861.00/5612: Telegram
The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State
[Received 4:14 a.m.]
5106. Reference your 3608, October 13th[30th], 3635, November 1st, 3658, November 3d,28 and 3660, November 4th.
We have discussed the question with Osusky, chief of the Czecho-Slovak Peace Delegation in Paris. We will also further discuss the matter with Beneš who we understand is to return to Paris shortly. We believe, however, that Beneš will entirely approve Osusky’s views.
Osusky states that public opinion in Czecho-Slovakia has for some time past been stirred up by what it considers bad faith on the part of the Allies in regard to the position of the Czecho-Slovakian troops in Siberia and that on this account the Czecho-Slovakian Government could not afford to even advance this proposal to their troops in Siberia. The present feeling of bad faith according to Osusky results from the fact that prior to the signing of the armistice the French proposed to return the Czecho-Slovakian contingent from Siberia to the western front. [This] movement was deferred, according to Osusky, upon urgent Allied [re]presentation that general military action was necessary against Russia and that the Allies for this purpose contemplated directing simultaneously military pressure south from Archangel and north from Black Sea and that Czecho-Slovakian cooperation in this joint military action was necessary west from Siberia. Osusky states that Czecho-Slovakian people have felt very keenly that notwithstanding the foregoing general understanding the Czecho-Slovakian people have first seen the French troops withdrawn from Odessa and finally the Allied military representation in north Russia withdrawn leaving the Czecho-Slovakian and other smaller central European contingents alone on the Siberian front with the Russians. In view of this situation Osusky believes that an effort today on the part of the Allied and Associated Powers to force the Czecho-Slovakian Government into maintaining its troops on the Siberian front against the Bolshevists might lead to disastrous results. Osusky further advises that reported low state of morale of Czecho-Slovakian and other central European military contingents now in Siberia due to firm conviction on the part of these troops that Principal Allied and Associated Powers are pursuing no definite policy with respect to Russia and that this opinion of these troops is reflected in the home countries.
[Page 313]Rathbone has already advised Treasury Department of his efforts to get definite agreement from British for them to advance half the total credits necessary for the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovakian, Polish, Serbian and Roumanian troops from Siberia. Rathbone hopes for an early decision in these matters which will be communicated to the Department.
With the limited knowledge we have of the actual state of affairs in Siberia it is difficult for us to suggest the best line of action to be taken in Siberia. … From the purely political aspect of the case, we are of the opinion that it would be highly inadvisable in view of the temper of the Czecho-Slovakian people, which [admittedly] has some basis of reason, to further endeavor to apply pressure outlined in your 3635 of October [November] 1st. Physical reasons will make it impossible to accomplish very prompt evacuation of friendly troops from Siberia and it is believed that better results would be accomplished by actually commencing repatriation of central European troops from Siberia in accordance with announced decision of the Supreme Council and to leave the augmentation of the troops on the Siberian Bolshevist front to recruitment of volunteers from these contingents now in Siberia.