Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XII
Paris Peace Conf. 862.00/344
Mr. C. A. Herter to President Wilson
My Dear Mr. President: I beg to enclose herewith, for your information, copies of several reports prepared by two officers of the Military Intelligence Section of our Army respecting their observations as to the political situation in Germany at the present moment, and reporting the substance of interviews with Mr. Erzberger1 and Count von Bernstorff.2 These officers travelled to Berlin at the urgent request of Mr. Erzberger. My colleagues on the Commission and I believe that these reports are extremely valuable as indicating the present sentiment in Germany in regard to the proposed Peace Treaty.
I beg to call your attention particularly to the report by Major Henrotin on the second interview which he had with Mr. Erzberger in which the latter made certain definite suggestions in regard to amending various Articles of the proposed Treaty.
Faithfully yours,
Memorandum by Colonel A. L. Conger
Memorandum for A. C. of S. G–2:
Subject: Report of trip to Berlin.
1. Upon the urgent request of Herr Erzberger, I left for Berlin, Friday afternoon, and arrived there Saturday evening at 10 o’clock. An appointment was made for me to confer with Herr Erzberger at 10.45 the next morning, and following that for Major Henrotin (who accompanied me to Berlin) and myself, to see, jointly, Herr Erzberger and Count Bernstorff. In the preliminary interview with Herr Erzberger I explained to him that I had not been sent by anyone in authority, but had come of my own volition, having, as a General Staff Officer, authority to travel wherever my duties took me, and that in consequence I was not speaking officially for any military or diplomatic [Page 125] authority; that what I should say represented my own views and certain facts which it had seemed to me important for the future peace of the world should be understood, and which were not now understood, at least by the German people.
At this point Count Bernstorff and Major Henrotin were introduced and I repeated in English, for the benefit of the Count what I had already stated separately to Herr Erzberger in regard to my having come entirely upon my own responsibility. I went on to say that I had done this in the hope that I might clear up some misconceptions, which I was informed were held by the German Government, and which were interfering with the settlement of peace.
The first of these misconceptions was that the President was not himself in sympathy with the terms of the Peace Treaty. I stated that I had it on excellent authority that the President was in thorough agreement with, and prepared to back up, all the terms of the Treaty of Peace as regards Germany.
Second, it was reported that the American Army had mainly gone home, and that this was interpreted to mean that President Wilson would not make further use of American troops in Europe. Further, that even if it was the President’s desire to make such use, that the temper of the American people would not stand it. I gave a most emphatic denial on these points. Count Bernstorff attempted to parry the statement that American public opinion, represented by the press, was supporting the Peace Treaty. I replied that such a misconception was a further example of the German misinterpretation of foreign public opinion, as a result of grasping at a few stray opinions favorable to the German side, and supposing that those represented the body of public opinion. I stated further that it was well appreciated by our own Government, and equally well appreciated by every Allied Government, each of whom took great pains to keep informed of the state of the American public mind.
Third, that the German Government was misinformed over the attitude of the French Government in supposing that the French Government was prepared to compromise on the Peace. I stated that it was commonly believed in Paris that the French Government was quite indifferent as to whether Germany did or did not sign the Peace Treaty, as it expected to get a great deal more out of Germany if the Peace were not signed than it would if Peace were signed.
Fourth, that the French people were supposed by the Germans to be against the renewal of the war, and would view with anxiety a failure to make Peace. I replied to this that the answer to this question was to be found in the participation in subsequent events of the American Army,—that the French people trusted its Government not to do anything without the participation of America, and that they [Page 126] were prepared to go hand in hand anywhere in any project to settle the Peace of Europe through that co-operation.
Fifth, in the matter of the interpretation of the Treaty, that it was commonly agreed in Paris that the Treaty was interpreted too literally by the Germans, that after signature, and as it became apparent that Germany was doing her utmost to live up in good faith to the terms of the Treaty, that it would receive more and more a liberal interpretation favorable to Germany.
