861.00/3691: Telegram

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

469. From Ambassador Francis.24

“19, January 21, 7 p.m. Your 4157, January 20, 4 p.m.,25 through American Embassy, London, just received. Chicherin message26 from Government never recognized by us or any Allied Government nor any neutral except possibly Persia, is based on fallacy that it represented Russian people, which it never did. I refused recommending recognition notwithstanding importunities of Robins27 and some other Americans. As records show, I always maintain that Soviet Government’s object was world-wide social revolution and all their efforts directed to that end as subsequent developments confirm. That Lenin accepted German money which used as German agent to corrupt Russia was clearly established but he would likewise have taken American, British, or French money to accomplish the same end. Lenin is fanatic, openly avowing was trying experiment in government on Russia. Trotsky is an adventurer, saturated with personal ambition and wholly without conviction. I encouraged Soviet opposition to Central Empires until Brest peace when issued address endeavoring to arouse Russian spirit and saying America would not recognize such peace but still considered herself ally of the Russian people.28 For this, also for address to Russians July 4,29 German Government demanded of Central Soviet Government that I be sent out of Russia. In the meantime had left St. Petersburg February 27 on account of threatened German approach, stopped at Vologda where remained five months being subsequently joined [by] French, Italian, Belgian, Serbian Missions. My requests that American officers be sent to aid Trotsky in organizing army and that railroad engineers be sent from Vladivostok to me at [Page 28] Vologda had ulterior objects as records show.30 Copy sent to American Mission.

Answering Chicherin message, while first reason dissipated, it unquestionably existed when Allied troops sent into North Russia.

Second reason, while Soviet Government negotiating for retention supplies at Archangel it was removing such supplies at rate hundred cars daily and British and French assured me was breaking faith by doing so in addition to having repudiated obligations given for purchase of such supplies.

I refrained from participation in such negotiations as America had little if any supplies there. Undoubtedly Soviet Government would not negotiate for retention such supplies at Archangel or make any other promises for recognition.

Third reason, a few days after Mirbach’s assassination31 the Soviet Government wired Allied diplomats, Vologda, inviting or ordering them to Moscow and saying Radek sent Vologda to “execute” removal.32 Allied chiefs unanimously declined invitation or order saying if order was meant considered it offensive; furthermore, German press was charging Mirbach death to Allied instigation and demanding of Soviet Government that German and Austrian troops be permitted to come to Moscow for protection of their Embassies and Consulates. Ten days later, after midnight, July 23rd, I received, as dean of diplomatic corps, telegram from Chicherin urging Allied diplomats quit Vologda and saying another day might be too late. To this we replied had concluded to accept advice and leave Vologda requesting locomotive to convey special train on track Vologda to Archangel. When Chicherin heard we contemplated going Archangel, he wired going there meant leaving Russia. I replied repeating request stating would not leave Russia unless compelled by force and then absence would be temporary. Locomotive furnished after twenty-four hours’ delay and diplomatic corps arrived Archangel July 26th. When told by local Soviet and representative Central Soviet that it was waiting to convey us where we elected we replied refusing to embark before communicating with our Governments with which communication had been severed for three weeks or more. After some colloquy our decision was wired Soviet Government, Moscow, who replied communication impossible. We decided to go Kandalaksha, which occupied by Allied troops, if furnished additional steamer because one inadequate, additional steamer provided July 28th but many useless obstacles prevented [Page 29] clearing until 4 a.m., July 29th. Meantime we heard from credible sources that while Central and local Soviet professed willingness for our departure that Central Soviet was secretly urging local Soviet to detain us as possible hostages to prevent landing of Allied troops, which have heard since was their object in insisting on our removing to Moscow rather than regard for our safety. Local Soviet, however, was afraid to detain us as local anti-Bolshevik revolution was impending. This was not first evidence we had of Chicherin hypocrisy. Anti-Bolshevik revolution occurred August 2nd, Allied troops landed four hours later and Allied Missions returned to Archangel August 9th.

Fourth reason, while Czecho-Slovak detention no longer obtains, it was burning issue when Allied troops landed Archangel. Permitting Czecho-Slovaks to depart now no reason why Soviet Government be recognized and it should be remembered that when Czecho-Slovaks started leaving Russia they were promised safe-conduct with their arms and all Czechs’ trouble caused by treachery of Trotsky who issued secret order that they should not be permitted to leave without giving up their arms and when given up they should be detained notwithstanding.

Answering last reason, Allied missions had positive evidence that German-Austrian war prisoners were being armed and German officers were instructing Bolshevik forces. While German-Austrian prisoners may now be free to return home, fact remains that Bolsheviks are propagandizing among prisoners and offering every inducement to join Red Army. Probably Soviet Government did send communication written and verbal to us through Norwegian representatives that if American troops were withdrawn they would establish diplomatic relations, but that involved recognition of Bolshevik Government which neither we nor any other well-ordered Government could afford, as Bolshevik orators not only charged our Government with being capitalistic but openly advocated opposition to all organized government everywhere. I was compelled to leave Archangel for surgical operation November 6th but Soviet Government had already instituted reign of terror to maintain themselves in power. They were pillaging and murdering inoffensive civilians without trial and when could not find men were arresting wives, mothers, and sisters as hostages for appearance of men to serve in Red Army. I recommended weeks before leaving Archangel armed Allied intervention for restoration of order knowing that same would involve extinction of Bolshevism, which I consider not only irreparably injurious to Russia but disgrace to civilization and reflection on Allies. I consider Bolshevism as practiced in Russia means a return of the race to barbarism if it should prevail throughout society, that is why I studiously avoided encouraging the Soviet [Page 30] Government, refused going Moscow and failed to establish even a modus vivendi with it. Have never doubted its willingness to make any arrangement that would secure our recognition as Chicherin message demonstrates. Heard through Radek after Robins’ departure that latter was messenger from Soviet to extend to our Government all privileges and concessions granted Germany in Brest treaty but Radek said that did not include England and France. Never heard that Robins was permitted to present this proposition to our Government.

I think furthermore that if peace consummated with disorder prevailing in Russia or if Bolsheviks permitted to dominate there that Russia will be exploited by Germany so completely as to effectually recoup her losses by war and become again a menace to civilization.”

Repeated to Am[erican] mission, Paris, as number 23, January 22, 10 a.m.

Davis
  1. David R. Francis, Ambassador in Russia, temporarily in London.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Transmitted by the Danish Chargé in Russia, ante, p. 8.
  4. Lt. Col. Raymond Robins, in charge of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia, December 1917 to May 1918.
  5. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. i, pp. 440441.
  6. Ibid., pp. 569571.
  7. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol i, pp. 487488, 493, and 519521.
  8. Wilhelm, Count von Mirbach, German Ambassador to the Soviet Republic, was assassinated at Moscow July 6, 1918.
  9. Correspondence between Soviet officials and Ambassador Francis relative to the removal of the embassies from Vologda to Archangel is printed in Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. i, pp. 618 ff.