861.00/5828: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain ( Davis )

[Paraphrase]

6243. For your information and guidance the following comments are submitted with respect to the oral statements made on November 24 by Lloyd George to Polk.3 At your discretion you may inform appropriate members of the British Government concerning the substance of these observations as occasion may make it desirable to do so.

The uselessness of reaching a satisfactory understanding with the Bolsheviki has been demonstrated by past experience. The ultimate aims of the Bolsheviki are hostile to all existing governments and any apparent compromise which they may make with these governments is vitiated by their avowed opportunism.

[Page 130]

There is the possibility, however, that the Bolshevik faction never will be forcibly driven from Russia, but will gradually yield to new leaders and change into a régime with which it will be possible to establish relations. It will be necessary to use the greatest care in this eventuality to determine the exact time at which the process of change has so far developed that countenance or recognition of the resulting government by foreign states will help to quicken rather than retard its evolution along rational lines. To grant premature recognition would check such development, it is believed, by giving aid and encouragement to ultra-radical and uncompromising elements which still remained.

It is my conviction that neither Lenin nor his immediate followers will ever give up permanently the dream of a world-wide revolution and loyally enter into friendly relations with governments which are not communistic.

Clearly even if evolution of the nature suggested has begun it is not sufficiently advanced to render it desirable or possible to try to reach an understanding with those now in control of the Soviet régime. In this connection see our telegram No. 6209 of November 24, 4 p.m. It is my belief that if Lloyd George seeks to reach such an understanding he will incur serious moral responsibility as well as make a great tactical mistake.

The American Government will give no support to the view that the dismemberment of Russia should be encouraged because a united Russia will be a menace to Europe. To take advantage of the present misfortune of the Russian people to interfere intentionally in the manner suggested with their future political rehabilitation would be a moral wrong and would pave the way for conflicts in the future. Granting that it is permissible to revert to such pre-war diplomatic methods, it is believed that a divided Russia not able to cope with existing Japanese territorial ambition or a possible revival of German imperialism would be by far a greater menace to the British Empire than would be an united, democratic Russia, well able to defend itself, but not disposed to attack.

Repeat confidentially to Ambassador in France.

Lansing
  1. Ante, p. 126.