763.72112/12393: Telegram
The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State
[Received July 28, 7:40 p.m.]
3354. For the President.
Mr. Clemenceau requests me to transmit to you the following message from my British, French, Italian, and Japanese colleagues relative to the proposed blockade of Soviet Russia:
“British, French, Italian, Japanese members of the Council of Five, respectfully offer the following on the President’s message relating to neutral trade in the Gulf of Finland. They do not desire to express any opinion upon the statement of international law laid down in the telegram. It may well be true that where there is no state of belligerency there can be no legal blockade; but they would point out that the situation in Russia and in the Gulf of Finland is at the present moment such as hardly to permit rigid application of rules which in ordinary cases are quite uncontested. Language in which international law is expressed is fitted to describe the relations between organized states but it is not so well fitted to deal with relations between the organized states on the one hand and unorganized chaos on the other hand. Russia during this period of transition is not a state but a collection of ‘de facto’ governments at war with each other and though it is quite true to say that the Allied and Associated Powers are not in a state of belligerency with Russia it is also true they are involved [in] military operations with one of these ‘de facto’ governments and that they are supplying arms and ammunition to the others.
It may not be proper to describe this condition of things as war but it cannot be right to treat it as peace, nor can the international rules applicable to a state of peace be applied to it without qualification. The case is a special one and must be specially treated.
We would venture to point out some of the ill consequences which in the present case would follow from neglecting this consideration.
Allied and Associated troops are defending themselves in circumstances of very great difficulty against Bolshevist attacks in Archangel. Yet we permit the Bolshevist troops, who are making these attacks, to receive supplies which we could easily cut off.
We are furnishing the Siberian army of Koltchak with military equipment, and at the same time we are permitting military equipment to go to his enemy. We have gone far in the direction of recognizing the Esthonians, and other non-Russian people, who are struggling to resist Bolshevist attacks: yet we leave neutral traders [Page 155] free to strengthen the Bolshevist armies, and to convey unhindered information to a hostile navy as to the number and disposition of our own ships of war.
It may be urged, indeed, that to interfere with neutral commerce will not so much have the effect of hampering the military operations of those who are engaged in attacking us and our friends, as in aggravating the misery under which the innocent civil population is already suffering. So far as our information goes, however, this will not be the result. Every cargo successfully brought through the Gulf of Finland to Petrograd supplies a new instrument to the Bolshevists for adding recruits to their army. None of it will reach anyone but soldiers and officials. Its distribution will be determined by considerations which are military and not philanthropic. It will not diminish the sufferings of humanity: it will add to them.
It has been suggested that it might [be] possible for the four other Great Powers to maintain the control of imports into the Gulf of Finland without the participation of the United States. We feel however the strongest objection to adopting any policy not accepted by our [all the] Principal Allied and Associated Powers and even apart from this overwhelming consideration we cannot ignore the fact that if in such circumstances an American ship were to enter the Gulf an incident might easily occur where consequences would be well-nigh intolerable.
It is for these reasons that we would most earnestly request the United States Government to [re] consider their decision and to concur in a policy which as it seems to us is of so special and exceptional a character as to be quite outside the ordinary rules laid down by international law for the conduct of maritime blockade.[”]