A résumé of the Note was transmitted to the Department by my telegram No.
1203 of to-day, 12 noon,53 and a copy of the Note has been forwarded to the
American Commission to Negotiate Peace under cover of despatch No. 83 of
March 1st.
[Enclosure]
The British Acting Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs (
Curzon
) to the Ambassador in Great Britain (
Davis
)
No. 29173/W/57
London
,
February 26,
1919
.
Your Excellency: Now that the negotiations
for the conclusion of an agreement for the re-organization of the
Siberian Railway have been satisfactorily concluded,54 and that the
settlement of this long disputed question is in prospect, His
Majesty’s Government feel it incumbent upon them to set forth, for
the information of the United States Government, the factors which
seem to them to govern the Siberian problem as it presents itself to
day.
The conclusion of the Armistice in November last may be regarded as
having justified the policy which prompted the Allied Governments
originally to decide upon the despatch of forces to the Far East.
The danger of the extension of enemy activities to Siberia was
definitely averted and Siberia was saved from the dangers which
threatened it from that direction.
Unfortunately this happy consummation did not dispose of the
difficult situation in which the Allied Governments found themselves
as a result of their action. If the German danger had been disposed
of, a state of affairs had arisen which involved no less
watchfulness on the part of the Allied Governments. The Armistice
did not in any way affect the activities of the Soviet Government of
Russia which continued their efforts to overwhelm the friendly
Russian forces opposed to them and to bring the whole country under
their disastrous sway, and it was with the situation thus created
that the Allied Governments were called upon to cope.
This situation has been complicated firstly by the lack of any
decision on the part of the Allied Governments as to the attitude to
be adopted to the Russian Soviet Government, and secondly, by the
divergent interests of the various Russian groups in Siberia. Both
these factors have contributed to complicate the task of those who
have been dealing with the Siberian problem on the spot with the
consequent disorganization which all competent observers agree has
been reached in practically every branch of Siberian affairs.
[Page 330]
In the view of His Majesty’s Government the paramount consideration
has been the commitment to the Russian forces opposing the
Bolsheviks which has resulted from co-operation with them, from the
moment when troops were first despatched to Siberia, and the
impossibility of withdrawing support from those forces at the
critical stage in their operations, simply for the reason that the
objects, in which the Allied Governments were primarily interested,
had been achieved.
For this reason, without entering into the merits of the disputes
between the various Russian groups in Siberia, they have, without of
course according formal recognition, consistently supported the
Government of Admiral
Kolchak which is established west of Lake Baikal,
feeling that one of the first essentials necessary for the
establishment of confidence among the troops operating at the front
was that there should be an ordered form of Government in their
immediate rear, on which reliance could be placed, and His Majesty’s
Government have correspondingly discouraged any action which to them
seemed likely to interfere with this end. The activities of General
Semenoff at Chita, and other Russian leaders elsewhere, have in
particular been regarded by His Majesty’s Government with especial
disfavour, and they have done everything possible to avert the
dangers arising from their action.
It seemed to His Majesty’s Government essential, that whatever the
eventual outcome of the deliberations in Paris as to the ultimate
policy to be adopted in respect of the Russian Soviet Government
might be, nothing should be done by the Allied Governments in
Siberia in the meanwhile, to allow the situation to develop
adversely from the point of view of the friendly Russian forces and
that everything should be done to maintain their efficiency.
If the United States Government agree in the foregoing estimate of
the present situation in Siberia, His Majesty’s Government feel that
they can rely on them to co-operate in taking all measures which may
be necessary to secure the immediate objects in view, and as support
of the Government of Admiral
Kolchak as a temporary measure seems to His Majesty’s
Government a vital condition of maintaining matters on a relatively
secure basis, they hope the United States Government will agree that
it is necessary to prevent any steps being taken by Russian elements
hostile to that Government, which may impair its usefulness.
I have [etc.]
