861.00/4954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan ( Morris ), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State

Our second conference4 met on July 27th and included military as well as diplomatic representatives. General Graves accompanied me. We confined our discussion to the present condition of the Czech forces in Siberia and finally agreed on the following statement of the essential facts.

1.
According to the information which the members of the conference could secure as to the state of the Czech troops in Siberia, they are prepared to take as decisive, and confirmed by their own observations, the opinion of General Janin that, except a small number of soldiers who may eventually volunteer, the Czech Army is not in a position to proceed to the front or to continue the permanent guard of the railway, and will have to be evacuated gradually via Vladivostok. This conclusion has been reached viewing the situation from the standpoint of the actual morale of the Czech troops. It is believed that they will not fight their way to Archangel or to the Black Sea, irrespective of whether such will be the decision of the Czech Government or whether British troops would be maintained at Archangel to secure the junction. As to the possible consequences that would follow if the Czech troops could not be evacuated from Siberia in the course of the coming winter, the Russian Government has expressed its conviction that considerable danger has to be anticipated both for the Czech Army itself and for the Russian situation.
2.
The Russian Government has not at its disposal at present the contingents necessary for the protection of the line, the whole of its army having to be concentrated on the Ural front.
3.
As there is no possibility of having Russian troops to defend the railway, it may be, if no foreign detachments were sent to take charge of the guard after the evacuation of the Czechs, a most critical situation would arise endangering the security of the line of communication between Vladivostok and Omsk, and practically cutting the Ural front from the Pacific.
4.
The quantity of troops necessary for such a guard is estimated to be of three divisions of infantry, 36,000 men, one division of cavalry, 3,000 men, and three batteries of artillery, total about 40,000 men. The guard of the line cannot be limited to a defense against possible attacks, but involves also eventual expeditions inside the [Page 293] country to pursue and disperse the elements of disorder wherever they concentrate with a view to attacking the railway. The region and necessity of such expeditions should be determined by the commanding officer in charge of the guard.
5.
The Russian Government will provide for the necessary barracks to be ready about first of October.
6.
Competent military authorities could determine the subdivision of the line to be guarded into portions and will elaborate regulations for the guard. It is stated in general that three zones have to be contemplated requiring about one division each: Irkutsk to Krasnoyarsk, name used above to the Taiga, name used above to Omsk.

I believe that this is a fair and moderate statement of the facts and they lead me to but one conclusion: The Kolchak movement cannot be effectively forwarded during the coming winter, and the Allied operation of the railways will not be possible beyond Irkutsk, unless the Associated Governments are prepared to supply additional troops to replace the Czechs.

Assuming the accuracy of the statements of the Allied representatives here, it would appear that, as a result of the war, the only countries that are in a position even to consider sending troops for the present are the United States and Japan. If the Department finds the assumption to be correct, I submit for the consideration of the Department my earnest conviction that no arrangement with Japan will prove satisfactory which does not provide that the United States shall contribute at least one half of the additional troops. I state my reasons for this conviction:

1.
There is a fundamental difference in purpose governing the Siberian policy of the two Governments. The Terauchi ministry, which was military, clearly planned to use the joint expedition to Vladivostok last summer as an excuse to take possession of the Chinese Eastern Railway and thus dominate northern Manchuria and eastern Siberia. The direct method of accomplishing the purpose failed, but the purpose remains. There is in Japan a group which recognizes the inconsistency of such a purpose with the present condition of the world. With this group Hara sympathizes in principle, but is hampered in action by the still powerful military control. All the evidence convinces me that Japan is pursuing in Siberia the same methods which have produced such tragic results in China . . . . The Seminoff controversy is, as I see it, simply a sordid conspiracy to practice extortion upon the people of Siberia through control of the customs service at Manchuria Station and of distribution at Chita. We cannot meet this conspiracy and enforce the “Open Door”, necessary for the economic salvation of Russia, merely by frank discussions and formal protests in Tokyo. We must [Page 294] speak our determined purpose in the only language the Japanese military clique can understand. This will not lead to friction; on the contrary it will bring about a better understanding. We shall not only help the liberals in Russia; we shall render an even greater service to the liberal and progressive movement in Japan.
2.
The presence of a substantial number of American troops will serve to impress upon the Cossack leaders and other reactionaries … the character and extent of the protection we are prepared to give to American agencies.
3.
If our Government decides to adopt a comprehensive plan of help for Russia, including the further supervision of the railways, control over the distribution of supplies, Red Cross work, educational and agricultural assistance, we must have an adequate military police to protect these agencies until better order prevails. Experience has shown that we cannot rely on Japanese support or protection, for the obvious reason that the majority opinion in Japan is at present jealous of and antagonistic to such efforts.
4.
Such aid as we have given to Siberia in the past year has been possible only because of the presence of the Czechs. In my judgment it is not fair to ask them to remain longer; they are rapidly breaking under the mental and physical strain put upon them by years of separation from home and family, continuous exertion, and unwholesome conditions of living.

I submit that we should assume our full share of the protection which any further effort to help Russia necessarily involves et cetera.

Morris
  1. See telegrams from the Ambassador in Japan, temporarily at Omsk, July 27, 4 p.m., and July 31, 11 p.m., pp. 396 and 269.