861.00/5012: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State
[Received August 10, 6:45 p.m.]
I do not feel competent to express any opinion on the general question whether our Government or the Allied Governments should in view of recent developments continue the policy of sympathy and assistance to Kolchak which was adopted by the Supreme Council at Paris. I fully realize that the members of Supreme Council had before them aspects of the situation far beyond the ranking [range?] of my observation. I can only submit my views on two [questions?] which I believe are relevant to the larger issue.
- 1st.
- Is the Kolchak government, as it now exists, sufficiently strong to rescue Russia from the grip of Bolshevikism? I regret to report that in my opinion it is not. Only drastic changes in its personnel and methods would render it equal to such a task, no matter how [Page 408] much support the Allied Governments might give it. As pointed out in my August 4, 12 p.m. neither Kolchak nor his civilian colleagues have been able to modify or control the forces of reaction and corruption which have surrounded them from the very beginning of the movement. I have discussed with Government officials, who I believe are earnest and well meaning men, the feasibility of the adopting certain immediate measures to win back popular support and confidence. These included some guarantees of personal security; an effort at least to punish military officials who are speculating in army supplies while the soldiers are without food, are commandeering railway cars and selling them at enormous prices; the creation of some provisional council of peasants and Zemstvo representatives with whom Kolchak could occasionally confer. But it is quite evident that they are powerless even to attempt such measures.
- 2d.
- Would it be possible with the assistance of the Allies to effect changes in personnel and methods? I have [confidence?] the Kolchak government might, with the exercise of tact and judgement and above all patience, be shaped into an instrument with which to combat Bolshevism. But it would be a long and at times a most discouraging task. For the moment we can only await the outcome of the present crisis. Should the Government survive, it can continue only provided it receives immediate help from the Allies.
I will summarize in my next and final report the specific help which will be required.