Sixth, that as regards to the Government of the Occupied Territory, measures already taken in the establishment of the new board on economic control, which I described in brief, indicated that the Government of this territory would not be such as would be found, either binding upon the people in the sense of a purely military government, or one which would isolate the people economically from the rest of Germany.
During the elucidation of the above points, Count Bernstorff maintained a running fire of comment and of protest making such statements as that under no circumstances would Germany sign the present Treaty, and that the Allies could do what they pleased. He appeared much agitated and several times on the point of having lost his temper. Mr. Erzberger on the contrary appeared calm and unmoved, glad to have the information, and seemingly glad to enjoy Count Bernstorff’s discomfiture.
The next morning, by appointment, Major Henrotin and myself a second time met Herr Erzberger alone. He began the conversation with the statement that it was perfectly patent to everyone that Germany must have Peace, and the German Government cordially and even anxiously desired Peace. But the German Government could not accept the present proposed terms, and therefore desired to meet the Allies and inform them of the difficulties in the German Government in meeting the demands of their people, in the hope that a compromise could be made which Germany could accept.
Herr Erzberger’s attitude during this statement seemed to indicate that he was making this proposal con gusto, and that he had had his way about it in making it in the Cabinet meeting which we were informed was held the preceding evening. The proposals he made were taken down in writing by Major Henrotin and are transmitted herewith.3
In addition to the above Herr Erzberger stated that he had sent a message to Lloyd George by a British Officer who had called on him two days ago. He also made reference to numerous conversations which he had had with French Officers, who were constantly protesting the friendliness of the French Government to Germany, which [Page 127] was said with an expressive shrug of the shoulders, indicating lack of credence on his part.
In this second conversation, which was held on Monday morning, I made no reply of any kind to the proposals, and no statements, but announced my intention of returning to Trèves at once, and that what he said would be duly reported to the proper authority.
Sunday afternoon I went, at his request, to call on Professor Hans Delbrück, who was leaving that evening for Versailles to act in an advisory capacity to the German Peace Delegation. He expressed great chagrin over the Peace terms. I stated that his views were of great interest to the American authorities, and asked him if he cared to be quoted on the subject. He replied, “Yes, you may say that I shall advise the German Government not to sign the Peace terms as they now stand, as being dishonorable for Germany. If Germany is to die politically, it is better for her to perish honorably than by agreeing to a dishonorable Peace. I shall therefore recommend that the Government say to the Allies: ‘We will not fight you; do what you please. Come in if you wish and take over the German Government, and we will give orders to all our subordinate officials to obey your orders implicitly and explicitly.’”
I did not see President Ebert or any other member of the Government except those named, but I was told by an agent who related to President Ebert what had transpired in the afternoon conference, with Bernstorff and Erzberger, that when Ebert was informed of the repeated assurances which had been given by Bernstorff and Erzberger that under no circumstances would Germany offer any active resistance to an Allied advance: “I am not so sure about that; I am not so sure that we won’t fight when the time comes.” This remark appeared not to have been given with the intention of being repeated to Major Henrotin and myself. The significance of it to me was brought out by the thousands and thousands of Officers and soldiers seen on the streets in Berlin and throughout the parts of Germany visited as far west as Cassel. Officers were everywhere in new gray uniforms with shining shoulder straps. Nowhere was the officer’s insignia, blue band on the arms, adopted only a few months ago, in evidence. The new uniforms of the officers and of the majority of the soldiers were in striking contrast to the war-worn, threadbare uniforms seen on the occasion of a former visit to Berlin in March. Officers, and many of the soldiers, wore sidearms, and nearly all of the soldiers seen were wearing at least belts, which was not the case two months ago. In Berlin many military bands were seen marching about the streets followed by small crowds. This indicates to my mind that the sentiment being spread and stirred up in Berlin over the Peace Treaty is being inspired by the Government, which is striving [Page 128] to unite the people. In Brandenburg a regiment of Lancers was seen by us on Monday afternoon parading through the streets, newly equipped, for field service, escorted by a throng of men, women, and children, who filled the entire street so that our automobile had to get into a side street to get out of the way.
