861.00/3953: Telegram

The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State

908. To Paris as 48. Department’s 507, February 24, 11 a.m., much appreciated. Definite promise of withdrawal has improved state of mind of the 339th.18 Statement quoted in Embassy’s telegram 887, February 20, 5 p.m.,19 has been published in English in the soldiers’ newspaper and in the British headquarters communiqué but so far withheld by the Russian censor from the Russian newspapers. What is the precise import of the phrase in Secretary Baker’s letter, “Prompt withdrawal of American and Allied troops [Page 619] in North Russia at the earliest possible moment that weather conditions in the spring will permit”? Neither the British nor French diplomatic or military authorities have received any information of the withdrawal of their forces. The French commanding officer has advice on the contrary that 250 soldiers will arrive in April to replace demobilized classes in the force already here. It is unthinkable that the Allies ever abandon the people of this region altogether. It would be an act of disloyalty which I am sure no Allied statesman could commit if adequately informed of the facts and the results which would ensue for the local population. Unfortunately what has been considered, since the Princes Island invitation, an uncertainty in the American attitude toward the Bolsheviki has brought us a little under the suspicion of contemplating a disloyalty of this kind. As word spreads of the intended withdrawal of the 339th the feeling will of course intensify. It is therefore now more especially [important?] than ever from the local point of view that the Embassy be placed in a position, through early and full advices concerning our attitude toward the Russian problem, to interpret this currently in a true light.

It will be unfortunate if an Allied expedition is continued in northern Russia without American participation. It would leave the Russians, in the estimation of many of them and possibly in fact as well, without a disinterested friend. This is explained more at length in the second paragraph of the Embassy’s 572, November 13, 3 p.m.20 I appreciate thoroughly on the other hand that the maintenance even of regular troops in northern Russia may be undesirable or even impossible from the point of view of renounced [domestic] politics—though I cannot believe that the people would insist on withdrawal if the situation were really understood. But in the event of such a dilemma is it possible that we might meet the requirements of the two [United States] considerations in some measure by sending a more considerable naval force? Admiral McCully, who returned to Murmansk last week, has telegraphed Admiral Sims recommending that in order to meet possible emergencies, two other vessels be attached to this station—one to be permanently at Archangel, one at Murmansk and the other cruising; vessels should have at least four-inch guns and arrive here before May 1st. For work in the River Dvina, McCully recommends in addition twelve submarine chasers. The interior water system of Russia is such that submarine chasers could proceed in appropriate circumstances from here to Petrograd and other important points in the interior of Russia.

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With reference to Secretary Baker’s letter I feel obliged to report for the Department’s information that the despatch of two railway companies at this time will hardly accomplish the objects enumerated. It is almost certain that by the time these troops can reach Murmansk and begin actually to improve operating conditions the spring thaw will have set off [in], making supply, reenforcements, or withdrawal impracticable by land. There will be then a critical period of isolation extending for about a month until the reopening of navigation (see the latter part of Embassy’s 866, 14th) after which supply, reenforcements, or withdrawal will be by sea.

Poole
  1. 339th Infantry, U.S.A.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. ii, pp. 567568.