Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/31
Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, May 24th, 1919, at 4 p.m.
C. F. 31.
- Present:—United States of America. President Wilson.—British Empire. The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.—France. M. Clemenceau.—Italy. M. Orlando.—Japan. Viscount Chinda.
| Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B. | } | Secretaries |
| Count Aldrovandi. | ||
| M. Saburi. | ||
| Prof. P. J. Mantoux—Interpreter | ||
Policy toward Russia.
1. The Council had under consideration a draft despatch for Admiral Koltchak prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr at the request of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. (Appendix I).88
President Wilson explained to Viscount Chinda that he and his colleagues had felt some misgivings lest Admiral Koltchak might be under reactionary influences which might result in a reversal of the popular revolution in Russia. They also feared a Military Dictatorship based on reactionary principles, which would not be popular in Russia and might lead to further bloodshed and revolution. This despatch had been prepared for consideration in order to lay down the conditions of support for Admiral Koltchak and the groups working with him at Archangel and in South Russia. Should Admiral Koltchak accept the conditions, he would continue to receive the countenance and support of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, otherwise he would not. The substance of the [Page 362] document was contained in the six conditions laid down in the last half.
Viscount Chinda said that he had only received the document a short time before leaving the Embassy, and consequently had not been able to study it in detail. Unfortunately, Baron Makino was on a visit to the devastated regions, and would not be back until the following day. He would be very much obliged if he could be allowed time to discuss the despatch with his colleagues before giving a final reply. Nevertheless, speaking personally, he felt that in all probability his Government would be prepared to associate themselves in this despatch. His reason for this belief was a despatch which had recently been addressed by his Government to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington, London, Paris and Rome, which he proceeded to read not as a proposal, but only as a matter of information. The gist of this despatch was somewhat as follows: More than six months have elapsed since the provisional Government under Admiral Koltchak was organised at Omsk to restore order in Siberia. It has so far accomplished its extremely difficult task with admirable tact and determination. Its position had lately been strengthened by its recognition by other anti-Bolshevist groups in Russia as the central organisation in Russia. Having regard to the general desire to see the restoration of an orderly and efficient Government in Russia, and believing that official recognition will materially conduce to this end, the Japanese Government feels that the time has come for a provisional recognition to be accorded, on condition of a promise by the Omsk Government to safeguard the legitimate interests of the Allied and Associated Powers, and that it will assume responsibility for the debts and financial obligations of the former Russian Government.
The message concluded with an instruction to bring this declaration to the notice of the Governments to which the Ambassadors were respectively accredited, and to suggest to them that the question might conveniently be discussed among their delegates at Paris. On concluding the reading of this despatch Viscount Chinda remarked that the policy in the draft despatch which had been handed to him seemed to be a preliminary step towards the policy proposed by the Japanese Government. This was the reason for his confidence that the Japanese Government would accept it. Nevertheless, he would like to discuss the matter with his colleagues.
One point of detail in the dispatch to which he wished to draw attention was the following statement:
“Finally, that they abide by the declaration made by Admiral Koltchak on November 27th, 1918, in regard to Russia’s national debts.”
He asked what the declaration was to which this referred.
[Page 363]Mr. Lloyd George, who had sent for the document containing the declaration, read the following:
[Here follows telegram from Mr. Klyuchnikov to the Ambassador in Paris, dated November 27, 1918, quoted ante, p. 356.]
(Sir Maurice Hankey undertook to send a copy to Viscount Chinda.)
Viscount Chinda supposed that the responsibility for sending supplies to Russia would be divided between the various Governments according to their respective capacity.
Mr. Lloyd George said that up to now Great Britain had supplied the great bulk of the war material. He would be very glad to adopt Viscount Chinda’s proposal, as then the United States of America would have to supply the greater part.
Viscount Chinda said he had only mentioned it because of the limited resources of Japan for such supplies.
President Wilson said that this was a matter for Congress. He hoped, however, he might induce Congress to take a share when the whole matter was explained to them.
Mr. Lloyd George said that substantially the conditions in this dispatch had been read to the British Trades Unionists, who had been satisfied on the whole.
Viscount Chinda then drew attention to the following passage in the despatch:
“They are therefore disposed to assist the Government of Admiral Koltchak and his Associates with munitions, supplies, food, and the help of such as may volunteer for their service, to establish themselves as the Government of All Russia,” etc.
He thought that Japan, having a standing army, might find it difficult strictly to conform to the letter of this proposal.
