861.00/3628 a: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

188. For the Secretary of State:

There has been considerable discussion in the Senate in regard to the Russian situation. Some Senators are demanding that the troops should be withdrawn; others are asking what policy should [Page 324] be pursued in Russia, and some are disposed to urge that Russia be allowed to work out its own salvation, in other words, that the Bolsheviks be let alone. I think the Hearst papers and Chicago Daily News, and others, are going to take the line last mentioned. Frankly, I am disturbed over the situation. It is obvious that great difficulty would be encountered at home by any of the Allied governments sending troops to Russia. It is also obvious that without support the present Expedition at Archangel ought to be withdrawn.

Personally, I feel that if some arrangement could be made to protect the Russians in the Archangel district, this Expedition should be withdrawn.

In regard to Siberia, the situation is difficult. We have for some time been insisting that the railways should be turned over to Stevens.44 Stevens has now signified his willingness to go ahead immediately with the plan evolved by Mr. Morris with the Japanese Government, and as I telegraphed you yesterday, Mr. Morris has informed the Japanese Government that we approved the arrangement he has secured. By forcing these negotiations, we have prevented the adoption of any other plan for more than two months and have recently blocked the counter proposal made by Colonel Jack.45 During this period the organization of the railroads have [has] steadily gone from bad to worse. If we withdraw the troops from Siberia, it would, in my opinion, be impossible to keep Stevens and his people there. Moreover, the plan upon which we have been working, and which is now approved, contemplates that at least some American troops shall remain in Siberia. If we withdraw Stevens too, we would be open to the charge that we had blocked the British and Japanese from putting through some plan for the improvement of railroad communications. I am not arguing in favor of staying in Siberia, but merely putting up the questions as I see them.

It has been impossible to get any concerted action in Siberia thus far, as the British have felt we have been playing hot and cold. As you know the Japanese are now withdrawing about half their troops, leaving apparently from thirty to fifty thousand in Northern Manchuria and Eastern Siberia. Charles Crane who has just returned from Russia said there is no possibility of accomplishing anything through Siberia as the distances are too great. I do not agree with him entirely. There is no free access through the Black Sea or the Baltic as yet to European Russia, consequently the Siberian Railway [Page 325] is the only line of communication to European Russia as well as to Siberia. Of course we have an absolute obligation to the Czechs and some obligation to the Russians who have sided with the Czechs. If the decision is to withdraw, it seems to me imperative to have some agreement with the Bolsheviks in order to protect those who have assisted us in these operations. Without an agreement, there is no question as to the fate of these people; even with an agreement, which would mean we would have to deal with the Bolsheviks, the result is doubtful.

I am merely putting up these suggestions for your consideration as I am sure careful discussion of Russia must be imminent.

In your discussions, has it been suggested that one of the solutions of the supply problems in Europe lies with the restoration of normal conditions in Russia, especially in regard to the export of grain, sugar, flax, oil and dairy products?

Polk
  1. See section on the Inter-Allied Agreement for Supervision of the Chinese Eastern and the Siberian Railways, ante, pp. 236 ff. See also Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. iii, pp. 239 ff.
  2. Col. Archibald Jack, in charge of the British Railway Mission in Siberia.