861.00/3724: Telegram
The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received 10:39 p.m.]
449. For Polk.
The action taken in regard to the Russian factions was the direct consequence of a recognition of the impossibility of military intervention. The evidence showed that there was no substantial hope of building up a Russian army and that even as auxiliaries they could not be relied on for continued efforts. Even those most insistent on intervention were doubtful as to whether Russian aid could be depended upon. The military authorities agreed that it would take at least 150,000 troops and probably many more. When the question was put to the powers represented in the Supreme War Council all declared that they could not send the necessary troops. … The President said that he did not believe that the American people would consent to sending our men there as no one could tell how long they would have to remain. Clemenceau and Orlando said the same thing. It is rumored on fairly good authority, though the story has not been published, that several thousand French troops threatened to revolt and raised the red flag on hearing that they were to be ordered to Russia.
In these circumstances the best and humane thing to do seemed to be to make an appeal of some sort to the warring elements to cease violence while the Peace Conference is in session. To dispose of [To do] this required some action looking toward a conference for mediation between the factions, otherwise the appeal would have no effect. It very probably will not accomplish anything but we could not do less than make an attempt to stay the slaughter and horror which the Russians are enduring. The only alternative since force was out of the question was to remain silent and let things take their course. That would have satisfied no one.
I am sending you this so you will understand the predicament we were in. You can use the information discreetly where you think it would do good and correct wrong impression.