861.00/4193a: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
1363. General Graves telegraphs the following information received from Major Slaughter at Omsk dated March 23.
“Czech staff and all leaders badly worried at attitude of Czech Army toward remaining in Russia. Officers desire to remain as long as needed and be guided by the Allies and their needs but the Army desires only to go home regardless of all other considerations. Unless steps be taken to meet this situation the Czechs are likely to prove a menace rather than a help in Siberia. Should Allies require Czechs to guard railroad lines I think they will be disappointed in results. Czech Army filled with Bolshevik propagandists. Officers themselves do not agree. Resistance to abolition of soldier committee only a subterfuge for agitation and revolt. Soldiers blame Allies for not sending them home. If asked to guard the lines they may be expected to passively obstruct traffic and countenance local disorder. Czechs say: ‘If we could be given official assurance that [Page 280] we would be sent home as ships become available agitation would stop and order and assistance on railroads might be expected.’
To send them all out in month or two without replacing them would be disastrous to this government which would collapse and Bolshevism return worse than before. To send them out slowly would permit this government to assume control and take over their duties. Unless Czechs change their attitude towards Russians many combats are likely to result. Allies can only restrain Czechs by promise to send them home. Every event would seem to confirm this.”
The Department is inclined to think that measures to commence to repatriate the Czechs should be taken promptly and a public statement issued to that effect. The difficulties, however, are great. The tonnage situation renders transportation by sea from Vladivostok to Trieste certainly slow if not impracticable. To have them retrace their steps through European Russia would require some definite understanding with the Bolsheviki which might be difficult to obtain even if the Omsk authorities would consent to open the Volga front for that purpose. I shall be glad to know if the Mission can discuss this matter with the Czecho-Slovak representatives at Paris and advise the Department of the result.