The temper of the people of Berlin, civilian as well as military, has changed entirely since two months ago. The people seem livelier, energetic, well fed, differing in opinions, as Germans always do, but united in a common patriotic purpose.
I am prepared from what I have seen to state positively that there are some people in Germany that are getting together an army ready to fight. The Government may be in it or not. Of those I think the Minister of War, Noske, must be in it. The General Staff may be in it, or not. Personally I do not think that Gen. Groener, or Hindenburg or the other leaders of the General Staff are in it. It may be that the military clique, reported to have been organized by Gen. Ludendorff, is running it. There are no evidences of this in the zone passed through by us west of Cassel. Whether other parts of Germany, besides Prussia, Hannover, etc., are the same or not, I cannot say, but after what I have seen I would not be surprised at the reappearance of the Kaiser in Germany, and his calling of the German Army into the field which would result in a wave of loyalty toward the Kaiser, such as has not been seen in Germany since 1914, of loyalty to Germany’s former leaders and enthusiasm for a war of self-defense. This enthusiasm, it must be stated in all frankness, is based on the German Government’s propaganda, or other propaganda, to the effect that Germany has been tricked in the armistice proceedings, that the Peace Treaty now offered is not in accordance with the terms of the armistice or with the 14 points of President Wilson.
Memorandum by Major Frederick Henrotin
Advance General Headquarters.
Trier, 20 May, 1919.
Impressions in Germany
I. Political:
The impression was clearly given that the leading spirits in Germany are now completely split into two parties: those for signing the peace if certain amendments can be obtained, and those who are opposed to signing at all. The latter party has, of course, the backing of the [Page 129] old military and autocratic regime, whose influence has increased very considerably during the last month. The various government officials, are, of course, backing the old party.
Evidently an organized propaganda has been at work for sometime past to stir up the people against signing the peace treaty and this was started even before the conditions were published. In Berlin itself numerous manifestations may be met against the signing of the peace treaty. One party of agitators was headed by a brass band in military uniform.
It is noticeable that the activities of the military caste are directed against the signing of the peace terms, and it is apparent that their men are being used for the same purpose.
With regard to the two parties, for and against signing the peace, from attached interviews it is clearly seen that Erzberger is on one side and Von Bernstorff on the other.
As to President Ebert: his opinion is likely to be swayed by whichever party wins the day. When asked regarding the peace terms, however, he made the following verbatim statement:
“That America should not expect that Germany, in view of the eventual consequences of peace as now constituted, will accept, that it must be evident to America that it will not only have to occupy but also govern Germany.”
II. Morale of the civilian population:
A distinct change is noticed in the attitude of the population of Berlin. Where before they were apathetic, they now appear brisker and more alert, and are evidently regaining their spirit, which the old party is endeavoring to foster as a weapon to use against the signing of the peace treaty.
III. Military:
A very distinct change is seen in the attitude of the military. The men are clad in new uniforms, have a soldierly appearance, and evidently take a pride in their duties. They have gotten back considerable of their military bearing. The officers are wearing their shoulder straps openly, and a very large number are seen in the streets of Berlin in uniform.
When passing through Brandenburg the writer had occasion to meet a regiment of the Brandenburg hussars, marching through the town with a mounted band at the head of the column. The men were all clad in new uniforms, the saddle equipment was all new, and the column presented a very business-like appearance. The men had their harness and equipment decked with flowers, and large crowds were gathered in the streets to witness the procession.
[Page 130]A reliable opinion from Berlin states that if Peace is signed the military will arrange an uprising in about six weeks’ time. If it is not signed, the present Government will resign, the Independents take over the Government, and sign the Treaty without any thought of executing it, and then in about two weeks’ time the whole country will be in an uproar, when it is probable that the military will again take possession of the people.
