Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XII

Paris Peace Conf. 184.013102/46

Mr. E. L. Dresel to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berlin, May 3, 1919.
[Received May 5.]

Sirs: I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum in triplicate on Impressions of the General Political Situation in Germany gained from Perusal of the German Press and Conversations in non-official Bourgeois Circles.

I have [etc.]

Ellis Loring Dresel

[Enclosure]

Impressions of the General Political Situation in Germany Gained From Perusal of the German Press and Conversations in non-Official Bourgeois Circles

1. From present surface indications the German Government will not sign the peace treaty if its terms are deemed in conflict with President Wilson’s principles as interpreted by official Germany. If the utterances of German statesmen and many leading publicists are taken at their face value it is probable that Germany will not sign the peace treaty. The recent speech of the Prussian Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Heine, a Majority Socialist, would indicate that the cession of Alsace Lorraine without a plebiscite, the admission of Germany’s responsibility for the war, the retention of the German prisoners on any pretext, a servitude of the Saar Basin and the cession of Danzig are considered inacceptable by the German Government. At the same time the present German Government evinces no disposition to assume the responsibility for rejecting the peace treaty. The National Assembly will be consulted before the final decision is taken, and it has already formed a special committee to study the peace treaty. There does not seem to be much doubt that the National Assembly would reject the peace treaty if asked to do so by the Government. The Special Committee numbers among its members men like Traub, Stresemann and Trimborn who may be fully expected to make it very difficult for the Government to urge the signing of the treaty. On the other hand, a recent article in the Vorwärts indicates that the Government will sign peace, but hopes not to be forced to sign dishonest peace. In determining the attitude of the Government it is necessary to consider that it deems it expedient to defer to a certain extent to the feelings of the German “patriots”. It therefore seems probable that the somewhat uncompromising utterances of government officials and publicists need not be taken too seriously, and that the Government will sign in the end, especially if it can save its “face” by being able to point to actual negotiation at Versailles.

The idea of submitting the issue to the German people by holding a plebiscite was first suggested by the Democratic leader Richthofen and Secretary Erzberger⁹ and now seems to be entertained by the Government. The opposition to a plebiscite is, however, very strong, especially from the quarter of the Conservatives and Radical Socialists, both of whom do not propose to permit the Government to evade its responsibility. This opposition has now extended to the ranks of the Democratic Party. One of the leading Democratic publicists, H. von Gerlach, points out that a plebiscite at this time would be preposterous on account of the ignorance of the masses of the people regarding the real issues, which is due principally to the misleading press campaign apparently inspired by the Government. Herr Haase, the Independent Socialist leader, expressed himself strongly in a recent speech against a plebiscite. If a plebiscite were actually held the chances are that the result would be in favor of rejecting the peace treaty. In any event it would give rise to most intensive agitation by the Nationalists and Independent Socialists and add new fuel to the fires of internal political controversy.

The agitation against signing the peace is believed by many to be insincere. In particular, the articles in the Majority Socialist press do not seem to reflect the true sentiment in the party. The provincial papers of the Majority Socialists follow the lead of the Berlin Vorwaerts in this respect. A plausible explanation of the press agitation against peace is that the Government conceived the measure in the beginning as a bluff which could be abandoned when found necessary, but committed itself too far and permitted the movement to get beyond its control. The extraordinary vicious campaign of the Berliner Tageblatt against signing peace is probably instigated by the Government. It is now being paralleled by the usual series of “impressive” protest meetings held in the large cities and towns. The practical arguments against refusing to sign peace are, however, so overwhelming that it is difficult to believe that the Government will in the end shut its eyes to them, unless it is convinced that its days are numbered, come what may, and that it is preferable to go down in a blaze of patriotic glory than to be compelled to abdicate in a humiliated Germany.

