Paris Peace Conf. 185.1722/7½
Colonel O. N. Solbert, Acting for the Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene), to General T. H. Bliss
Subject: Information and recommendations concerning Latvia.
It is requested to present in condensed form certain information, and especially recommendations, and reasons for same, concerning the present crisis in Latvia. The following is such a presentation based upon the appended detailed reports18 of the Mission under Lt-Col. Greene, my verbal discussion of the situation with the Mission, and Mr. Ulmanis, Prime Minister of the Lettish cabinet, and Gen. V. D. Goltz during my visit in Libau.
[Page 151]General Statement. The German military forces enjoy their legal status in Latvia under Art. 12 of the November armistice. The front and zone of operation against the Bolshevist forces are under the command of Gen. Von der Goltz, who is also military governor of Libau. His is the only authority in the land that is coupled with executive power. There seems to be no distinct agreement between the Lettish government and the German command as to the extent of the zone of operation or of the administration of the territory not included therein.
Theoretically, at least, the supreme political authority in Latvia inheres in the de facto Provisional government appointed by the Latvian National Council at Riga, Nov. 18, 1918. It consists of twelve members, all Letts; the Baits, Jews and Russians not being represented. The government enjoys no mandate from the people and is entitled to consideration as nothing more than a de facto governing body. The German high command has, however, expressly recognized by treaty the Latvian government as the theoretical sovereign.
Overthrow of the Lettish Government. At Libau on April 16th the Lettish ministry was forcibly deposed and its offices occupied by a battalion of Baits just returned from the front. Two members of the ministry were arrested, the rest mainly took refuge under allied protection. German troops also disarmed Lettish officers and soldiers and looted their quarters.
According to statement “the office of Gen. V. d. Goltz was not informed of these events. However he finally gave orders to remove the pickets of Bait troops from the streets, although not wishing to interfere with the interior politics of Latvia, at the same time, being in supreme police power, he had to bear the responsibility for order in the fortress of Libau.”
The reasons given by the Baits for their action was that the cabinet was not representative (being composed only of Letts), that it had failed to undertake the establishing agreement between the various groups of the population (Letts, Baits, Jews and Russians), that it had levied unreasonable requisitions, passed objectionable land reforms, instituted a senseless financial policy, and that it was not seriously combatting Bolshevism.
If the German command did not directly connive in this military coup with the Baits, it at least, by certain omissions to uphold order when Bait and German troops acted with violence against the Lettish troops and ministry, did look upon it with favor. It may have taken the latter course to be free to disown complicity should subsequent allied action deem such course desirable.
Several days after the coup the Baits proposed a military directoire of two men to form a cabinet. The two officers at the front (a Balt and a Lett) offered this refused to act in such capacity as the allied missions would have nothing to do with this whole affair.
[Page 152]Food distribution was temporarily held up as the government which had contracted for its payment had ceased to exist. This had the effect of discrediting to a great extent the action of the Baits, and giving the people hope of an allied opinion on the coup so as to clear the atmosphere regarding their relations both with the Germans and the Baits.
The present situation is that the Letts (who form about 70% of the population) are waiting for allied action. If allied governments countenance the forcible usurpation of the government by the Baits (who form about 7% of the population), the Letts will probably take matters into their own hands and rise up throughout the country and exterminate the long hated, power- and land-privileged Baits. Such an uprising of the Letts would be looked upon by the Germans as a Bolshevik revolution which they in turn would take as a pretext to put the Letts down with the sword. The present is a critical period.
Recommendation. That the allied powers notify the German command and the Lettish government (through their prime minister) that they wish the reestablishment of the former ministry, but that this request be couched in such terms that the reinstated cabinet will include members of the different races of Latvia to make it representative. This to be done for humanitarian reasons in order to prevent revolution and bloodshed. The fact that the former cabinet was not representative was a weakness—it was taxation without representation. Such allied action would also clearly demonstrate to the German government that the allies will not countenance their exploitation of smaller races, and would be a guarantee against future repetition of such a coup.
The Military Situation. The Military Situation is paramount. About one-third of the territory claimed by Latvia is cleared of Bolshevists. The line along the Aa River, from the Gulf of Riga to Lithuania, is held against them by German, Bait and Lett troops (20,000 German, 3,800 Bait, 3,000 Lett, and 300 Russian troops). The deciding elements in this fight are the German troops and the German command. The withdrawal of the German force, unless replaced by one of equal strength, will deliver the country to Bolshevism. The advantages accruing to Germany by maintaining her military force here are:
- 1.
- Protection of Germany from Bolshevism.
- 2.
- Maintenance of an army in being, under service conditions outside of Germany, and ready for an emergency.
- 3.
- Holding their “bridges to the East”, or retaining German influence in the Baltic littoral as a commercial “jumping off” ground for Russia. Germany now faces economically to the East due to forced circumstances and threatened allied boycott. Germany’s logical road [Page 153] to Russia since the erection of the buffer states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc., lies therefore through Latvia. Besides keeping her own road open by controlling German influence in Latvia and Russia’s only ice-free harbor, Libau, she also blocks the only gate of entrance for Allied commerce to Russia.
Recommendations.
1. To send Allied troops to replace German troops. This being out of the question;
2. The formation of a Lettish National Army. Although the Lettish Government has proclaimed a general mobilization, the German command has refused to allow this to be carried out as dangerous to the Germans and to the security of the country against Bolshevism. The Letts hate the Germans, and the Germans maintain that a great portion of the Lettish population has Bolshevist tendencies. It is estimated that 8,000 troops, besides the 7,500 now in service, between the ages of 18–35 could be mobilized. Progressive mobilization as Latvian territory is regained shows expectation of an increase to 20,000. To accomplish this would require complete direction, instruction, financing, equipment of food, clothing and war supplies of every nature by the Allied governments. Such a course would also require from the entente a rigid definition of Germany’s position here, the attitude she is to assume toward creating such a force, and the help to be afforded by her to this end, and explicitly her part in maintaining aggression against the Bolshevists until such time as the newly [mobilized?] Latvian force can relieve the said German force of its responsibility to the Allies for the preservation of order.
If this recommendation is not considered favorably;
3. To definitely assign to Germany the task of keeping Bolshevism out of Latvia and its coast from where it could better reach other countries. Along with such responsibilities must go the authority of German independent action, the privilege of supply by sea, the acknowledged moral support of the Allies, and a recognition of the advantages accruing to Germany as a result of success.
Whatever course is taken, there should be a co-ordination of efforts in Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Future Military Operations. The German command states that it contemplates no further operations than improving communications. The spirit and desire of the Baits, Letts and Russians at the front is to advance and relieve Riga. The situation in Riga is desperate. Reports indicate atrocities beyond belief, starvation universal and disease rampant. Coincident with relief must go food for the population. It is the opinion that the forces on the front, if the Germans are willing, could advance and take Riga, especially with naval assistance.
- Not attached to file copy of this document.↩