Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XII

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/62

Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Dawley to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

Reval, June 22, 1919.

Subject: Report.

1. As temporary head of the Mission sent by the American Commission to Negotiate Peace to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, I desire to express my dissent from the course of action that is being followed by the Allies in the solution of the problem of the Baltic States. I believe myself as well informed on the present military situation in Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania as any representative of the Allied Powers. The military situation I believe to be of paramount importance. The political and economic factors are so closely related to the military that they are inseparable from it. I believe that the policy followed this far has had for the most part a negative effect and that unless some positive constructive action is taken, Allied prestige and influence in these important states will be seriously diminished if not entirely lost. The foregoing criticism and the comments which follow do not apply to Finland, with which I am less familiar, and which appears to be in a situation totally different from that of the other Baltic States.

2. The Esthonian, Lettish and Lithuanian peoples were formerly subject races in the Russian Empire. They are ancient races, long held in subjection, poor for the most part in material goods, of small educational or cultural attainments, with no experience in self government. On the other hand, all three races are ambitious for independence and are eagerly seeking recognition in the world at large and more particularly from the Allies. They want friendship and support from us. Amongst themselves they are suspicious, and crudely, violently, often short sightedly resentful of any people or group of people which they may imagine stands in their way. In Latvia and Esthonia the land-holding aristocracy for seven centuries has been a German nobility superior in culture and educational attainments to the peasant races by which they are surrounded. These Baltic Germans, or Baits as they are generally called, have for all this period been the dominating political and administrative element in these communities. They ruled or misruled the country in mediseval times, they ruled or misruled it under the Czars, and this notwithstanding the fact that numerically they composed no more than 15 or 20 per cent of the population. For centuries the Esthonians, and Latvians submitted with varying degrees of good or ill grace to this domination. They are now determined to put an end to it and to take all power into their own hands. In the execution of this plan they are willing to resort if necessary to violence. In Lithuania there are virtually no Baits but there is a land-holding nobility of Polish origin, regarded by the Lithuanians as the Baits are regarded by the Esthonians and the Letts.

3. To the east of these Baltic countries lies Bolshevik Russia, for whom many of the people in all three countries, but particularly in Latvia and Esthonia, have considerable more or less concealed sympathy. To the south and west lies Germany, a nation defeated but still ambitious, still possessed of some power, with a practical certainty of increasing power in the future. Germany’s ambitions in Russia and the Baltic countries are boundless. She realizes that in these countries are great markets, great sources of raw material, even perhaps reservoirs of military power on which her greatness and conceivably her future existence as a nation may depend. She recognizes the usefulness for her own purposes of the Baltic element in Esthonia and Latvia. She recognizes the values of a Lithuanian state as a counter to Poland. She recognizes that her power of organization and her industrial output are necessary and almost indispensable to the Great Russia that now lies under the paralyzing rule of the Soviet Republic.

4. The Allies and the great bulk of opinion of the civilized world are hostile to Bolshevism. The Allies have never committed themselves to the extermination of Bolshevism but they are committed as it would seem to keep a sanitary cordon drawn and to prevent the release of Bolshevism into Europe and the Western world. For the maintenance of this sanitary cordon we have consented to the presence in Latvia and Lithuania of some 60,000 German troops, 20,000 in Latvia and 40,000 in Lithuania. They have been in these countries under Article 12 of the Armistice, which explicitly recognizes the fact that the presence here of German troops may be necessary to maintain order in the country. There can be no doubt whatever that their presence has in the past been necessary to keep Bolshevism out. This fact is recognized by the Letts and Lithuanians themselves.

5. Bearing in mind these facts the problem of the Baltic States as I see it is as follows:

(1) To maintain in these territories the sanitary cordon against Bolshevism.

(2) To secure justice for all the indigenous races in these provinces alike, the Esthonians, Letts, Baits, Lithuanians, and Lithuanian-born Poles.

(3) To prevent Germany from ruthlessly exploiting these countries and from making of them and of Russia in the future, a vast territory servile to her every scheme of expansion and aggrandisement.

(4) To stand ready at such time as a stable government, not repugnant to our principles of freedom and order, exists in Russia, to define the relations to Russia of these small frontier communities, determining whether these states shall be absolutely independent, shall preserve autonomy under the Russian rule, or shall lapse back to complete vassaldom under the Russia State as they were in the days of the Czar.

6. The problem is monumental and calls for the highest statesmanship, the most determined adherence to a fair, generous and just policy carried out by agents who shall be above suspicion and vile intrigues. Any petty policy, any playing of race against race, party against party, class against class, is playing the game as the Germans are playing it, and we are bound to lose. On the other hand, to bait and harass the Germans or the German armies now in occupation in these provinces, with the implied assent of the Allies is simply to stimulate their antagonism and make them all the more eager to push their influence and consolidate their following in these countries. It is also to weaken the defense of these countries from the Bolsheviks without and from the Bolsheviks within. If we sympathize with the Baits against the Esthonians and Letts we are sympathizing with a small reactionary land-holding minority against national and democratic movements. If, on the other hand, we encourage the Letts and Esthonians to exterminate the Baits, or the Lithuanians to exterminate the land-holding Poles, or countenance an arbitrary confiscation of the lands of Baits or Poles, we encourage the tyranny of a majority and the destruction of the most intelligent, experienced, and capable classes in the respective countries.