Minister Noske seems to have thrown his lot in with the Military party. It appears certain that in the case of the non-signing of Peace, all the troops which are now being thrown towards the Polish frontier will be immediately used to attack the Poles; that the notion has been carefully fostered in the eastern provinces that the German civil population has been armed, and that very strong anti-Polish propaganda has been let loose, not only amongst the civil population, but also amongst the troops.
Memorandum by Colonel A. L. Conger
Advance General Headquarters.
Trier, 20 May, 1919.
In conversation with Major Kroeger, of the German General Staff, purporting to be spokesman for General Gruner, Chief of the German General Staff at Kolberg, he stated that he had been instructed to speak only on the question of military terms, in connection with which he stated that the immediate demobilization of the German forces, and, incidentally handing over all material, could constitute a very serious financial loss to the German government, running into billions of marks; moreover, that 100,000 men would not be sufficient during the present emergency to cope with the interior political situation. He thought, however, that if the Allies would agree to the gradual demobilization of the German Army, the figures given later could be reduced. He stated that in a recent count made between the German General Staff, the War Minister Rheinhardt, and the Reichsminister Noske and other members interested, the figures varied between 200,-000 fighting troops, outside of non-combatant units, and 300,000 troops of all descriptions. They acknowledge that if the peril in the East disappeared part of these forces could certainly be demobilized.
To enforce his statements, Major Kroeger added that 40,000 troops were required to restore order in Munich and 60,000 to preserve order in Berlin alone. With regard to the present situation he frankly admitted that resistance in the West was impossible; that on the eastern [Page 131] front the figures were unchanged; that troops were moving from the Baltic front to the Polish front, but that this move would take two months; that the troops were being moved to the Polish front on account of the trouble with the civilian population; moreover, General Gruner had sent special orders to Upper Silesia to avoid any hostile act against the Poles, but that he was unable to guarantee the troops or the militia. He stated, in conclusion, that the opinion of the German General Staff was that Germany, as long as she remained a nation, should have an army sufficient to defend her frontiers; that 100,000 men would only be sufficient as a gendarmerie.
Major Kroeger was unwilling to discuss the peace terms, but stated, as a matter of principle, in which General Gruner was agreed, that the German government and German people were unwilling to sign a treaty of peace which they would not be able to fulfill.
Memorandum by Major Frederick Henrotin
Advance General Headquarters.
Trier, 20 May, 1919.
Interview With Herr Erzberger
At ten o’clock on the morning of the 19th instant a second interview was had with Herr Erzberger. He stated that he wished to lay down all his cards on the table; and that it was necessary for Germany that the Peace be signed; and that he believed a conversation would clear up matters. In the meantime, he begged that the following proposals be sent through:
- Firstly, the League of Nations: Erzberger insisted upon the entry of Germany into the League of Nations immediately upon the signature of the Peace Treaty, and upon her admission on a basis of equality with the other Powers. The Statutes of the League of Nations would be accepted as proposed, with the exception of some of the clauses bearing on economic inequality.
- Secondly, military questions: Following the signature of the Treaty of Peace, disarmament will take place and conscription will be abolished, but he stated that the number of 100,000 men was insufficient to preserve order in Germany under present circumstances, and that they should need a force of 350,000 men under arms for the first year, and 200,000 the second year, and then the army could be reduced. Some changes would have to be made in the tables of organization to fit in with their normal tables. Mr. Erzberger stated that [Page 132] Germany would be willing to give up all her battleships. He stated that the military terms would not constitute an obstacle to signing the Treaty.
- Thirdly, The Merchant Ships: Germany would need to retain a portion of her merchant fleet, in order to resume the economic life of Germany, and to meet her economic obligations. He suggested that a World Pool of shipping might be organized under the League of Nations, and also that negotiations be opened for turning over shares in the Hamburg-America and the North Deutscher Lloyd to British and American capital (which was formerly impossible under German law).
