861.00/5021: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State
[Received August 13, 7:34 p.m.]
Supplementing my August 11, 11 a.m.:
Kolchak returned from his visit to the northern army yesterday, brought Dietrichs back with him and made him Secretary of War and Chief of Staff in place of Lebedeff, appointed the Cossack leader Ivanoff-Rinoff Lieutenant General in the Siberian Army and then immediately left for the southern army. During his stay he met the Allied representatives and told us that the Siberian Army was not sufficiently organized to make a stand at the Tobol River and [Page 411] would therefore continue to retreat to the Ishim River which is only 170 miles west of Omsk; that Dietrichs urged as a military measure the immediate evacuation of Omsk, but that he himself feared that the Government would fall if this were done. He had decided therefore not to evacuate Omsk, not to remove the gold reserve which is stored here, and not to accede, as long as the crisis lasts, to the demands of liberals on one side or Cossacks on the other who desired to change the structure of his Government. As emergency measures he was trying to gather from various sources 20,000 soldiers to [on] whose personal loyalty he could depend; he had ordered all civil employees of the Government between the ages of eighteen and forty to report at once for military duty at the front; and he also proposed to consolidate the Government departments in one building and thus release for military purposes the many large buildings they now occupy.
From the Allied Governments he requested the following assistance: 1, Their confidence and sympathy for three or four weeks longer by which time he believed the future of his Government would be decided. 2, Not to stop shipment of materials already arranged for—the rifles from America, donated equipment from Great Britain—and not to discontinue the discussions (being made?) with our War Department for additional equipment. 3, Not to postpone the discussion among the Allied Governments of any comprehensive plan of assistance which as a result of the conferences here we have submitted to our Governments. In this connection I am glad to report that Sir Charles Eliot, Count Martel, and General Takayana Gito [Takayanagi?] heartily in agreement with the conclusions summarized in my August 11, 11 a.m. and have so reported to their respective Governments.
Finally he requested as imperative the following concrete measures: release of the ruble notes in the possession of Heid at Vladivostok;42 acceptance by the Japanese, French, and British banks at Harbin and Vladivostok of the Government’s proposal to guarantee them against loss by a deposit of gold if they would consent to purchase Siberian notes and so keep the notes in circulation a few weeks longer; despatch of sufficient troops to guard the Chinese Eastern which has been deserted by the Chinese troops who undertook to guard it.
I submit the following comments on these requests: In view of the action of the Supreme Council (at Paris?) I think we should do everything possible to encourage Kolchak at this time. Would the [Page 412] Department consider favorably suggesting a purely personal message from the President to Admiral Kolchak expressing confidence in his motives and purposes, appreciation of the serious difficulties which confront him, and the hope that he may meet them successfully and thus permit our Government to assist the Russian people in a larger way to establish the liberal institutions for which they are struggling? I believe that such a message would give him great encouragement.
I hope the Government will feel justified in continuing the shipment of rifles. I agree with Admiral Kolchak that the Allies should not postpone the discussion of plans for greater assistance as the question of time is of utmost importance.
I recommend the release of the notes at Vladivostok although I appreciate the difficulties suggested in your August 8, 7 p.m.43 I doubt whether the Kolchak government can or will use them under present conditions; but if requested I think Heid should be instructed to deliver them. The establishment of the yen in eastern Siberia and Manchuria would in my judgment be most unfortunate. We have no American banks interested in the proposal to buy rubles; the French and British banks will, I think, accept the proposal; and the Japanese banks will, of course, refuse.
In reference to guarding the Chinese Eastern, Great Britain has already consented to use the Hampshire regiment which has left Omsk, France will supply a small contingent and General Graves has telegraphed Stevens that he has 2,000 men available.
All preparations have been made to evacuate the few Americans who are still [here?]. In view of the decision not to move the Government from Omsk conditions will probably remain unchanged for several weeks, and I shall be free to start eastward unless the Department desires me to stay longer. I will await further instructions.
- See section on Release to the Kolchak Government of the Russian State Bank Notes Printed in the United States, post, pp. 453 ff.; see also Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. iii, pp. 72 ff.↩
- Post, p. 456.↩