7. Unfortunately there is not a single one of these vital factors and principles which has not been already at one time or another overlooked. In Latvia, for example, there existed the Ulmanis Government, which was overthrown by the coup d’état of the Baltic Landeswehr of April 16. By patient efforts on the part of the Allied representatives the Baits were induced to disavow their act and to accept the principle of minority representation in a coalition government to be formed for the prosecution of a war against Bolshevism. Up to May 8 Mr. Ulmanis had an opportunity to form such a Government which should be truly representative of all the elements in Latvia and which should contain a majority of his former cabinet. Mr. Ulmanis obstinately refused to do this, preferring to seek to shelter himself behind the Allies and to adopt an attitude which committed him to no constructive effort but simply to an expression of Hun hate and Bait hate. In his attempt to obtain Allied sympathy he has been more successful than he deserved, but in the long run nothing has been gained either by Mr. Ulmanis or by those of the Allies who strove to restore him to power. At present, he, with a large number of his followers, sits impotent and apparently terrified on a boat in the harbor of Libau. Meantime, Mr. Needra, the Lettish pastor, with the support of the Baits, the moderate Letts, and some of the smaller peasant land-holders, formed a provisional government which has been functioning since about May 10. Mr. Needra was not in the beginning pro-German. He sought, in fact, begged the support of the Allies but failing to receive it, he turned to the Germans, where he found a warm welcome. His Government is not strong but it has to its credit the achievement, with German assistance, of having taken Riga and practically cleared a large part of Latvia of the Red Army. After waiting all these months, the Allies have still some positive action to take in the domestic situation in Latvia.

8. The real purpose of Germany in maintaining an armed force in these countries is:

(1) To fight Bolshevism, as vigorously or as laxly as the needs of the moment seem to dictate.

(2) To keep an army in being ready outside the territorial limits of Germany for an emergency.

(3) To assure the import of large amounts of food stuffs and raw materials to Germany.

(4) To extend and maintain German influence outside of Germany.

(5) To protect her bridges in the East.

The Allies have stooped to harassing the German occupying forces and have never attempted to define their position in a straightforward and constructive manner. They have neither treated with the German as an ally, fought him as an enemy, or considered him as their agent or servant, which in fact he was. On the contrary, they have been prone simply to insult him as an interloper and let things go at that. The Bolshevik menace now appears to have lessened and in my opinion three-fourths of the German troops in Lithuania, and half the German troops in Latvia should be now withdrawn. However, our action in the past has been so dilatory, and our treatment of Germany so impolitic, that the Baltic Landeswehr of Latvia under the command of a German officer, and with furtive support from the Germans, has had time to march north and attack the Esthonians in their rear, thus creating a civil war in Latvia, weakening the front against the Bolsheviks, and providing Germany with an excuse for a prolonged military domination of the country, coupled quite possibly with the colonization and political control. The Provisional Government of Latvia six months ago entered into an agreement with Germany by which troops who fought for Latvia for thirty days might acquire Latvian citizenship. Under this agreement some 20,000 pure German subjects have a right to regard themselves as citizens of Latvia and to fight the Esthonians under the guise of being Letts. When they are sick of being Letts they can throw off the lamb’s skin and give the roar of the Prussian lion.

9. I believe that these great problems can be solved only by an Allied Mission with a complete organization, charged with the duty of directing the Military operations of these countries, of organizing, equipping and training their national forces, and guiding their civil government in the application of political principles of justice and fair play to all parties. The outline of such an organization is attached hereto as Exhibit l.³⁹ It is a large organization but the issues at stake are large issues. Negligence or procrastination now we may pay for dearly in the future.

10. The situation is such that as already observed, a large proportion of German troops could be withdrawn without imperiling the safety of the countries in question. I recently recommended the complete recall of all German troops and elements from Courland, but this was to follow the immediate extension of material and moral aid to Latvia. The latter implied the formation of a national coalition government, with a consequent nationalization of the Landeswehr and Lettish detachments. Since then the situation is so much more critical due to the lack of an attempt at a constructive solution that I now advise the withdrawal of only 50 percent of the Germans in Latvia. In this connection attention is invited:

(1) To the disposition of German troops in Lithuania, i. e., the great majority being concentrated in the southern part of Lithuania near the Polish and German frontiers.

(2) German troops have taken no decisive part in offensive operations against the Bolsheviks since March; the advance of the Letts and the Landeswehr on Riga being merely followed by the German forces in the nature of a flank protection. The same is true of the Lithuanian offensive in the direction of Ponewiecz and Dwinsk.

(3) The railroads and communications in Latvia and Lithuania are completely operated and controlled by Germany. The situation demands the complete control of the evacuation of the German troops by the Allies and further that the railroads and communications, together with rolling stock and operating personnel be left in situ.

11. There are attached hereto the following documents:

(1) Organization and outline of procedure for Inter-Allied Mission to the Baltic States.

(2) Report on the Esthonian-Landeswehr situation to date.

(3) Report on the relation of Ingermanland to the Russian Northern Corps.

(4) Report on the Russian Northern Corps.

These questions are treated in separate reports so that each may be considered by itself, but they are not isolated matters and the relation of all these events and the political and military factors which underlie them should be considered in relation to the whole situation which I have attempted to state in the foregoing.

E. J. Dawley

39. None of the enclosures to this document are printed.