President Wilson said he did not understand this phrase to mean Government help. It had not been in contemplation to send formed troops. His interpretation of the words was that it meant such individuals as might volunteer.
Mr. Lloyd George said the phrase had been inserted to meet the case of Great Britain. There was a very strong feeling against sending forces to Russia, and it was necessary to give guarantees to the soldiers that they would not be sent. Nevertheless, a good many men in the British Army had volunteered to go to Russia to take part in the operations; indeed, sufficient numbers had volunteered to supply the Archangel force. That was the reason for this provision.
Viscount Chinda said it would be very difficult for the Japanese Government to undertake their help in that sense. There were technical difficulties in the way of employing Japanese forces as volunteers. They could only send regular troops.
[Page 364]President Wilson said Mr. Lloyd George’s interpretation showed that he had not read it aright. He understood it had been agreed that the Allied and Associated forces should be withdrawn from Archangel.
Mr. Lloyd George said that the difficulty in withdrawing the men who had volunteered from England was that they were mostly men in technical services, such as artillery and aircraft, who could not well be spared. If they were withdrawn, it would place both the Archangel forces and Denekin in great difficulties.
Viscount Chinda said that the Japanese forces in Siberia were regulars, and they could not be converted into volunteers.
President Wilson said that the answer was that the United States and Japanese troops who were in the rearward services were not affected. This phrase only concerned the troops taking part in regular operations. The United States and Japanese forces were on the lines of communication. He suggested that the difficulty should be met by the substitution of some such words as the following:
“Such other help as may prove feasible.”
Mr. Lloyd George said that he thought the phrase had better be left out rather than amended.
(It was agreed that the words: “and the help of such as may volunteer for their service”, should be omitted.)
M. Clemenceau said that he learnt that the Japanese had furnished a considerable amount of munitions to Admiral Koltchak, but he could not specify the exact amount.
Mr. Lloyd George said that on the whole he thought it would be better to omit the following words from the second paragraph of the letter:
“The total cost of which exceeds £100,000,000.”
(It was agreed to omit the above words, and to substitute the following:
“at a very considerable cost”.)
Conclusion: (It was agreed that the draft despatch should be provisionally approved, subject to the above corrections, but that no action should be taken until it had received the formal approval of the Japanese Delegation.
Viscount Chinda undertook to notify Sir Maurice Hankey if the despatch was approved, and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed in that event to submit a copy for signature by the representatives of the Five Powers, after which it would be dispatched in their name to Admiral Koltchak by M. Clemenceau.)
[Page 365]The Military Situation in Siberia
2. (Colonel Kisch was introduced.)
Colonel Kisch gave a description with a map of the military situation in Siberia. He explained that Admiral Koltchak’s main operations were on his northern wing with the immediate object of effecting a junction at Kotlas with the forces based on Archangel. His subsequent objective would be Viatka. The Bolshevists had been forced back in this district, and, in order to meet the menace, had withdrawn 20,000 men from opposite the forces at Archangel. With these reinforcements they would be able to oppose Koltchak’s 36,000 men on his northern wing with about double strength, though the morale of the Bolshevist troops, who had been severely handled, was low. The Bolshevists had countered this attack by Admiral Koltchak by a counter-attack against his southern wing, where they had made a total advance in the region of Samara, which had been threatened by Koltchak, of some 60 miles. Denekin was creating a diversion to check this counter-attack by an advance towards Tzaritzin, and Admiral Koltchak was putting in his last reserves to check this Bolshevist advance, and meanwhile was pressing on in the north. On the west the Esthonians had made a considerable advance, and, if aided by a rising in Petrograd, might even hope to capture that city. The inhabitants in the districts recently overrun by Admiral Koltchak had received him favourably. In the northern part of Russia there was close affinity between the population west of the Urals and the Siberian population, but before long Koltchak, if he continued his successes, would be entering the really Bolshevist regions of Russia.
(Colonel Kisch then withdrew.)
The next stage in Russian Policy
3. Mr. Lloyd George said that if a satisfactory answer was received from Koltchak, the following decisions would have to be taken:
- (1)
- Whether the Allied and Associated Powers should confine themselves to rendering him assistance.
- (2)
- Whether they should recognise the Omsk Government as the Government for the area occupied by Koltchak’s troops.
- (3)
- Whether the Omsk Government should be recognised as representing the whole of Russia.
President Wilson said that he hoped, before Koltchak’s reply was received, to have Mr. Morris’s report.
[Page 366]Mr. Lloyd George suggested that someone ought to be sent to see Denekin.
. . . . . . .