861.77/736: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
1106. For the Secretary of State and McCormick:
Mr. Morris reports that a somewhat acute situation is arising as between General Graves and the Japanese military authorities because of radical divergence of policy. General Graves is holding absolutely aloof from internal conflicts between Russian factions. On this subject he telegraphs as follows:
“No. 200, March 5. As I construed my original instructions which are still in force, I was to take no part in differences between different Russian factions. Before Armistice I permitted United States troops to be used in co-operation with Japanese along the Usuri Railroad against a force composed of Germans, Austrians and Russians. Since the Armistice there has been no menace from Germans and Austrians but there is danger of serious trouble between different Russian factions which may develop at any time.
The feeling is now becoming so bitter that each faction claims if you are not with them you are against them. The Japanese have started campaign to put down an uprising in Amur Province as reported in my 197, and my refusal to permit the use of United States troops in the trouble between Russian factions has enabled Reactionary Party to claim that Americans are Bolsheviks and enabled the other parties to claim we are favorable to Reactionary Party, because by our presence Reactionary Party is enabled to commit excesses on the people which they could not do if Allied troops were not present. No one doubts the truth of this latter contention. Japan and the United States are in Siberia with the same announced purposes and following opposite courses relative to taking part in internal troubles. This has made it seem advisable to me to ask if my policy in considering the Bolshevik trouble in Siberia entirely an internal trouble in which I should take no part is the policy the Department desires me to continue to follow. Graves.”
In this connection I refer to the Department’s instructions to Consul-General Harris31 which have been repeated to London, Paris and Rome to ascertain whether those governments are inclined to take the same position, and to you for your information. You will recall that the firm stand taken by Ambassador Francis at Archangel under somewhat similar circumstances did much to clarify the situation there. My own opinion is that General Graves should be authorized to make quite clear to the Russian military authorities at Vladivostok and in the Primorskaya and Amur Provinces that the power of this government to assist Russia in Eastern Siberia will be paralyzed if any group in control reverts to arbitrary or reactionary methods, and furthermore, that such a course will create public [Page 481] sentiment in America which may have a far-reaching effect. In other words, I think that General Graves, without employing his forces to assist one Russian faction as against another, should be authorized definitely to throw the weight of such influence as he may have through the presence of American forces, to insist upon a policy of moderation and, at the same time, should make perfectly clear that this government cannot lend itself to any measures which savor of counter-revolution or reaction. Let me also point out the advisability of taking measures to prevent civil war in the rear of the Czechs, who are now in Central Siberia. I think it also necessary to emphasize again the fact that the support which General Graves is to lend Mr. Stevens as provided by the plan, will require him not only to use his good offices to prevent armed conflicts between factions, but also to interfere by force where the question of communications or the safety of our own men are threatened. In the cities and towns along the railways the population should be protected from arbitrary acts and encouraged in any orderly efforts to manage their own local affairs.
In my opinion the situation is somewhat beyond General Graves and I think he will be required to be told specifically how far he can go, as his inclination is to interpret his instructions very conservatively. This will no doubt require your discussing the question with the President. If you do so, please let me know directions he will issue to the Secretary of War. I feel confident the French and British will approve but believe we may have some difficulty in securing the cooperation of the Japanese. I would like to be in a position to place the situation strongly before them, to secure unity of action.
As you have no doubt been informed through General Churchill,32 last month General Graves after conferring with Mr. Stevens asked for authority first, to move one battalion of American troops to Harbin, and subsequently, two companies to Irkutsk. In compliance with the President’s authorization for General Graves to lend Mr. Stevens the support necessary to make the railway plan effective, the War Department approved General Graves’ request.