the annual freezing of sea approaches to Petrograd early in month of December of each year and the difficulty of transportation of supplies into Petrograd from open ports as outlined in this cable. We are quite sure that in the event of the fall [of] Petrograd many philanthropic organizations including the American Red Cross will be interested in endeavoring to relieve the sufferings of the Petrograd population and on this account they should have full knowledge of the transportation difficulties.
Whilst all reports confirm the imminent release of Petrograd from Bolshevist control nevertheless in view of past experience we cannot be sure of this until it is a fact accomplished. It is naturally understood that the plan of operations outlined herein will not be put into effect until Petrograd actually falls.