Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XII

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/80

Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Dawley to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Reval, July 19, 1919.

Subject: Report.

1. In continuation of my report dated July 11–12, from Riga,⁵⁰ the following is a report on (a) Situation Lithuania (b) Situation at Riga (c) Situation at Libau (d) Situation Esthonian Army (e) General Situation Esthonia (f) Situation Northern Russian Army (g) General Recommendations.

Situation Lithuania.

Professor Shimkus, Minister of Trade and Industry of the Lithuanian Government arrived at Libau about July 10 from Kovno. I did not have an opportunity to talk with him personally but later had a conference with an officer of the Lithuanian Staff who had come with Mr. Shimkus. As indicated in my previous telegrams, the situation in Lithuania is critical in that the Poles, notwithstanding the military solution as regards their military zones of operation was prescribed by the Entente by way of defining the line between the two armies, have advanced westward across this line attacking the Lithuanians. Professor Shimkus maintained that the objective of the Poles was Kovno and that it was necessary for the Lithuanians to withdraw their forces which were operating in the direction of Dvinsk against the Bolsheviks for the protection of their capital. I believe exactly as stated in my report of May 15 from Lithuania,⁵¹ that it is part of a German policy to keep the Baltic Countries in a state of internal unrest if not actual war. It was clearly foreshadowed both by Prof. Shimkus and the Staff officer that an alliance of Lithuania with Germany against Poland was extremely probable as they could not countenance the advance of the Poles across Lithuania. I need not call attention to the extreme danger this proceeding involves to this entire country by making possible the advance of the Bolsheviks westward from Dvinsk, the danger being not only to Lithuania, but to Latvia and finally to Esthonia and to the North Russian Army. It was earnestly requested that I go to Kovno but in view of the fact that the Mission is already sadly depleted in numbers, and that I would be entirely alone, I did not feel I could accomplish anything toward averting a Polish-Lithuanian War.

In this connection I was also influenced by the fact that there is at Warsaw a large French Mission and a large British Mission, and an American Minister with his military attaches, etc. During the latter part of May I furnished our American Minister at Warsaw with a complete copy of my report on Lithuania of May 15, and went over the situation very carefully with him, leaving in his possession all the notes that I had. If it is impossible for these Missions at Warsaw to avert this internal warfare, I do not see how it is possible for a single officer to affect the situation from the Lithuanian side.

I call attention again to the fact that Lithuania has been entirely dependent upon Germany for finance and for the entire maintenance of her small armed forces. Any break with Germany takes away the only source of supply, aside from American foodstuffs, that Lithuania has, and this fact alone renders an alliance with Germany more probable.

Situation at Riga.

I left Riga by British destroyer on July 14. As indicated in my report of the 11th and 12th, there had been no decisive measures taken as regarding an agreement with Germany supplementary to the armistice agreement signed on the 3rd of July. I felt such an agreement or virtually peace terms to be absolutely essential for the following reasons. The Germans still occupy a large part of Courland and are in almost complete possession of all the railways in Latvia. They have at least all the rolling stock. There is no rail communication between Riga and Libau, nor any telegraphic or telephonic communication in the country except that maintained by the Germans. I need not call attention to the fact that if a new Government is to operate in Latvia, it must have access to these ways of communication. They are also essential to the life of the country and to the operation of the American Relief Administration and food distribution. Still another factor is the fact that the military forces in Latvia, including the Lettish Detachments, the Landeswehr, and Prince Lieven’s Detachment, have been completely armed, equipped, maintained, paid and otherwise supplied by Germany. On July 4, following the armistice, Germany naturally severed all such supply for the Lettish Detachments, and it is logical to presume that with the severing of all relations with Germany by the Landeswehr, Germany will also sever relations. Prince Lieven’s Detachment still remains as far as I am informed, under German support and control. General Yudenitch, Commander in Chief of all the Western Russian Armies, has ordered Prince Lieven to move his detachment by water from Libau or Riga to Narva. I need not call attention to the difficult position in which Prince Lieven is placed in this regard, as all his equipment is German. I believe General Yudenitch extremely ill-informed on the general situation and that he is influenced by the equally ill-informed British Mission. I do not regard the severance of any of these troops from German supply as logical or as well advised until the facilities are known to be present to replace said German supply. The British have requested supplies, finance, etc., but they have no assurance that it will be granted, and the supplies promised to the Russian Northern Army are already a month overdue, and their arrival is not foreseen.

Bearing in mind the above, I drafted a peace protocol covering some of the above points which I deemed absolutely necessary. This draft was completely and unconditionally rejected by the British Mission. I believe also that a similar agreement is necessary to be made as between Prince Lieven and the Germans, supervised by the Interallied Mission, but I have not undertaken any draft of this. In connection with the shipment of a portion of Prince Lieven’s Detachment from Libau to Narva, I call attention to the fact that there are some 26 members of Russian officers’ families left at Libau absolutely destitute, their men having gone to Narva unable to make any provision for their dependents left behind there, as to assistance or possibility of joining them in Russia.

Situation at Libau.