The population of the industrial districts of Germany is the only stratum of the German population of which it can safely be said that it favors acceptance of the peace terms. The Independent Socialist Party will favor the signing of the treaty, and the same holds true of the greater part of the Majority Socialists. The sentiment of the bourgeoisie is on the whole against signing, depending as it does in large measure on the dicta of its party leaders and press. Financial circles are divided but will probably in the end favor signing peace if no early tangible advantage from rejection is apparent. The volunteer army and the peasants will reject peace that does not come up to nationalist requirements.

It is possible that an attempt will be made to organize a great popular uprising in the event that the peace terms are considered impossible of acceptance. The whole attitude of the present Government and the bourgeoisie points to this, and the idea would be most welcome to the reactionary element. Any such attempt would be answered with a general strike with consequences which it is impossible to conjecture. The truculent enthusiasm artificially engendered by the nationalist agitators would be short lived. The futility of armed resistance to the Allies is too apparent and an outburst of bellicose enthusiasm would soon give way to an attitude of sullen passive resistance.

The belief that the influence of labor and radical opinion in France and England would make impossible further military action against Germany is not shared by wide circles outside the reactionary group represented by Westarp and Reventlow. German radical opinion inclines strongly to the view that kindred opinion in Allied countries will eventually rectify any wrongs worked by the peace treaty.

The present Government rests on the support of the greater part of the Majority Socialist Party, the Democratic Party and the Center Party. The support of the last named is not unqualified. This coalition represents on paper the majority of the German people but the dissatisfaction with its administration is widespread, and even its parliamentary majority does not inspire great confidence. The Center Party can determine the fate of the present Government.

The strongest opposition to the present Government comes from the radical parties, the Independent Socialists and Communists, who have made great inroads on the Majority Socialist Party. The other element of opposition is the natural obstruction of “the Conservatives and National Liberals, whose numbers are far less imposing than those of the supporters of the Government.

The present Government might be replaced by a purely Socialistic government to the exclusion of the bourgeoisie and the Communists. Such a government has been repeatedly suggested even by bourgeois circles, but the wide division between the Majority and Independent Socialists is the great obstacle to its establishment. It does not seem possible for a union to be effected unless the present Majority Socialist leaders, Scheidemann, Landsberg, Noske and Heine resign. It is continually being pointed out by Independent Socialists like Breitscheid, and Democrats like von Gerlach, that the only salvation for Germany lies in the uniting of the working classes. Whether this will be recognized by the present Majority Socialist leaders is now the question.

The present Government is divided within itself, as shown by the recent resignation of the Democratic Secretary of State for Finance, Herr Schiffer, owing to differences with Scheidemann. The opposition to Scheidemann is very strong but is kept below the surface. The Majority Socialist members of the Government are subjected to continual criticism for concerning themselves principally with the interests of their political party, and not the welfare of the whole country. The friction between Erzberger and Brockdorff-Rantzau is an open secret. Erzberger is said to plan to make the Democrat Richthof en Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The strength of the present German military units is variously estimated at from 600,000 to 850,000 men. The cadres are considered reliable: the officers and sergeant majors are carefully picked men. The troops consist mostly of young men from 17 to 25, usually boys from the country who have been attracted by the high pay promised. The soldiers’ councils have been reduced to practical insignificance among these troops, but no full reliance seems to be placed in the men by the officers, and it is certain that despite all precautions there is a considerable sprinkling of radical elements among the men of these new elite troops. The conspicuous advertisements for volunteers still appear in the papers and on the billboards.

It is generally admitted that the trend of the working classes is towards radicalism. The results of the recent municipal elections confirm this. The most noticeable effect of this movement is seen in the Majority Socialist Party, the left wing of which has gained increased influence recently. The Communists have gained some ground but it is believed that their prospects depend in a large measure on the outcome of the Munich uprising.

