861.77/736: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Vladivostok, to the Acting Secretary of State

Supplementing my March 7, 4 p.m.28 and connected with the Allied plans for protecting the railways is a question which I feel should be submitted for the consideration of the Department. The facts are:

  • 1st, one result of the military expedition in support of the Czechs and the actions of the Czechs themselves was to suppress more or less, [in] towns and villages along the railway, popular uprisings and disorders which had previously occurred. In addition relying on statement of the Czechs and others that the order would be maintained by the Allied forces large numbers of the city and peasant population surrendered their arms and ammunition and thus rendered themselves defenseless against aggression from any source.
  • 2d, another immediate result of expedition was the renewed vigor given to various reactionary groups in their efforts to regain political power. They fully expected help from the Allies and in many instances received it. The French, the British have been fairly consistent in their support first of the Omsk Government and more recently of the Kolchack dictatorship. The Japanese have at various times supported Horvath, Semenoff, Kalmikoff and are generally reputed to sympathize with the present reactionary rule of Horvath and Ivanoff-Rinoff in the maritime district.
  • 3d, all of these groups, relieved by the presence of foreign troops from the fear of any popular uprising, are growing daily more reactionary [Page 476] and aggressive. The campaigns of the Japanese and Czechs drove the Bolshevik elements into hiding. Thus the way was opened for the Cossack military leaders and groups of former officials to inaugurate a campaign of their own against the more moderate liberal parties and organizations in Siberia. The Kolchack government may not actually support this campaign although carried on in its name but is too weak to prevent it even if it desires to do so.
  • 4th, the campaign consists of attacks on peasant villages, beating of women, arbitrary arrests of officials whose chief fault is that they are trying to build up a form of local representative government, and the killing of workmen and peasants whenever any irresponsible officer alleges that they have Bolshevik tendencies. Specific instances to support this general statement have been reported in full by General Graves to the War Department.
  • 5th, General Graves has been appealed to by Zemstvo representatives, individuals of liberal views and groups of peasants asking either for protection or for assurances from the Allied commanders that if they resist these outrages Allied troops would not interfere on the ground of suppressing Bolshevism.
  • 6th, recently when four well-behaved citizens of Vladivostok were arbitrarily arrested by Horvath’s soldiers General Graves asked the Japanese military authorities to agree to a plan approved by all the other Allied representatives except France to regulate arbitrary arrests within the limits of Vladivostok. The Japanese military authorities refused assent on the ground that they could not intervene local affairs.
  • 7th, on the order of Kolchack’s local representatives four of the Vladivostok Zemstvo representatives, one Zemstvo representative from Za-Baikal and the editor of the Dalekaya Okraina were arrested Saturday and five were started Sunday for the west. These men are reported to be men of moderate views and earnest purpose. If Ivanoff-Rinoff is not notified by the Allies that force will be used to prevent such arbitrary arrests, it is believed other Zemstvo officials as well as other moderate liberals throughout eastern Siberia will be arrested. General Graves interprets his instructions as preventing him from taking any steps to protect these men or to prevent further arbitrary arrests.

The situation thus created raises the question whether we can remain in Siberia and at the same time permit these reactionary groups to inaugurate a campaign of this character, the apparent purpose of which is to suppress all local representative institutions. Graves, Rodgers, Caldwell and I have discussed this question at great length. We all feel that for the present our troops should remain as long as other Allied troops remain in Siberia. Apart from the obligations recently assumed to assist in the protection of [Page 477] the railways is the further consideration that our Government initiated the expedition on strict compliance [sic] with the Czechs, invited the cooperation of Japan, acquiesced in the action of both the Czechs and Japanese in restoring order along the railways and in a few cases our troops actually assisted. We have thus had a substantial part in creating the conditions which have made possible the emergence of these reactionary groups. We cannot therefore avoid the responsibility of seeing to it that while we are assisting in protection and operation of the railways, reactionary groups do not use this opportunity to suppress ruthlessly the efforts of the masses of Siberia who are struggling for some measure of local self-government.

I suggest for the consideration of the Department that in carrying out the agreement for the military protection of the railroad our Government should insist that in the protected area and in the cities and towns along the railway where Allied troops are quartered the population should be protected from the arbitrary action of any group. I believe that this position will be supported by our European associates but I fear it will not be acceptable to the Japanese military authorities. I feel however that now is the time frankly to discuss the question with our associates and reach a clear understanding in regard to it.

Morris
  1. Not printed.