Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia

Paris Peace Conference 861.00/598

Memorandum of conversation with Mr. Alexander Kerenski [at Paris], May 4, 1919⁶¹

Paris, May 4, 1919

1. Kerenski is convinced that the Bolshevists are just about at the end of their rope, and that their complete overthrow is only a matter of a few months now. He believes that Admiral Kolchak will succeed them as master of Russia, and his greatest fear is that Kolchak will inaugurate a regime hardly less sanguinary and repressive than that of the Bolshevists. He feels that the only solution of the Russian question that lies in the true interests of Russia and of the world is the restoration of a genuinely democratic government, based upon a coalition of all parties who stand for the principles of the March Revolution of 1917, (i. e. excluding the Bolshevists at one extreme and the monarchical reactionaries on the other).

2. Kerenski affirms that the French and British governments, or at least their representatives in Siberia, have constantly been aiding and abetting the reactionary elements around Kolchak. He believes that the Allied and Associated Governments ought to have a united policy towards Russia, a policy in accordance with the principles laid down in the invitation to the Prinkipo conference, a policy of supporting a democratic coalition and of working against the extremists on either side. He suggests that it is only the United States that can take the lead in establishing such a united Russian policy.

3. As the chief feature of the Russian policy which he would like to see followed by the Entente and ourselves, he suggests the following:

(a) That we should inform Kolchak that we were disposed to recognize his government as the government of Russia, but only on condition that he give proof of his democratic principles by the following measures:

1) Restoring the civic liberties, the Zemstvo and municipal organizations and the Siberian parliament.

2) By reorganizing his cabinet on a coalition basis.

3) By promising to call a Constituent Assembly for all Russia as soon as that becomes at all feasible.

4) By publicly guaranteeing that, until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, the peasants are to remain in possession of the land they now hold, and the workingmen are not to be deprived of those liberties (association, strike, etc.), which they won through the March Revolution.

(b) If Kolchak, when sounded through diplomatic channels, declares himself ready to accept such conditions, Kerenski thinks the Allied Governments ought at once to recognize him and his friends as “the Provisional Government of Russia until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.”

61. The authorship of this memorandum is not indicated on the file copy.