From all quarters come complaints of the utter demoralization of the German people, and there are abundant indications of this demoralization in the alarming frequency of robbery, theft and crime in general, the widespread callousness, the indifference to illicit traffic in commodities, the unheard of epidemic of gambling. There are two methods proposed to improve the morale of the people: that of the reactionaries who seek to arouse nationalistic feeling with a view to gradual reversion to the ideals of old Germany, the primordial interests of the State, absolute loyalty and discipline under a stern authority; and that of the radical reformists who recognize the necessity of breaking once for all with old Germany and educating the people to believe in broader and purer ideals. It is fairly obvious that the reactionaries have an easier task than the reformists. The latter fully appreciate how gigantic the task is that they have set before them. First of all the people must be thoroughly enlightened, a great task in itself, and then they must be taught to shape their own new enlightened ideals. Many reformists despair of success unless aid is rendered by foreign countries; the necessary “spiritual depediculation [sic]” of Germany must receive a stimulus from without. The tendency towards relapse is too strong in Germany today. The Government itself does nothing to enlighten the people; a crusade from abroad is indispensable. The desire to emigrate is very marked among younger military circles and it is certain that much German capital has been smuggled to neutral countries in contemplation of subsequent emigration.

A reactionary counter-revolution is greatly feared by the parties of the extreme Left who view with increasing apprehension the Government’s apparent desire to cater to the bourgeois parties. The danger of a reactionary uprising actually seems much nearer today than the danger of a new Spartacus revolt, but the one would provoke the other. The militarists of the old regime are actively engaged in the endeavor to organize an efficient new Army as free as possible from the “taint” of social democracy. The present Government is practically leaving the militarists a free hand, trusting fully in their assurances of loyalty. The Independent Socialists and Communists are, however, extremely vigilant and may be depended upon at least to sense the coming of a royal uprising. In any event it seems that the militarists are willing to bide their time: they are confident that a favorable opportunity to regain the power will present itself sooner or later.

Of deeper and more sinister significance is the elaborate campaign of the reactionaries to win over the youth of Germany to the old militaristic ideals. The activity of the German National Juvenile League is very intensive and the German radical reformers state that they have no adequate means of coping with it. The juvenile organisations of the Social Democratic Party are efficient as party organizations, but there is no concerted effort on the part of democratic Germany to meet the great danger of the poisoning of the youth of Germany. The German National Juvenile League is stated to have unlimited funds at its disposal, which are furnished by industrial circles, and is having great success with its program, which offers many attractions to the youth in the way of sports and entertainment. The counter movement of the German reformists has insignificant financial support and is forced to confine itself to an enlightenment campaign on a limited scale. The reformists are confident, however, that they can ultimately win over young Germany to democratic ideals, but at present the battle for the German youth is an unequal one.

The monarchical sentiment no longer predominates in Germany. It is confined to the Conservative, National Liberal and Center parties, on the whole, while finding some few supporters in the ranks of the Democratic Party. The feeling against the Hohenzollerns is very strong among the common people, who would never tolerate their return, but there seems to be a growing movement elsewhere to rehabilitate the Hohenzollerns in public esteem. One hears much praise nowadays of the great benefits which Germany enjoyed under the Hohenzollern rule, and the free circulation of pamphlets explaining the conduct of the Crown Prince indicates a sort of campaign to exonerate him. On the other hand the Berlin municipal government recently voted to remove all pictures of the Hohenzollerns from the public school buildings.

The food shipments which are now reaching Germany undoubtedly have a stabilizing tendency, but more because of the improvement of alimentation which they seem to promise than because of any appreciable effect which the shipments have had themselves. The continued supply of food at reasonable prices would in time reduce the present large proportions of illicit trade and smuggling and tend to improve the morale of the people.

The idea of constitutional establishment of the Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Councils meets with favor among the Independent Socialists and Communists and in the left wing of the Majority Socialists. It even seems attractive to many Democrats, but it is a question whether it would receive the support of the majority of the German people. The Government seems desirous of postponing any decision on this issue as long as possible and the impression is gained that the idea of a Räte Chamber has lost some impetus during the past few weeks. It seems likely that a compromise on the basis adopted by the recent Soviet Congress will ultimately be reached.

May 2, 1919.

9. Matthias Erzberger, German Secretary of State without portfolio.