861.77/888: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received June 8, 6:15 a.m.]
After several talks with General Tanaka and the Minister for Foreign Affairs I left with the Minister a confidential memorandum dated May 17 embodying the substance of your May 6, 6 p.m. This afternoon the Minister handed me the following reply:
“The Japanese Government have taken note of the decision of the United States Government contained in the memorandum of the American Embassy of May 17 respecting the abandonment of the proposed plan of establishing a zone for the protection of railways and of rivers and waterways in Siberia.
They have no intention of urging the adoption of that plan. The only point on which they place particular importance is that the complete harmony shall be maintained, and the spirit of mutual helpfulness displayed, in the action of the Allied military forces. Sharing as they do with the American Government the belief that the Allied forces are available and should be employed only in cases of actual necessity of policing and protection, and not for any offensive undertakings, they feel that they can confidently look forward to the realization of the desired unity of action and purpose.
[Page 564]They however [fail to?] appreciate clearly the meaning of the suggestion made by the American Government that the Inter-Allied Committee at present sitting at Vladivostok should have preeminence in all matters affecting policies. By the railway arrangement recently concluded, the Inter-Allied Committee is charged only with the general supervision of the railways in the zone in which the Allied troops are now operating. It has practically no authority to deal with any questions of general policy involving issues of a wider significance than those which properly relate to the supervision of the [railways?]. Such political questions falling outside the defined functions of the Inter-Allied Committee might, in the opinion of the Japanese Government, be made the subject of discussion and adjustment among the Governments of the Associated Powers in Siberia, apart from the session of that Committee. Nor is the Committee in a position, consistently with the terms of the existing arrangement, to control measures for the protection of the railway, which is expressly placed under the Allied military forces. In this situation, if it should now be the intention of the American Government to extend in any way the competence of the Inter-Allied Committee beyond what is prescribed in the arrangement, such a modification does not appear to the Japanese Government to be either necessary or appropriate.”
At the same time he handed me the following reply to the memorandum which I had submitted, with the approval of the Department, on June 2d:13
“The Japanese Government have carefully considered the suggestion embodied in the memorandum of the American Embassy of June 2d on the subject of policy to be followed in the operations of the Allied military forces in Siberia. They fully accept the underlying principles apparently implied in that suggestion that the Allied forces are available only in cases of actual necessity for the preservation of order in the regiments [regions?] immediately bordering the main routes of communication in Siberia. Referring, however, to the application of this principle, the Japanese Government desire to offer the following observation:
- 1.
- In their opinion, the object of military action should be no more or less than the preservation of order in such regiments [regions?], which is essential not only for the protection of the railway and those engaged in its operation, but also for the safety of the military forces themselves, as well as of their own nationals and the Russian population in the localities. All measures necessary for the attainment of this object should be left in the hands of the military authorities.
- 2.
- The region to be covered by the Allied military activities should be as far limited as possible, but it should include mines and other establishments which have direct bearing upon the supply of materials needed for the working of the railway. It is equally important to place under military protection the rivers and waterways [Page 565] by which the transportation of stores for the use of the Allied troops is actually carried on.
- 3.
- The military forces should be authorized to act on their own initiative within the scope of the object above defined. It appears neither wise nor practicable to call upon them to withhold their action until a request for it is made by those in charge of the railways.
The military commanders shall be empowered to work out in common accord the details of the plan of military action to be taken in the discharge of their duties.”
I am disappointed in both replies. They reveal vividly the inherent difficulty of any real cooperation with the Japanese military forces in Siberia through civilian control. The two memoranda, read together, indicate that the General Staff insist upon retaining the initiative. They can not understand and will not tolerate any arrangement which would deprive them of independent action and it is this attitude, adopted not only by the General Staff but by every subordinate military official, which is so exasperating to our representatives in Siberia. My conversations have apparently not improved the situation. They have only clarified the issue.