- Fourth, Territorial Questions: Erzberger would require a plebiscite to be taken in all territory proposed for surrendering to the Allies, with the exception of Rupen and Malmedy, and that the Plebiscite should be taken by a secret vote under the control of a neutral committee, Dutch, Swedes, etc. This is to include territory already in the hands of the Poles. All troops should be withdrawn from the disputed sections and the boundaries would then be fixed by the League of Nations, as nearly as possible in conformity with the results of the vote taken.
As a counter proposal to the Saar settlement, Erzberger suggests an arrangement whereby France would be assured of 20,000,000 tons of coal per annum, and France would be offered a partnership in all German mines, so that they could be certain of obtaining its delivery. Every possible international guaranty would be given them.
Occupied Territory: Erzberger states that the nation wishes the occupation of German territory to be abandoned within the next six months. Mr. Erzberger frankly stated that he fears that the occupation of this territory will interfere with the economic life of the districts. He pointed out that the money necessary for the disbursement of the expenses of maintaining the allied armies was so much money lost that could otherwise be paid to the Allies, and that occupation was not necessary in order to hold Germany down, for that could be effectually done through the industrial and economic means at the disposal of the Allies, such as control of imports, etc. Germany could offer other guaranties, such as receipts of railroads, public forests, and lands, customs’ duties, internal revenues, etc., and that moreover, on the strength of these guaranties, the League of Nations should issue a loan to Germany. From a military point of view, he stated that no military forces would be maintained within a distance of 50 kilometers of the East Bank of the Rhine. All fortifications would be razed, so that the Allies would have sufficient guaranties. He mentioned, in this connection, that it would be necessary for Germany to maintain her gendarmerie forces in order to preserve order in this territory.
[Page 133]Colonies: Minister Erzberger wishes that Germany be made mandatory for her colonies, or part of same, in order to satisfy public opinion in Germany, so that her people would think that she was a nation possessing colonies.
Finance: Erzberger stated with regard to indemnities, that he was agreed to Article 244, part 1, of the Armistice agreement [draft treaty of peace?], with the exception of paragraph 4 relating to pensions, and paragraph 5, cost of prisoners, as he stated that this should be mutual, paragraph 6, the payment of allocations to soldiers’ wives, and paragraph 7, indemnities resulting from ill-treatment of prisoners. Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 9 and 10 will be paid.
Germany, however, Mr. Erzberger stated, could not pay the debts of other European nations, such as Bulgaria, Turkey, etc. He stated that all property handed over, according to the terms of the treaty, such as public buildings, colonies, railroads, manufactured products, etc., should be included in the indemnities.
In regard to the judgment of the Kaiser, and the fixing of responsibility for the war, or for acts of cruelty in its prosecution, Erzberger stated that from a constitutional point of view, Germany could not extradite a German subject. It would be a “gemeinheit” on the part of the German Government to give up the Kaiser. He stated that he was agreed that all responsible parties should be punished, and that he understood that the Allies could not accept that they should come before German courts. He suggested that a neutral tribunal should be instituted at the Hague, or elsewhere, and that the accused should appear before this court with the allies acting as plaintiffs. He stated that the German people could not conceive of justice being done in the case where the accused would be tried before a court where the Allies were both plaintiffs and judges, and that fairness could not be looked for under these circumstances.
Speaking of Reparations, he stated that Germany was in a position to rebuild France and Belgium, and that two months after the peace treaty was signed, 100,000 workingmen could be sent for that purpose and that six months later, 500,000 men could be devoted to this work, and that in two and a half years all would be restored. The work would be modern and sanitary. Germany, he stated, had plenty of building material. The plans could be drawn up by the French and the work controlled by them. He stated further that this would be of assistance to Germany, as it would enable her to put all men out of work to this employment. He stated further that for the practical working of the scheme a permanent commission should be set up, parallel to the Allied Commission, and along the lines of the present Armistice Commission. Any disagreement arising could be submitted to the League of Nations for settlement; and in dealing with a [Page 134] permanent commission the Allies would obviate the difficulties of dealing with the German Government.