The British at Libau are quite optimistic at the situation and state that the recruits under their hands are doing remarkably good work. I do not know from personal inspection but I am not nearly as optimistic as to the results obtained. I do know that they are being fed by American flour and they are without arms, equipment or clothing. There is practically no work of any kind going on at Libau, even the printers being on a strike. Both the employers and the strikers have requested an American for mediator. To my mind it is simply an outbreak of Bolshevism. They both have categorically refused to allow a British officer to mediate. Libau is still out of touch with the rest of Latvia except by boat. There are numerous rumors to the effect that the Germans do not intend to evacuate Latvia. Still other rumors to the effect that the Germans are increasing their forces in Latvia. I do not regard these rumors as founded. But as stated before I do not believe the Germans will evacuate until they have concluded an elaborate agreement with the Latvian Government exacting agreements for their safe withdrawal, etc. If the rumors as regards the reinforcement of German troops are correct, it merely means that Germany is defying the Entente with no intention of carrying into effect the peace of Versailles.

Situation Esthonian Army.

With the exception of one regiment left in the vicinity of Ramotzki, 50 kilometers east of Riga, all Esthonian forces have been withdrawn, part being sent to Narva and part to Pskoff. Esthonian forces still hold the line against the Bolsheviks from about Luban See to Pskoff. The reason for the reinforcement at Pskoff and at Narva is to be ready to stop the Bolsheviks should they break through the Russian Northern Army, which is not improbable. The Esthonians realize that it is very dangerous for them to allow Pskoff to be retaken by the Bolsheviks and are prepared for the emergency.

General Situation in Esthonia.

The general political situation in Esthonia is one of unrest and disquietude and distrust. As indicated before, while the Esthonian Government is a fair government, it is not strong in that it is unable to entirely enforce its policies, especially as regards the radical elements. These radical elements are of course bent on independence. When they see independence far away, they become more radical and at present are demanding a peace with the Bolsheviks. There is also considerable evidence of distrust of members of this Government, notably of one Minister who is accused of harboring at the present time a Bolshevik Commissary and representative. For the particulars of this and other occurrences I invite attention to the enclosed newspaper editorials.⁵²

I am led to believe that the British are pressing for the independence of Esthonia. This recommendation, if they are making it, is not based on full information or impartial or complete investigation of the conditions. I do not admit that they realize in any true proportion the political situation in Esthonia and if they are making this recommendation for independence, it is merely because they feel indebted to the Esthonians for helping them out in the crisis brought about by their unfulfilled promises of ammunition for the Russian Northern Army.

There was recently a serious mutiny of Esthonian troops at Dorpat, as a result of which 21 men have been tried by court martial and executed. I am satisfied that the Esthonian Government and Command handled this matter in a very satisfactory manner but the case has not yet been completed, and has an extremely grave political complexion. I am also satisfied that the real reason of this outbreak was the lack of shoes for the troops. I can not believe that the situation of these countries is appreciated. There is no industry. There is no work for the workers except those who have land, in other words the peasants. The Esthonian method of solving this, namely the confiscation of land from the land holders and giving it to the landless, is not working out, in that the landless when offered the land refuse to accept it.

The fatal error the Bolsheviks have made is that they would not and could not and can not reorganize industry in Bolshevik Russia. To my mind this is one way to combat Bolshevism and to do so it is necessary to put money in this country and start industry. It is true that the country is largely agricultural but there are at the same time industries of various kinds, shipping, paper, timber products, etc., that can and must be revived if the country is to be saved from Bolshevism eventually. To do this, one thing is necessary, material and moral support from the Allies. In the event this is not forthcoming, it will come from Germany, who realize very clearly the entire problem and the needs of the situation. It is not necessary to recognize the independence of Esthonia to ameliorate conditions, but it is necessary to extend material and moral aid in something more than the form of advisory and investigating missions.

Situation of Northern Russian Army.

The reports which Lieut. Hale drafted on this subject are complete. There are no new developments since the date of his writing except the Northern Army have been compelled to effect the evacuation of a few more villages. I entirely agree with Lieut. Hale that the Northern Army is wasteful of ammunition but I must also ask you to consider that they have not the superior direction and command which we were accustomed to see and operate under in France, and I might also add that other armies, notably the British, French and American have been accused of waste of ammunition. As will be seen in one of the editorials ascribed to a Mr. Ivanoff, a Russian, the Russians must have aid. Germany is at present offering this aid, naturally on her own terms. If the Entente will not grant it, Germany will, and now that the peace is signed, there is no possible way of stopping her short of another war.

General Recommendations.

1. I recommend that the equipment and supplies which I recommended on June 20,⁵³ be immediately made available for Latvia, Lithuania and Esthonia, and that the Mission organization be inaugurated.

2. That the loans therein recommended be immediately placed to the credit of these three countries.

3. That the best consular agents obtainable be sent to these countries to open the way for commercial relations with America.

4. That the complete equipment authorized for two American divisions, tables of organization for a war of movement, excepting heavy artillery, trench mortars, etc., with proportional supply of small arms and ammunition, be made available for the Russian Northern Army.

5. That the advance part of these supplies consisting of complete individual equipment for 20,000 men, including clothing, arms, etc., to be loaded and dispatched immediately to Reval, together with 24 field pieces, 75 mm., 4000 rounds of ammunition, 50 percent shrapnel and 50 percent high explosive, per gun; 300 machine guns, light, Browning or Lewis; 3,000,000 rounds small arm ammunition for same; 3,000,000 rounds small arm rifle ammunition; 50 2–3 ton trucks; 10 Ford cars; 15 light Ford trucks; and 15 Ford ambulances.

6. That a Division Headquarters and Staff, American, be sent immediately to assume direction and supervision of the Russian Northern Army, as outlined in my report of June 22.

E. J. Dawley

50. No copy of this report has been found in the Department files.
51. Ante, p. 184.
52. Not reprinted.
53. Document not found in Department files.