Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/50
Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
[Received February 6.]
Sirs: I have the honor to report that one of the vital problems that interests everyone here is what should be the future political connections of German Austria. Three solutions have been proposed, namely, complete political and economic independence, membership in some sort of a Danubian confederation, and union with Germany.
In Vienna, at least, few people, I believe, favor the first of these solutions, though it is probably more popular in the country districts, where there is also talk of smaller republics formed from the ancient provinces, perhaps with some sort of tie with one another. It is also pointed out that an independent Austrian state would be larger than Switzerland and would have as many natural resources. Why should it not exist just as well? There is even a suggestion it might be neutralized, but the prevalent belief is that a small, weak Austria with barren soil and scant mineral wealth would be incapable of a prosperous life and, in particular, could never support a great city like Vienna, which would be doomed.
The people who favor a Danubian confederation include, in the first place, most of those who cling to the past, especially the aristocracy and the former officials and officers who are numbered by the tens of thousands, for be it remembered German Austria furnished an undue share of these in the former dual empire, and is now suffering from a plethora of men who do not know how to be anything else. They regard a confederation of this kind as being a sort of reconstruction of the dual empire in a form which will give freedom to each nationality but will weld them all into some sort of a federal state to the economic as well as the political advantage of each part.
Secondly, we must take into account the aversion of many Catholics to belonging to a German state where the majority is Protestant, as well as the fear of the propertied classes and conservatives generally of belonging to one where the Socialists make up such a great proportion [Page 241] of the population. Then there are the old dislike of the Austrian for the North German and especially the Prussian, a dislike the war has tended to heighten, at least for the moment; and an unwillingness to see Austria, which so long was the leading state of Germany, henceforth nothing but a minor member even if her unity is preserved under the new regime, which is not certain. There is, too, a strong feeling on the part of the Viennese against seeing their ancient famous imperial capital reduced to the position of a German provincial town. In a Danubian confederation Vienna would still hope to be the capital of the whole, the seat if not of empire at least of common interest, common culture and common trade of many nations as in the past. In the Germany of today they say there can be no great future for Vienna. This last consideration affects the many financial and manufacturing interests centered here. At the present moment they are suffering terribly from the breakup of the dual empire, for their field extended to every part and they have been dismembered with the dismemberment of the territory they covered. Different legislation and hostile tariffs in the new formations into which this territory has been broken up will bring to them the greatest injury, if not ruin, but a Danubian confederation, with free trade between its members, will not only save them but will enlarge the field for their activity. In this field they will have, at least at first, no rivals of equal strength to themselves, whereas if Austria is to be a part of Germany they will have to compete with German skill and enterprise, and the superior organization of the great German industries.
There is some uncertainty as to just what countries should be included in this confederation; for example, Poland, Rumania, the Balkan States; but this is a matter of detail that can be settled later. The United States is often pointed out as a model that might well be imitated. A Danubian confederation, from its loose nature and varied nationalities can never be an aggressive power that will menace others, but it will have sufficient resources to make it strong enough for defence. Such a confederation may be regarded as a political necessity for the peace of the world, for without it the various small states of Eastern Europe will inevitably be filled with mutual jealousy and rival aspirations. We shall have the story of the Balkan Peninsula over again.
A final argument frequently heard is the fear that the victorious allied powers may be so opposed to a union between Germany and Austria that they will take measures to prevent it; or that Austria if she persists in her desire will receive more severe treatment than she otherwise would in the terms of peace. Indeed by joining with Germany, whom the Allies intend to punish severely, she may come in for a share of the punishment which she may escape if she remains alone.
[Page 242]The partisans of a union of Austria with Germany include not only those who prefer this solution in itself, but also many who in theory might prefer a Danubian confederation but believe there is no chance of its realization. The first of these have been represented by the German Nationalist Party, who have always felt that Austria was, and for many centuries had been, an integral part of Germany and that the historical and racial connection had been only temporarily severed by the rivalry between the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns that had led to the expulsion of Austria after the war of 1866. Now that the dual empire has gone to pieces and that Italians, Serbs, Rumanians and Poles are being united to their brethren outside, and the Czechs have formed a new state, what could be more natural than for the Germans of Austria to unite to the rest of their German brethren. This is the day of national states and it is better to be part of a great one than to vegetate as a detached fragment. The reunion of Austria to Germany will restore in favor of the south the preponderance which has been exercised by northern Germany owing to the too great power of Prussia.
The Social Democratic Party, the strongest in the present coalition government, has taken the same ground, but it has been perhaps more influenced—as it is charged with being—by an additional reason. As the present Austria is not an industrial state the Socialists are only a minority in it and bid fair to remain so. If Vienna is going to decline they are likely to shrink rather than to gain in numbers. But if Austria is incorporated with Germany, the Austrian Socialists will be members of a powerful and perhaps some day the dominant party in a great society.