Mr. Erzberger stated that Germany wishes freedom within the interior of the country, and therefore desires that there be no commission working in Germany.
In regard to the turning over of manufactured articles, he stated that in such cases as dyestuffs, ammonia, etc., there would be no difficulty arising, and in spite of the outcry raised in the German press against the demand for the milch cows, this could be done, as Germany could take oils, oilcakes, etc., in exchange, and that in this way the production of milk in Germany would increase far beyond the loss of 160,000 cows.
Mr. Erzberger stated that they would sign the Treaty, and that he wished it to be signed, and to be observed sincerely. However, he could not sign a Treaty which departed too far from the 14 points of President Wilson. He stated further that he could have the Treaty accepted in Germany, although he let it be understood that it would require a certain amount of camouflage to put it over, but promised he could do it.
Memorandum by Major Frederick Henrotin
Advance General Headquarters.
Trier, 20 May, 1919.
On May 18th, 1919, at 1:00 P.M., an interview was had with Herr Erzberger and Count von Bernstorff. The latter spoke the whole time, Mr. Erzberger only listening and not interfering with the conversation, which was carried on in English, it being noticed that the Count omitted to translate his remarks or any replies made to his questions, to Mr. Erzberger. He was evidently determined to make the interview a personal one and to ignore Mr. Erzberger. The Count stated flatly that the Germans would not sign the peace treaty; that it was their intention to refuse to sign, and to invite the Allies to come in and take over the government of Germany.
When informed what the consequences would be of not signing, he stated there was no reason for the American troops to return to Europe as Germany would offer no resistance. He was given plainly to understand, however, that the troops would return, and that the consequences would be exceedingly serious for Germany, and probably result in the destruction of the nation.
Count von Bernstorff would not raise any specific objections to any points in the Treaty, with the exception of requesting that a [Page 135] plebiscite should be held in West Prussia, Upper Silesia, and the Saar district, and that Germany should be given admission to the League. Apparently, from his attitude, he disapproved of the Treaty on general principles, and formed part of those who were determined not to sign. His attitude is perhaps explicable by the fact that since his re-entry in political activities his main object in life has been to persuade the German people and the German government that President Wilson would give them a treaty which would be in accord with their dearest wishes. It is also not to be forgotten that he is a member of the old regime, and in this connection will probably take the same attitude towards the peace terms as the other members of his party.
Memorandum by Major Frederick Henrotin
Advance General Headquarters.
Trier, May 20, 1919.
Impressions of Interviews With Herr Erzberger
A very distinct change was noted in the attitude of Herr Erzberger as between the first and second interviews. In the first he appeared to be imbued with the spirit of most of the officials in Berlin, that “the peace terms were impossible; Germany could not sign, and the Allies could come in and take over the country.” Apparently the German Government does not realize the consequences of not signing the Treaty, more especially in so far as America is concerned, their apparent impression being that the Allies would merely occupy Germany in a peaceful, unassuming manner, as they have done with the Rhinelands, and assume the obligations of feeding the civilian population. This impression was evidently dissipated to a great extent by the straight-forward statement made by us, so that in the second interview, which was preceded by a meeting of the Government, a far more conciliatory attitude was adopted, and the definite statement was made by Herr Erzberger that it was necessary for Germany to sign Peace, and some concessions must be made by the Allies to mitigate the severity of the Terms, and to camouflage them in the eyes of the German people. It is probable that the tone of the German press during the next few days will show their new spirit—in fact, already on Monday morning the Welt am Montag published a conciliatory article by Von Gerlach, embodying the statement made by Herr Erzberger concerning the milk cows.