Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/20
Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, May 20th, 1919, at 11 a.m.
C. F. 20
- Present.—United States of America. President Wilson.—British Empire. Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.—France. M. Clemenceau.—Italy. H. E. M. Orlando.
| Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B. | } | Secretaries |
| Count Aldrovandi | ||
| Prof. P. J. Mantoux. | Interpreter |
. . . . . . .
The Bolshevist’s reply to Dr. Nansen
7. The Council had before them a copy of the reply by the Bolshevists78 to Dr. Nansen’s letter,79 together with a Memorandum agreed to by Mr. Hoover, Lord Robert Cecil, M. Clementel, and Professor Attolico, with a covering letter from Lord Robert Cecil to Sir Maurice Hankey.80 (Appendix 3.).
After a prolonged perusal of this document
M. Clemenceau said he did not see how any change could be made in what the Council had tried to do. There was no doubt that the Bolshevists were now going down hill. Dr. Nansen had suggested a humanitarian course, but Lenin was clearly trying to draw it into a political course.
President Wilson said that Lenin’s argument was that the price the Allied and Associated Powers were trying to exact for food was that their enemies should beat the Bolshevists by compelling the latter to stop fighting. What was really intended was to stop aggressive fighting by the Bolshevists, because this was inconsistent with food distribution. They were perfectly correct in claiming that the Allies were supporting Koltchak and Dennikin, and not putting pressure on them to stop fighting. Lenin’s argument was that for him to stop fighting was to sign his death warrant.
M. Clemenceau pointed out that Lenin was not in the hands of the Allies.
President Wilson replied that if supplies were stopped, Koltchak and Dennikin would have to stop fighting too.
M. Clemenceau said it was impossible to stop Lenin fighting, and his word could not be trusted.
[Page 352]President Wilson said he did not feel the same chagrin that he had formerly felt at having no policy in regard to Russia. It had been impossible to have a policy hitherto.
Mr. Lloyd George said there had been very little choice. There had been a lunatic revolution which certain persons, in whom little confidence was felt, were trying to squash. The only reason why the Allies had encouraged them was to prevent Germany from getting supplies. They were, however, now entitled to say, having supported us so far “you cannot leave us in the lurch.”
President Wilson said that the Americans had only gone to Siberia to get the Czechs out, and then the Czechs had refused to go.
Mr. Lloyd George said that his Government’s object had been to reconstitute the Eastern front. They had succeeded in doing this, though somewhat East of the line on which they had hoped to establish it. Nevertheless, the reconstitution of the front did prevent the Germans from getting supplies, with which they might have broken the blockade. The feeling in Great Britain was that it was impossible now to leave these people in the lurch.
President Wilson said that at least pledges could be exacted for further support.
M. Clemenceau fully agreed.
Mr. Lloyd George agreed, and said it could be done in either of two ways:
- (1)
- By a formal dispatch;
- (2)
- By summoning the representatives of the various Russian groups now in Paris and putting the conditions to them.
President Wilson preferred the first proposal. The second would be contrary to the idea that had been at the basis of the Prinkipo scheme, namely, that it would not be fair to hear one party without hearing the other. His view was that a formal demand and notice ought to be sent to the various Russian groups. He had himself sent something that was almost equivalent to this, as he felt he was entitled to do.
(After some discussion it was agreed that Mr. Philip Kerr should be asked to prepare a draft for the consideration of the Council.)
Mr. Kerr was sent for. While awaiting Mr. Kerr
President Wilson read extracts from a document which had been alluded to at a discussion on the previous day, signed by M. Kerensky and some of his friends,81 and which contained a number of proposals, including the following:
- (i)
- That the Powers should only help the various Russian groups on certain fundamental conditions for the establishing of Russia on a democratic basis with a constituent [Page 353] assembly, and Governments which declined to agree should not be supported.
- (ii)
- That as a Constituent Assembly could clearly not be called at the present time, Regional Assemblies should be elected on a democratic basis for the re-establishment of Local Government.
- (iii)
- That a representative mission should be sent by the Great Powers to Russia to give assurance of sympathy and assistance.
- (iv)
- That proposals for supplying food were harmful.
These proposals in short, President Wilson continued, were that the Powers should obtain an assurance from each group that it would be united with the other groups to form an all Russian Government on a constituent basis, and that in the meanwhile each group should do what it could in its own area.
Mr. Lloyd George was afraid of splitting up Russia.
President Wilson said it was merely proposing to substitute a democratic for an autocratic basis.
(After some further discussion Mr. Kerr entered.)
President Wilson informed Mr. Kerr that the Council desired to make a further effort with Russia along the lines of definite assurance to the several groups as to what they were aiming at. They had been reading a document prepared by certain Russian groups in Paris who, though anti-Bolshevist, were suspicious of reactionary tendencies among the groups fighting the Bolshevists. These suggested that pledges should be demanded from the various groups fighting the Bolshevists to establish a government on a democratic basis. In the meanwhile it was proposed to establish a democratic Government in these Regions by setting up Provincial Central Assemblies. The idea of the Council was to embody these demands in a message to the several Governments, and they hoped Mr. Kerr would prepare a draft for their consideration.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the question of the Baltic Provinces had not been discussed. All the other Russian groups fighting the Bolshevists were violently opposed to any recognition of Esthonia and Latvia and the other Baltic provinces. They alleged that to recognise them would be to tear up Russia and to bar access to the sea.
Mr. Kerr asked what promise was to be given to the various Russian groups to encourage them to give these undertakings.
Mr. Lloyd George said it was not a question of promising more, but of continuing the assistance which was now given.
President Wilson said that the dispatch should intimate that without satisfactory guarantees no further help would be given.
[Page 354]Mr. Kerr asked if they were to accept the frontiers laid down by the League of Nations.
Mr. Lloyd George said they must.
President Wilson said there was no other solution. He then produced a letter from Mr. Hoover on the subject of the Baltic Provinces,82 where there was an appalling shortage of food. This was due, according to Mr. Hoover, not to lack of financial or shipping facilities, but to the absence of order. He suggested that enough naval force should be given to provide for the protection of relief in the coast towns, and for its distribution along the coast. In this way the established governments should be helped to preserve order. The situation was so appalling from the humanitarian point of view, that he hoped the Council would be willing to hear a deputation composed of the British and United States Naval authorities and himself.
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that in the first instance, Mr. Hoover should discuss the matter with the Admirals.
(This was agreed to.)
(Mr. Kerr withdrew with instructions to draft a letter of [for] consideration.)
. . . . . . .