Even the capitalists and manufacturers are not all opposed to union. There are some that believe that in the end, if not immediately, better conditions of credit and better and safer markets can be found for them in a united Germany than in a detached Austria, however confederated. There is much they can sell in Germany itself and they will profit by the gains of German enterprise throughout the world. There is room, too, for Vienna in the south as well as for Berlin in the north, and it is Vienna that has the greater natural advantages. Why despair of her future?
As for a Danube confederation, whether desirable or not, there are many reasons for doubting if it is in any way possible. We may talk of the United States, but the difficulties that had to be overcome before the American constitution was laboriously evolved were child’s play compared with those that would face the creators of the United Danubian States. These states are inhabited by many different nationalities; hardly any two of them are on good terms, and many of them regard each other with a bitter hatred, born of centuries of friction, rendered intense by the events of the last five years and still [Page 243] further exasperated by the sudden reversal of their relations to one another and by their fierce conflicting claims which, however settled, will leave ill feeling behind them. Verily a common parliament representing these elements would be a wonderful spectacle.
But even a looser union with only a common tariff and financial system and a common foreign policy would meet with many of the same difficulties, and looks quite beyond the bounds of probability for a generation.
The Ausgleich of 1867 which created dualism between Austria and Hungary never worked well at any stage of its existence. As soon as each decennial renewal was voted, thanks to the pressure of the dynasty of the army and of the foreign office, both sides began to prepare for the next nasty wrangle that must occur when the matter came up again. Each renewal was obtained with increasing effort and led to increased ill feeling.
Tariff negotiations are proverbially thorny, and to bring about a commercial union between four, five or more equal states is hardly in the range of practical politics. Even if it were brought about, every time any modification was suggested, there would be fresh trouble. Nothing but universal free trade could obviate this; but if it existed, the chief reason for a confederation would disappear. And, who wants it? Hungary? Yes. Fallen from her high estate, if she is to lose her non-Magyar territories and be reduced to an agricultural inland community she must look for some support, and there is little else she can hope for. But there is little indication that others of the proposed members really desire it. Most of them are full of self-confidence in their new found greatness and believe they are quite able to stand alone, and even absorb land belonging to their neighbors. It is true the new Czecho-Slovak state, which, if it gains all the territory it is now claiming, would be the leading member of the confederation, might like an arrangement that would secure a large field of enterprise to its powerful industries and assure it of economical as well as political hegemony. But this hegemony would be particularly distasteful, not to say disastrous, to both Austria and Hungary, whose feelings towards Czecho-Slovakia would be like those existing between Germany and France.
But supposing the dream to be realized, what reason is there for thinking that Vienna would retain her ancient glory? Budapest, which has had an independent life since 1866, has gained much on her; and Prague will now do her utmost to supplant her in every way possible.
Such are some of the chief arguments put forth here by the partisans of a Danube confederation and those of a union with Germany. It is hard to gauge the strength of the forces on the two sides. A prominent official said to me recently that if everyone in Austria were [Page 244] to vote out loud the great majority would favor the union; but if they were to vote secretly everyone would vote against it. I note, however, that Dr. Bauer, the chief of the Social Democrats, does not avoid the issue but insists upon it in his electoral speeches, and newspaper discussion of it is increasing as the date of the election draws near. My own opinion is that public opinion is still in rather a fluid state and may be turned one way or the other by the course of events. Union with Germany was proclaimed at a meeting of the National Council of German Austria on November 12, 1918, but nothing was said as to the form in which it was to take place, and it is not too late to draw back or to insist on impossible conditions. All sorts of elements will enter into the final decision.
The form of constitution adopted by the new German state will have its influence; especially the question whether the unity of Prussia is to be preserved, for there is a pretty general dislike of Prussia here and if Prussia continues to exist as a whole or is not seriously diminished in the Germany of tomorrow, Austria is less likely to join in. The size of the new Austria will also make a difference, for there seem to be many Austrians who think that their country is capable of independent existence if it includes German Bohemia, but not if it is deprived of it, in which case it must adhere to Germany.
The leaders of all three parties that have formed the present coalition government have committed themselves in favor of union. The German Nationalists and the Social Democrats may be expected to remain true to this policy, but the German Nationalists are only one of the group of Bourgeois parties; and the Christian Socialists who it is generally expected will be the most important party of all after the next elections may see fit to change their attitude. They are strong in the country districts. Their support lies in the peasants, the aristocracy and the clergy; that is to say, in the conservative elements generally, who dislike modern Germany and abhor Socialism. It is to be noted that so far the Austrian Church does not appear to have taken a decisive stand. The influence of the hierarchy and that of Rome are still great. One would naturally think of them as being thrown on the side of the conservatives and against the Socialists, and the idea of a union with a Protestant state; but other considerations, such as a desire to strengthen the Catholic element in Germany may lead to a different conclusion. If this influence is really exerted it may be decisive.
The above impressions hastily formed without time or opportunity for serious investigation are nevertheless submitted in the hope that they may be of some utility.
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