Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/20

Appendix III to C. F. 20. 88Feeding of Russia—Copy of letter from Lord Robert Cecil to Sir Maurice Hankey

M. 163

My Dear Hankey : When the Nansen scheme was first started, I understand that Hoover, Clémentel, an Italian and I were appointed as a Committee to advise the Supreme Council as to the steps to be taken in connection therewith.

Yesterday Mr. Hoover brought to me the reply that Lenin has sent to the Nansen letter, and suggested that we should take some action upon it. I enclose a copy of Lenin’s reply.89

Accordingly, a meeting was held today in the Astoria, attended by Mr. Hoover, Professor Attolico and myself. Monsieur Clémentel was invited but was prevented from coming. At that meeting it was agreed that Mr. Hoover should send immediately the following reply to Nansen’s question at the end of the Lenin telegram:

“Please inform Nansen that until whole matter has been given further consideration by the Governments here we consider it extremely inadvisable to arrange any meeting with Bolshevik representatives.”

We further agreed upon the memorandum of which I also send you a copy. Will you please inform the Supreme Council.

Yours very sincerely,

Robert Cecil
[Page 116]
[Enclosure]

Memorandum on the Nansen Proposal

Lenin’s reply to Nansen really amounts to this:

“I shall be very glad to accept supplies but not to cease from fighting, though I would be prepared to enter into negotiations for a general Russian peace.”

It is now for the Associated Governments to take the next step, and before deciding what that step should be they must make up their minds what is to be their policy in Russia.

It seems to me they have two courses open to them: They may either decide that so long as the Bolshevik Government is in power there is no hope for Russian peace, and that therefore the first thing to do is to smash the Bolsheviks. If this is to be their line they must strain every nerve to support Koltchak, Denikin, the Letts, the Esthonians, the Poles, and even the Finns in attacking Russia. They must furnish them with supplies and money and instructors, and do everything to make their coming campaign against the Bolsheviks successful. They must also break off all relations direct and indirect with the Bolsheviks, and advise Nansen to say that in view of Lenin’s response his scheme for relief is at an end, and that nothing further of that sort can be looked for by the Russian Government. That is one policy. It may be the right one, but it undoubtedly involves much further bloodshed and destruction of material wealth.

The other policy would be to ask the military authorities to define as nearly as they can what is the position of the various forces fighting in Russia. As soon as the line dividing the combatants has thus been determined, each and all of them should be admonished to retire, say, 10 kilometres on their own side of the line, and to refrain from all future hostilities. They would be told that international commissaries would be sent to the various fronts to see that these directions were obeyed. If, and so far as, they were obeyed, the Associated Powers would do their utmost to supply to the various Governments concerned food and clothing and other necessaries. If some refuse and some accept, those who accept should be supported. Those who refused would be deprived of all assistance. The Governments should further be informed that the Associated Powers or the Council of the League of Nations would immediately take into consideration the whole Russian problem. Their first step would be to call upon all sections of the Russian people, or any part of them who express their adherence to this policy, to elect by free and universal suffrage, under the supervision of the League of Nations, a constituent assembly for the purpose of determining the future constitution of the Russian Government. [Page 117] In the meantime Nansen would be advised to say that so long as the Soviet Government declined to abstain from fighting he was powerless to help them.

This policy is in accordance with the general principle underlying the Covenant of the League of Nations—namely, that national grievances must not be settled by resort to arms unless every other possible means of settling them has been first tried. It does not in any way prejudge the rights of any Russian quarrels, but it proceeds upon the principle that in any case peace is to the interest of all concerned.

I believe that either of these policies has a fair chance of success, and may be defended by powerful arguments. What is not defensible is a combination of the two: a suggestion that Lenin must cease fighting while we are supplying arms and equipment to Denikin and Koltchak; or, conversely, that Koltchak and Denikin should be encouraged to wage war against Lenin while we are negotiating with the latter to give him economic assistance. Compromises of this kind can only lead to a prolongation of hostilities in Russia, and the spreading in that country of the belief that the Associated Powers cannot be trusted.

May 16, 1919.

[For the report of the discussion by the Council of Four of the Soviet reply to the Nansen proposal, see Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des États-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, May 20, 1919, at 11 a.m., p. 351.]

  1. The minutes of the meeting of the Council of Four (C. F. 20) of May 20, 1919, 11 a.m., are printed in part, p. 351.
  2. The Soviet reply (signed by Chicherin) was transmitted from Copenhagen in telegram no. Crab 104, May 14, supra.