861.77/655: Telegram
The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received February 1, 6:30 p.m.]
521. Department’s 391, dated January 24th, 3 p.m. and Department’s 392, January 24th, 4 p.m.45
The substance of these cables has received the careful consideration of Secretary Lansing and McCormick and the latter has discussed the matter generally [fully] with the President who approves and authorizes the following procedure:
You are requested to ask for a second [secret] hearing before such committee or committees in Congress as you think best. At this hearing you will state that it is the President’s wish that the Siberian situation and the activities of the administration in relation thereto be made known fully and frankly, though in strict confidence, to the members of these committees. You will then develop the strategic importance both from the point of view of Russia and of the United States of the Trans-Siberian Railway as being a principal means of access to and from the Russian people and as affording an opportunity for economic aid to Siberia where the people are relatively friendly and resistant to Bolshevik influence and where there are large bodies of Czech-Slovaks who rely upon our support as well as large numbers of enemy prisoners of war whose activities must be watched and in all cases [if necessary] controlled. The potential value of this railroad as a means for developing American commerce particularly from the west coast of the United States to Russia might be mentioned. You may then narrate in considerable detail the difficulties which we have had with Japan with reference to this railway and in particular the action of Japan in practically seizing the Chinese Eastern Railway, thereby in effect controlling all intercourse to and from Russia via the Pacific. You might mention the number of troops sent by Japan for the purpose and point out that such number was far in excess of that contemplated by the arrangement under which troops of the Associated Governments were landed in Siberia. The nature of the activities of Japan [Page 247] including disposition of their troops and Japanese commercial activities should then be referred to [followed by] a statement of the efforts of the Government of the United States to restore the railroad to a condition where it would not be exclusively dominated by any one power. … The conversations of the President and Secretary of State with the Japanese Ambassador, the negotiations of Ambassador Morris under instructions from the Department and the economic pressure applied by the War Trade Board46 may be referred to. You should then describe the successful conclusion of these efforts of the United States as evidenced by the arrangements for administration of the railway by Stevens as a Russian employee and the withdrawal of substantial numbers of Japanese troops. We feel that these proceedings and their conclusion can properly be described as a very important and constructive achievement which may be of inestimable value to the people of Russia and to the United States as well as the world in general, provided they are followed through, thereby giving practical effect to the principle of the open door. You will then point out that in order to give substance and permanence to the arrangement which has been reached, it will be necessary to devise a plan for the financing of the railway and that it is the view of the President that this financing should be regarded as a joint obligation of the interested Governments and that the President is prepared to propose [and endeavor] to secure agreement on such a plan [provided] it seems probable that Congress will be prepared to appropriate the funds necessary to permit the Government of the United States to deposit [carry out] its proportional share of any financing agreed to. You may add that if the disposition of the committees whom you will be addressing is favorable to such a plan, the President will as a provisional measure and as (indicated?) in Am[erican] mission 376, January 21st, arrange through the Russian Bureau, Incorporated, or through his special fund, for a limited temporary advance to support Stevens, pending the submission to Congress of a definite financial plan provided one can be agreed to. The consequence of failure to support Stevens, as indicated by Department’s 130 [113] January 6th,47 should be developed and the responsibility of Congress in connection therewith made clear. It is felt that it may be desirable that Woolley appear with you and state to the members of the committees the purposes and activities of the War Trade Board Russian Bureau, Incorporated, pointing out that these purposes and activities have from time to time been publicly announced and that the corporation does not constitute a secret instrumentality.
[Page 248]The foregoing is designed to indicate the spirit in which the President wishes the Siberian situation to be handled and you should not consider yourself bound to follow literally the suggestions made. It is desired that you treat the matter with the utmost frankness, giving all information at your disposal under, of course, a pledge of confidence.
It is desired that you cable as promptly as possible the attitude of the Congressional Committees and pending our hearing from you on this subject you are requested to hold in abeyance the giving of instructions to General Graves and the advance of money by the War Trade Board Corporation as suggested by Am[erican] mission 376, January 21.
We feel that it may be a wise practice to take Congress more into confidence on such matters and we at least desire to make the experiment in this case.