861.00/4332: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received April 20, 3:13 a.m.]
Your April 16 [14?], midnight,58 our April 16, 11 a.m.58 Harris message follows…
[Page 334]“April 2nd, 11 p.m. Pursuant to instructions from the Department Consul General Harris has been in conference with Admiral Rodgers, General Graves, Mr. Smith of Railroad Commission and Consul Caldwell of Vladivostok.
We are in accord and of opinion as follows: that the liberal movement as headed by Kolchak is increasing in strength. Indications are that Kolchak is inclined to approach the center parties to make concessions to them and to unite with them in a comparatively liberal form of government. His influence would be extended were he to promise a constitutional assembly to the peoples but sees at present as a chief necessity only the subdual of Bolsheviki and although well disposed to civic institutions regards a pledge to them as of less immediate importance. Kolchak seems sincerely committed to the good of Russia reorganizing policies of liberal character with possible personal preference for constitutional monarchy rather than for republic, but not at all in favor of old type of government. Kolchak probably represents the most acceptable type of men Russia has available but we do not believe him a great national leader.
The really reactionary associates immediately about Kolchak are not of primary importance although it is perhaps not advisable for him to seek an immediate break with them. He has recently disavowed the actions of some of the more important reactionary leaders who claim his countenancing in eastern Siberia. The Zemstvos are not so favorably disposed towards Kolchak government, for the Cossacks under Semenoff and Kalmikoff are reactionary and violent, and the people are not sure that Kolchak himself is sufficiently liberal. Zemstvo representatives eastern Siberia say that Kolchak has reduced their authority.
The betterment of the whole people is essentially dependent on economic prosperity induced through operation of railroads and elimination of Bolsheviks, who seek to rule for their own profit by terror, violence, and destruction, and through the prevention of arbitrary acts of violence by reactionary Cossacks in the name of order. The Siberian situation would be improved,
- 1st,
- if after enunciation of satisfactory liberal policies, some form of encouragement yet not reaching formal recognition as de facto government could be given by Allied Powers to the liberal movement now headed by Kolchak. We are now actually dealing with Kolchak on railway business and must continue to do so.
- 2d,
- some form of financial and material support is necessary. A loan is preferable to a gift, although there is some chance of losing it. If arms and supplies are given it should be done openly and by agreement of the powers. Japan’s secret gift of arms of Semenoff and Kalmikoff promoted reactionary discord and tended to drive [Page 335] peasantry into control of opposite party and violence when they only asked be free from oppression.
- 3d,
- agreement on part of Allies to refrain from assisting or supporting any of the Cossack factions now embarrassing Kolchak.
- 4th,
- adoption of every means, short of force, to weaken strength and influence of reactionary Cossack leaders. The Cossack people generally of Siberia are essentially the same as the rest of peasantry and desire stable government and personal security.
- 5th,
- development of industrial and civic prosperity by prompt and efficient operation of railroads.
- 6th,
- stabilization of currency.
Japanese military authorities have been fomenting trouble in various directions as set forth in recent reports by General Graves to Department and the conduct of the Japanese troops in Siberia has not been in accord with policies of the United States but within past few days Japanese command has expressed its intention to conform more to American policy and [to combat?] Bolshevism by creation of economic prosperity and to use physical force against any Russian party only when such party interferes with railroad or attacks Japanese troops or for [sic] cantonments.59
The Inter-Allied Railway Committee has been acting harmoniously and the best promise of success in pacifying Siberia is through smooth working of railway protected by Allied forces against lawless attacks of any minority party of violence. Not only is there divergence of views between the Japanese military party and the present Japanese Government but it seems probable that both the English and French Military representatives in Siberia personally hold very reactionary views as to Russian politics and are not in harmony with the representatives of their own Governments on the Inter-Allied Committee, consequently the Government[s] of England and France have not had clear-cut view as to the situation here. Indications are that the representatives of England and France, especially France, on the Inter-Allied Committee wish to delay action by the military committee until their home governments are as well informed and both powers have granted authority of [to?] the civil representatives on the railway committee to require their members of the military committee to conform to the general policy as expressed by the Inter-Allied Railway Committee.
The matter is one to be settled in its broad lines of policy by agreement between the Allied powers party to the railroad agreement.
Apparently if the powers will unify the expression of views by their respective representatives, the Inter-Allied Railway Committee [Page 336] will be able to arrive at harmonious decisions promotive of their law, order, good feeling, and prosperity in Siberia. Harris.”