“324, July 14, 6 p.m. General situation. Unquestionably serious at
present moment and created largely by Russian psychology. The people and
government have evidently misunderstood just the nature and extent of
the assistance which the Allies were willing to afford. They depended
too much upon this as a factor in their struggle with Bolshevism. The
Russians as well as the Czechs today lament the fact that the Allies did
not send 50,000 troops to their assistance when Czechs were in
possession of Samara and Kazan, claiming that Bolshevism could not [sic] have been crushed last October. They also
still criticise the Princes Island proposition as something which
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greatly encouraged the
Bolsheviki and in like degree discouraged the Russians. The Omsk
Government and people in general have also been hoping for recognition
and as same has not been forthcoming the reaction has been depressing.
There has been no enthusiasm among people for recruiting, morale of
soldiers has deteriorated until they are now completely demoralized at
the front. An order has been issued to retreat 500 versts from last
week. This probably means sacrificing Ekaterinburg, Cheliabinsk and
Tiumen, even threatening Omsk. I am satisfied if Bolsheviki march on
Omsk the capital will not be evacuated but Kolchak overthrown and all Siberia will turn Bolshevik.
This is the seriousness of the situation and this is real reason why
Government is appealing for American and Japanese assistance to guard
railway in central and western Siberia. Government has no financial
resources but man power now becoming exhausted. Harris.”
President Wilson to the President of the Senate
(Marshall)22
Washington, 22 July,
1919.
Sir: For the information of the Senate, and
in response to the resolution adopted June 23 [27], 1919,23
requesting the President to inform the Senate, if not incompatible
with the public interest, of the reasons for sending United States
soldiers to Siberia, the duties that are to be performed by these
soldiers, how long they are to remain, and generally to advise the
Senate of the policy of the United States Government in respect to
Siberia and the maintenance of United States soldiers there, I have
the honor to say that the decision to send American troops to
Siberia was announced to the press on August 5, 1918, in a statement
from the Acting Secretary of State, of which a copy is
enclosed.24
This measure was taken in conjunction with Japan and in concert of
purpose with the other allied powers, first of all to save the
Czecho-Slovak armies, which were threatened with destruction by
hostile armies apparently organized by and often largely composed of
enemy prisoners of war. The second purpose in view was to steady any
efforts of the Russians at self-defense, or the establishment of law
and order in which they might be willing to accept assistance.
Two regiments of infantry, with auxiliary troops—about 8,000
effectives—comprising a total of approximately 10,000 men, were
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sent under the command of
Major General William S.
Graves. The troops began to arrive at Vladivostok in
September, 1918. Considerably larger forces were dispatched by Japan
at about the same time, and much smaller forces by others of the
allied powers. The net result was the successful reunion of the
separated Czecho-Slovak armies and the substantial elimination in
eastern Siberia of the active efforts of enemy prisoners of war. A
period of relative quiet then ensued.
In February, 1919, as a conclusion of negotiations begun early in the
summer of 1918, the United States accepted a plan proposed by Japan
for the supervision of the Siberian railways by an international
committee, under which committee Mr. John F. Stevens would assume the operation of the
Russian Railway Service Corps. In this connection it is to be
recalled that Mr. John F.
Stevens, in response to a request of the provisional
government of Russia, went to Russia in the spring of 1917. A few
months later he was made official adviser to the minister of ways of
communication at Petrograd under the provisional government. At the
request of the provisional government, and with the support of Mr.
John F. Stevens, there
was organized the so-called Russian Railway Service Corps, composed
of American engineers. As originally organized, the personnel of
this corps constituted 14 skeleton division units as known in this
country, the idea being that these skeleton units would serve as
practical advisers and assistants on 14 different sections of the
Siberian Railway and assist the Russians by their knowledge of
long-haul problems as known in this country, and which are the rule
and not the exceptions in Siberia.
Owing to the Bolshevik uprising and the general chaotic conditions,
neither Mr. Stevens nor the
Russian Railway Service Corps was able to begin work in Siberia
until March, 1918. They have been able to operate effectively only
since the railway plan was adopted in February, 1919.
The most recent report from Mr. Stevens shows that on parts of the Chinese-Eastern
and Trans-Baikal Railway he is now running six trains a day each
way, while only a little while ago they were only able to run that
many trains a week.
In accepting the railway plan it was provided that some protection
should be given by the allied forces. Mr. Stevens stated frankly that he
would not undertake the arduous task before him unless he could rely
upon support from American troops in an emergency. Accordingly, as
provided in the railway plan and with the approval of the
interallied committee, the military commanders in Siberia have
established troops where it is necessary to maintain order at
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different parts of the
line. The American forces under Gen.
Graves are understood to be protecting parts of the
line near Vladivostok, and also on the section around Verchne
Udinsk. There is also understood to be a small body of American
troops at Harbin. The exact location from time to time of American
troops is, however, subject to change by the direction of Gen. Graves.
The instructions to Gen.
Graves direct him not to interfere in Russian
affairs, but to support Mr. Stevens wherever necessary. The Siberian Railway is
not only the main artery for transportation in Siberia, but is the
only open access to European Russia to-day. The population of
Siberia, whose resources have been almost exhausted by the long
years of war and the chaotic conditions which have existed there,
can be protected from a further period of chaos and anarchy only by
the restoration and maintenance of traffic on the Siberian
Railway.
Partisan bands under leaders having no settled connection with any
organized government, and bands under leaders whose allegiance to
any settled authority is apparently temporary and transitory, are
constantly menacing the operation of the railway and the safety of
its permanent structures.
The situation of the people of Siberia meantime is that they have no
shoes or warm clothing; they are pleading for agricultural machinery
and for many of the simpler articles of commerce upon which their
own domestic economy depends and which are necessary to fruitful and
productive industry among them. Having contributed their quota to
the Russian armies which fought the Central Empires for three and
one-half years, they now look to the Allies and the United States
for economic assistance.
The population of western Siberia and the forces of Admiral Kolchak are entirely
dependent upon these railways.
The Russian authorities in this country have succeeded in shipping
large quantities of Russian supplies to Siberia, and the Secretary
of War is now contracting with the great cooperative societies which
operate throughout European and Asiatic Russia to ship further
supplies to meet the needs of the civilian population. The Kolchak Government is also
endeavoring to arrange for the purchase of medical and other Red
Cross supplies from the War Department, and the American Red Cross
is itself attempting the forms of relief for which it is organized.
All elements of the population in Siberia look to the United States
for assistance. This assistance can not be given to the population
of Siberia, and ultimately to Russia, if the purpose entertained for
two years to restore railway traffic is abandoned. The presence of
American troops is a vital element in this effort. The services
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of Mr. Stevens depend upon it, and, a
point of serious moment, the plan proposed by Japan expressly
provides that Mr. Stevens and
all foreign railway experts shall be withdrawn when the troops are
withdrawn.
From these observations it will be seen that the purpose of the
continuance of American troops in Siberia is that we, with the
concurrence of the great allied powers, may keep open a necessary
artery of trade and extend to the vast population of Siberia the
economic aid essential to it in peace time, but indispensable under
the conditions which have followed the prolonged and exhausting
participation by Russia in the war against the Central Powers. This
participation was obviously of incalculable value to the allied
cause, and in a very particular way commends the exhausted people
who suffered from it to such assistance as we can render to bring
about their industrial and economic rehabilitation.
Very respectfully, yours,
